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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“…[W]hile we breathe, we hope, and where we are met with cynicism and 
doubt, and those who tell us that we can't, we will respond with that timeless 
creed that sums up the spirit of a people: YES, WE CAN.”  
        BARACK OBAMA 
       The 44th US President1 
 
 
Inspired by Barack Obama’s historic election as the 44-th President of the United 
States, I wanted to use as an epigraph to my dissertation an excerpt from his victory 
speech, the gist of which was belief in CHANGE. His victory has demonstrated that 
everything is possible, if you go for it wholeheartedly and work hard to achieve what 
you want. When Martin Luther King was delivering his inspirational "I have a dream" 
speech at Washington's Lincoln Memorial in 1963, he was speaking of his dreams for 
the US - dreams to live in a world free of racism, where his children “will not be 
judged by the color of their skin but by their character."2 When Thomas Mundy 
Peterson3 voted in 1870, he thought that the world had changed, since no Afro-
American had ever done it before. Barack Obama’s victory can be considered not 
only as another huge step forward in realization of an American Dream, but also as a 
symbol of change in general.  
 
Indeed, the world is changing. However, sometimes these changes can emerge in the 
form of a new look at the old things. For example, corruption is not a new 
phenomenon. It has been in place as long as there has been a willingness to accept 
different kinds of favors in exchange of conducting private affairs, business or 
carrying out government policy in the interests of certain individuals. The first 
documented cases of bribery date back to the year 3000 B.C.4 Two thousand years 
                                                 
1 The first Afro-American President in the history of the US elected on 4 November 2008. 
2  King Jr. M.L., I have a Dream, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm 
(accessed 5 November 2008). 
3 The first Afro-American to vote in an election under the 15th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution ratified on 3 February 1870, which prohibited the states and the federal government 
prevent a citizen from voting based on race, color, or previous status as a slave. 
4Arnáiz, T.M. (2008): The Exclusion of Tenderers in Public Procurement as an Anti-Corruption Mean, 
1, http://www.nispa.sk/_portal/files/conferences/2008/papers/200804200047500.Medina_exclusion.pdf 
(accessed 8 February 2009).  
 10 
 
ago, Kautilya, the prime minister of an Indian kingdom, wrote a book “Arthashastra” 
discussing bribery issues. Seven centuries ago, Dante placed bribers at the bottom of 
Hell, demonstrating thereby the negative attitude to corrupt behavior.5 
 
Nevertheless, until early 1990s, the problem of corruption was barely addressed either 
at national or international level, although everyone knew about its existence. The 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)6 had no incentive even to speak or write the 
word “corruption” regarding their own loans. No matter how much was stolen, they 
were confident that they would not have to “shoulder any financial burdens”.7 
Institutions like the World Bank (WB)8 had a global “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy 
regarding corruption9 which was even a taboo subject there for a long time and used 
to be referred to discretely as the “c-word”.10  
 
Since the speech of James Wolfensohn, the then President of the WB, at 1996 annual 
meeting of the Boards of Governors of the WB and the IMF11, stressing out the need 
for the international development community to deal with the “cancer of corruption”, 
all that has changed dramatically - the taboo has been broken, the MDBs have started 
bringing to light the problem of corruption in the projects they fund and the fight 
against corruption has become global. Significant changes occurred in attitudes and 
understandings among international and regional development assistance 
organizations. 
 
                                                 
5 Tanzi, V. (1998): Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures, IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol.45, No.4, 559-560.  
6 The term “MDB” refers to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
7 Winters J.A. (2004): Combating Corruption in the Multilateral Development Banks, 1, 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/WintersTestimony040513.pdf (accessed 7 November 2008).   
8 The World Bank Group is a term covering five institutions - the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Agency (IDA), the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In this dissertation, the term 
“World Bank” will refer only to IBRD and IDA, since procurement procedures for both institutions are 
the same.  
9 Winters, supra note 7, at 2.   
10 Tung, K.-Y. (2002): The World Bank’s Institutional Framework for Combating Fraud and 
Corruption, 1.   
11 Wolfensohn J.D. (1996): Annual Meetings Address, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ 
EXTPRESIDENT2007/EXTPASTPRESIDENTS/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20025269~m
enuPK:232083~pagePK:159837~piPK:159808~theSitePK:227585,00.html (accessed 7 November 2008).  
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As a result, new anti-corruption policies have been formed to reduce levels of 
corruption addressing more carefully issues of selection and supervision of projects. 
One of the mechanisms introduced was debarment, also referred to as “blacklisting”. 
Although these two terms are considered to be synonyms in connection with an anti-
corruption policy, the former is used more frequently. Personally, I also more incline 
to the term “debarment”, since there is a slight difference in their meaning. Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines blacklisting as “putting the name of (a person) on a list of 
those who are to be boycotted or punished.”12 The consequences might be different 
depending on the purpose of blacklisting although they always result in exclusion. As 
for debarment, it is defined as “the act of precluding someone from having or doing 
something; exclusion or hindrance.”13 In realm of public procurement, it consists of 
two stages. First, the companies or individuals, the activities of which are in 
contradiction with the valid rules, are identified and, subsequently, put on a blacklist. 
At this stage blacklisting does not necessarily require a physical list or relevant 
written records. Second, these blacklisted companies or individuals are prevented 
from engaging in future contracts permanently or for a certain period of time (that is, 
debarred). This means that all debarred parties should be first blacklisted, while not 
all blacklisted companies will be debarred.14 From this point of view, “blacklisting” 
has a broader meaning. However, since various sources have been used for the 
purpose of this research, both terms hereinafter should be considered as equal.  
 
As debarment is a relatively new mechanism, it is still a rather uninvestigated sphere. 
The initial research revealed that there was a limited amount of published material 
thereon, and, in particular, on debarment as a mechanism of preventing corruption 
applied by MDBs. Considering the importance of tackling corruption in the MDB-
funded projects and the growing use of debarment by them, I decided to focus my 
research on corruption in the MDB-funded projects, its consequences and importance 
of combating it; debarment as one of the mechanisms to fight it, its features and 
                                                 
12 Garner B.A. (Ed.-in-Chief) (8th ed. 2004):  Black’s Law Dictionary. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Transparency International, recommending minimum standards for public procurement, also used 
these two terms separately. See: Transparency International, Minimum Standards in Public Contracting 
[hereinafter, TI Minimum Standards] 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/public_contracting/tools_public_ contracting/ minimum 
_standards (accessed 5 December 2008).   
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requirements, conditions, criteria and the procedure of its usage, as well as its 
implementation by the MDBs. The research is based on the published literature, 
information available on the Internet and personal communication with MDB 
representatives at the time of writing this dissertation.  
  
The following dissertation is divided into ten Chapters.  
 
Chapter I explains the importance of tackling corruption in MDB-funded projects, 
illustrates its devastating consequences for development and gives a clear picture of 
the project cycle mapping out corruption risks at all its stages. Inclusion of this part is 
important due to necessity of having a good understanding of various techniques to 
misappropriate funds and disguise corrupt behavior throughout the project cycle. This 
helps to detect misdeeds when they occur and is a good illustration of practices which 
can serve as a ground for debarment. In the end, Chapter I suggests measures to be 
taken by MDBs to respond the challenge of corruption. 
 
Chapter II gives an overview of debarment as an anti-corruption tool, including its 
historical background, general features of the procedure, its objectives, impact and 
requirements to ensure a fair and effective outcome.  
 
Chapter III explains the common approach of the MDBs to tackle corruption and 
gives an overview of their preventive and remedial measures. 
 
Chapters IV-VIII constitute the core of this dissertation. They examine anti-corruption 
policies of each MDB and give the detailed description of their debarment 
proceedings followed by an example of the case which led to debarment. 
 
Chapter IX provides a synthesis and comparative analysis of the debarment 
procedures in all five MDBs.  
 
The final Chapter X summarizes critical remarks found in literature regarding flaws in 
debarment procedures coupled with the author’s comments thereto in light of the 
 13 
 
latest changes. It also illustrates the challenges MDBs are facing during implementing 
debarment, followed by concluding remarks.   
 
Annexes I-VII include a tabular synthesis of debarment procedures in the MDBs and 
respondents’ due process rights, as well as flowcharts illustrating the process of 
dealing with allegations of fraud or corruption in each MDB. 
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CHAPTER I. CORRUPTION IN MDB-FUNDED PROJECTS 
 
 
A. The Importance of Tackling Corruption in MDB-funded Projects 
It took much time and efforts to make the world society understand, that fraud and 
corruption are the greatest obstacles to development in all its dimensions. In a survey of 
more than 150 high-ranking public officials and key members of civil society from more 
than 60 developing countries, public sector corruption was rated as the most severe 
obstruction to development and growth in their countries.15 Corruption in developing 
countries is not simply a domestic problem, but often involves a variety of actors within 
and outside of developing countries.16 Efforts of international organizations to reduce 
poverty in poor countries by providing development funds are in vain until these funds 
are being stolen, making poor people “even poorer, by denying them their rightful share 
of economic resources or life-saving aid”17. Cases like the United Nations Oil–for-Food 
scandal prove the necessity of more actions to be taken by international organizations to 
protect their financial interests and safeguard taxpayer funds.18  
The Commission for Africa is convinced that “good governance is the key” to the 
economic growth of African states and its report of 2005 makes it clear, that unless 
there are positive changes in accountability and reducing corruption, other reforms 
and external support will have only “limited impact”.19 Similar statements were made 
by Barack Obama during his recent trip to Africa, pointing out that “development 
depends upon good governance” and “that is a responsibility that can only be met by 
Africans”.20 However, Kaufmann argues that Obama's message was implicitly 
                                                 
15 Gray, C.W., Kaufmann, D. (1998): Corruption and Development, Finance and Development, 7. 
16 Chanda, P. (2004): The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Efforts: Current Legal 
And Structural Obstacles And Uncertainties, 32 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 315. 
17 UNODC (2004): Global Action against Corruption: The Merida Papers, 1.  
18 For the details of the Oil-for-Food scandal see http://www.iic-offp.org/ (accessed 3 June 2009).  
19 Commission for Africa (2005): Report, 37, http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/ 
thereport/english/11-03-05_cr_report.pdf (accessed 23 July 2009). 
20 BBC News (2009): Obama speaks of hopes for Africa, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8145762.stm 
(accessed 26 July 2009). 
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addressed also to aid donors, which have a tendency, especially within last years, to 
conceal the situation about poor governance and corruption in African countries.21    
Since projects funded by MDBs are implemented by means of public procurement, a 
common example of corruption in these projects is when public officials award 
development project contracts to their friends, or accept bribes in exchange for 
contracts, which results in individual gain of these officials, and prevents 
development in much needed areas as the quality, and in some cases even presence, of 
a final product is lacking. “Funds desperately needed to combat poverty and disease 
and to build roads, hospitals and schools are spent instead on everything from palaces 
on the Riviera to the acres of shoes made of snakeskin, satin and ostrich”.22  
 
Each year the World Bank is spending several billions of dollars on loans, thereby 
exposing itself to significant operational risk for corruption and fraud. Northwestern 
University political economist Jeffrey A. Winters estimates, that since its founding, the 
World Bank lost about $100 billion of its loan funds intended for development to 
corruption, and if we add corruption of loan funds from other MDBs, the figure would 
almost double to $200 billion.23 
 
Winters refers to these stolen funds as a “criminal debt”. Most countries have a public 
debt that must be repaid to creditors by their citizens. Criminal debt refers to the share 
of total borrowed funds that has been stolen. Although the benefits from these 
resources were enjoyed privately, the fiscal burden of repaying this criminal debt is 
borne publicly.24 Winters argues, that the debt is criminal in two ways: first, it was a 
crime to let the funds meant for the development be stolen, and second, it is an 
injustice to make poor people, who are denied the full development impact that the 
project could have achieved, bear the heavy burden of repayment. Indeed, corruption 
can sometimes place the burden of repayment of loans on some of the poorest people 
                                                 
21 Kaufmann, D. (2009): Obama on Governance and Corruption in Africa: A message to aid donors as 
well?  http://thekaufmannpost.net/obama-on-governance-and-corruption-in-africa-a-message-to-aid-
donors-as-well/ (accessed 23 July 2009). 
22 New York Times Editorial (2009): Grand Larceny Africa, 16 June 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/opinion/17iht-edafrica.html?_r=1&hpw (accessed 26 July 2009). 
23 Winters, J.A. (2002): Criminal Debt, in: Pincus J.R., Winters, J. A. (Eds.), Reinventing the World Bank, 101. 
24 Ibid. at 107.  
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in the world, and if they have received just 70% of the loan funds from MDBs, they 
are nevertheless obliged to repay 100% of the loans they have never received plus 
interest.  
 
It is worth mentioning, that the percentage of aid funds lost due to corruption 
represent not bribe per se, but the inflated contracting costs and the loss of equipment 
and other inputs that result from tolerating bribery.25 The money paid as a bribe must 
come from some part of the project budget, which generally results in increased prices 
and decreased quality, and, consequently, less effective projects. When less-qualified 
bidders are awarded contracts through corrupt and fraudulent behavior, qualified 
bidders lose trust in government institutions and confidence in the system and stop 
bidding.  
 
But there is also the second side of the coin. Tina Søreide argues that the major reason 
for bribery in public procurement is probably because everyone believes that 
everyone else is involved in such kind of “business”.26 It must be frustrating to lose a 
contract because a competitor paid a bribe. Therefore, a lot of companies involved in 
the competition pay a bribe, even if they would be better without corruption. Rose-
Ackermann refers to this problem as a “prisoner’s dilemma”, where even if all bidders 
agree not to offer bribes, each of them doubts that the rest will adhere to this 
agreement and continue offering bribes.27 Søreide gives the following example to 
illustrate how this “chain” corruption can impact the economic environment:  
 
Imagine that a highway is to be built, and the cost of the project is estimated at 
the amount of $500 million. Ten companies take part in the tender. If five of 
them pay $500 000 each to win the contract, while the winner also pays 10% 
of the contract value, $50 million. The apparent effect is that $50.250.000 is 
wasted (at least if the money is brought out of the country). Besides, the bribe 
paid by the contractor most probably inflates the highway price, or makes the 
company skimp on the quality. The other four bribing companies also have to 
                                                 
25 Rose-Ackerman S. (1999): Corruption and Government; Causes, Consequences, and Reform, 179. 
26 Søreide, T. (2002): Corruption in Public Procurement: Causes, Consequences and Cures, 4. 
27 Rose-Ackerman, S. (2009): Can Anti-Corruption Policies Do Without Corporate Ethics? 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/22/corporate-ethics-bribery-bix-corruption09-
cx_sra_0122roseackerman.html+rose-ackerman+corruption+prisoner%27s+dilemma&cd=1&hl= 
de&ct=clnk&gl=at&client=firefox-a (accessed 16 October 2009).   
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regain their “sunk cost”, for instance by increasing prices on other products 
offered by the company, contributing to higher domestic inflation.28  
 
Eventually, the losers in this “high-level game” are ordinary people who are deprived 
of the possibility to enjoy the full development impact that the projects aiming at 
reducing poverty could have achieved.      
 
The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, which is the World Bank’s Charter, stipulate that “[t]he Bank shall 
make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the 
purposes for which the loan was granted”.29 This is an explicit statement requiring the 
Bank not to allow its funds to be corrupted, and laying responsibility on it to fulfill 
this requirement. Similar provisions are contained in Charters of other MDBs. 
 
Nevertheless, for years MDBs were doing nothing about thefts of the project funds 
and seemed to take care more of the outcome, rather than the process of the project 
implementation itself. For example, one senior official at the WB interviewed by 
Winters, claimed that, “[i]f you take the amount of 30 percent loss, it means 70 cents 
[on the dollar] got used for development after all. That’s a lot better than some places 
with only 10 cents on the dollar.”30  
 
Another WB task manager opposed the “glass is 70% full” perspective, arguing that 
“if they're busy stealing 30 percent, they're not paying any real attention to the other 
70, even assuming 30 percent is all they're taking. What you're really doing is really 
ruining the whole effectiveness of the investment itself.”31  
 
He gave the following example:  
 
“You cut corners and nobody cares. If you let out a contract for $2 million, 
and you get the few civil servants at the top sharing $600,000 or 30 percent, 
do they care if the contractor puts in concrete that is just sand and water? Do 
                                                 
28 Søreide, supra note 26, at 6. 
29 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 22 July 1944, 
Article III, Section 5(b) [hereinafter, IBRD Articles of Agreement]. 
30 Winters, supra note 23, at 111. 
31 Ibid., at 120. 
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they care if the contractor doesn't put reinforcing steel in the structures? They 
don't care. So when Bank people say we're at least getting 70 cents of good 
development on the dollar, no you don't…. and the end result is you get very 
little development.”32  
 
Talking about the value a country or the poor really gets from projects, where “you 
get only one dollar out of ten that goes to the poor”, he claimed that it is not really 
worth it, since nothing has been done to strengthen the economy for the long term. 
“You've only nourished a corrupt government that has no intention of providing 
services.”33  
 
Therefore, when the funds of international organizations are at stake either as loans or 
grants, these organizations for the sake of efficiency of investment and development 
assistance should have an interest in the effective use of their resources.   
 
Concurring with the idea that due to a lack of accountability from the government 
side, the development banks themselves should be held responsible, Daene C. 
McKinney sets forth the following accusations against them:34  
 
a) Provision of funds with no follow up on their use 
The MDBs are more concerned about “pushing money out the door” and meanwhile 
look the other way.35 In those rare cases when there is little supervision, evaluation 
procedures are result-oriented. 
 
b) Selection of large-scale projects in nations prone to corruption 
Countries with governments known to be opaque receive funding in the same manner 
as transparent ones. Rose-Ackerman is of the same opinion claiming, that kleptocratic 
states should not be helped to become more efficient at controlling and exploiting 
their own population, and the World Bank should not help autocrats collect taxes 
more efficiently.36 At the same time, Kaufmann in his special report argues that the 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. at 121. 
34 McKinney, C. (2005): Corruption in Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), 1, 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/ce397/Topics/Ethics/Ethics(2005).doc (accessed 10 February 2009). 
35 Bosshard, P., Stealing from the World Bank – an Eyewitness Account, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/4363/ (accessed 30 August 2009).   
36 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 179-180. 
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approach of the multilateral financial institutions has been changed lately and they 
would not fund now the governments with the “extreme misgovernance in financial 
aid”, as they would have done couple of decades ago – for example, they have lately 
refrained from providing funds to Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe.37       
 
c) Ignoring the possibility of corruption when drafting contracts  
As an illustration of this accusation can serve, for example, leaving out clauses that 
could possibly prevent bribery or other corrupt acts.   
 
d) Closing eyes to notifications of corruption 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project38 is an example of a development project for 
which very few outside institutions offered help in prosecuting corrupt corporations 
whereas poor countries are unable to do it without external aid. 
 
Besides, as argued by Low, because the MDBs often play a key role in major 
infrastructure projects, their posture can influence the course of key economic 
activities of governments and private parties around the world.39 In addition, their 
policies and practices may also influence the practices of private lenders participating 
in these projects.40  
 
Thus, it is clear from the above mentioned, that good governance is a key to the 
effectiveness of development assistance, and that the impact of international aid can 
only be witnessed in corruption-free environment.  
 
According to Kaufmann, compared to the mid-1990s, over the last decade the priority 
given to the governance in the aid effectiveness agenda has slowed down.41 While 
there are numerous projects and programs all over the world aimed at improvement of 
                                                 
37 Kaufmann D. (2009): Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, 26, in: 
World Bank, Development Outreach, 26-29, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/kaufmann-corrected.pdf (accessed 27 July 2009).  
38 For the details about Lesotho Highlands Water Project case see Chapter V, C (10) of this 
dissertation. 
39 Low, L.A. (1998): Transnational Corruption: New Rules for Old Temptations, New Players to 
Combat a Perennial Evil, American Society International Law Procurement, Vol.92, No.5, 151. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Kaufmann, supra note 37, at 27.  
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governance, they mostly avoid addressing complicated governance and corruption 
problems, which are of great importance for development.42    
 
Before going into details on how the MDBs tackle the problem of corruption in the 
projects they fund, I would like to give a general overview of corruption and public 
procurement phenomena and point out the most common ways of disguising 
corruption throughout public procurement process.   
 
B. Definition of Corruption 
 
According to Tanzi, etymology of the word “corruption” originates from the Latin 
verb “rumpere”, which means “to break”.43 Consequently, corruption occurs when 
something is broken. Being “a prism with many surfaces”, this “something” depends 
on which angle corruption is viewed from.44 It might be a moral, social, political or 
economic code of conduct as well as criminal, civil or administrative law. However, 
to have the whole picture and not to see only one side of the prism presenting 
corruption, for instance, as a criminal behavior, it is necessary to view it broader.45 
 
Although corruption has been defined in many different ways, there is no generally 
accepted definition which applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption. In 
most cases different observers would agree on whether a certain behavior constitutes 
corruption. Unfortunately, the behavior is often difficult to observe because acts of 
corruption do not typically take place in broad daylight.46  
 
Difficulties in working out a common definition for corruption are rooted in legal and 
political problems as well as different attitudes and customs in different cultures. 47 
For example, gift giving in many village traditions is not considered corruption since 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Tanzi, V. (1995): Corruption: Arm's Length Relationships and Markets, 168, in: Fiorentini G. and 
Peltzman S. (Eds.), The Economics of Organized Crime. 
44 Council of Europe (1996): Program of Action Against Corruption, 15,   
http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/greco/general/GMC96%20E95%20Actionprogr%20English.pdf (accessed 15 
February 2009). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Tanzi, supra note 5, at 564. 
47 Søreide, supra note 26, at 2. 
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the transaction is not made “under the table” - it is open and transparent; the scale is 
not life-changing; the benefits are usually shared with the community, and the public 
rights are not violated.48 In fact, corruption is not about “putting one’s fingers in the 
till but more about the abuse of power or improbability in the decision-making 
process”.49 
 
Because of the discrepancy in notions of corruption in different societies, during the 
negotiations of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)50 it was 
decided not to define corruption at all but to establish a wide range of acts constituting 
corruption. The Convention included not only basic forms of corruption such as 
bribery and the embezzlement of public funds, but also trading in influence, 
concealment, and laundering of the proceeds of corruption, as well as offences 
committed in support of corruption such as money-laundering and obstruction of 
justice.51  
 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,52 although 
focusing mainly on the fight against organized crime, includes few provisions 
regarding corruption. Article 8 of the Convention gives the following definitions of 
corruption: 
 
• The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, 
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another 
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the 
exercise of his or her official duties. 
 
• The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, 
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another 
                                                 
48 World Bank, “Youth for Good Governance” distance learning programme, Module III, Introduction to 
Corruption, 5, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35970/mod03.pdf (accessed 5 June 2009).   
49 Ibid.  
50 The text of UNCAC is available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html 
(accessed 5 January 2009). Signed in 2003, UNCAC entered into force on 14 December 2005 after 
having been ratified by 30 signatories. 
51 UNCAC, Chapter III, Art.15-25. 
52 Adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, entered into force 
on 25 December 2003.  
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person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the 
exercise of his or her official duties. 
 
Among other multilateral instruments to prevent and combat corruption, only the 
Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union (the EU 
Convention), adopted by the Council of the European Union on 26 May 1997, and the 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on 4 November 1999, contain general definition of corruption. The 
EU Convention defines corruption as follows:   
 
• Passive corruption: the deliberate action of an official, who, directly or 
through an intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind 
whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such 
an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or 
in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties.53  
 
• Active corruption: the deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, 
directly or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever 
to an official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain from 
acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in 
breach of his official duties.54 
 
Under the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, "corruption" means requesting, 
offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue 
advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or 
behavior required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect 
thereof.55 
 
                                                 
53 Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or 
Officials of Member States of the European Union, Art.2. 
54 Ibid., Art.3. 
55 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Art.3. The Convention entered into force on 1 November 2003. 
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The Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention 
on Corruption, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption only define different acts of corruption. 
 
The most popular and simple, and at the same time, the most appropriate for the 
purpose of this dissertation definition of corruption is that of the World Bank. It 
indentifies corruption as the “abuse of power for private benefit”.56 Obviously, this 
definition implies public corruption which involves a government official benefiting 
at the expense of the taxpayer or at the expense of an ordinary person who comes into 
contact with the government.57 Tanzi argues that public corruption can occur, when 
the following conditions are met:  
• the act must be intentional, breaking the rule which is precise and 
transparent;  
• the breach of the rule must be beneficial for the offender and/or people 
related to him;  
• there must be a direct link between the specific act of “corruption” and the 
benefit derived. 58 
    
 
C.  Definition of Public Procurement and its Principles 
 
The term “procurement” means all kinds of acquisition of goods and services by any 
individual or organization (public, private, international etc.). It can be anything from 
the purchase of pens to the construction work of a new international airport.  
 
“Public procurement” refers to the acquisition of goods and services by a government 
and can take place at every government level: municipalities, provinces or states, and 
in national or federal governments. Contracts are signed with companies or 
                                                 
56 Likewise, TI defines corruption as a “misuse of entrusted power for private gain”. 
57 Conversely, private corruption occurs between individuals in the private sector, such as the Mafia 
extorting money from a local business. This research is dealing only with public corruption. 
58 Tanzi, supra note 43, at 167-168. 
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individuals - local or foreign - and are supposed to meet the user’s requirements with 
the best value for money. As such, public procurement must serve citizens’ and 
taxpayers’ interests.59 Purchases of goods and services can benefit citizens directly, 
such as purchases of projects on the construction of roads, dams or a sewage system. 
Others benefit citizens indirectly, such as a purchase of consulting services to 
redesign the customs agency.  
 
Robert Jourdain and Nadia Balgobin distinguish six different procurement types: 
International Competitive Bidding, Limited Competitive Bidding, National 
Competitive Bidding, Shopping, Direct Contracting and Force Account. The 
following table outlines the specific features of each of these procurement types:60 
 
Table 1. Procurement types and their features 
Procurement Type Features 
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) • Widest range of choices 
• Gives adequate, fair and equal 
opportunities to bid  
 
Limited Competitive Bidding • ICB by direct invitation, no 
advertisement 
• Limited number of suppliers 
 
National Competitive Bidding • Unlikely to attract international 
competition 
 
Shopping (National and International) • At least three price quotations from 
known/ predetermined suppliers 
 
Direct Contracting, Single Source • Extension of existing contract for 
goods/services of similar nature  
• Standardization of equipment  
 
Force Account • Borrower’s own personnel and 
equipment 
 
                                                 
59 Jourdain, R., Balgobin, N. (2003): Analyzing the Public Procurement Process to Identify and 
Eliminate Risks of Corruption, in: Controlling Corruption in Asia and Pacific, 106 - papers presented 
at the 4th Regional Anti-Corruption Conference of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia 
and the Pacific, Kuala-Lumpur, Malaysia, 3-5 December 2003. 
60 Ibid., at 107. 
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Irrespective of the procurement method that is being used, it should be based on a 
good governance and integrity. In order to prevent mismanagement, fraud and 
corruption in public procurement, OECD countries in October 2008 approved OECD 
Principles for Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement (OECD Principles). The 
OECD Principles, being in the form of OECD recommendation, serve as a policy 
framework with ten key principles to strengthen integrity and raise confidence in the 
management of public funds. These principles are divided into four groups, aimed at 
enhancing transparency, good management, prevention of misconduct as well as 
accountability and control, respectively:61 
 
A. Transparency 
1. Provide transparency in the entire procurement cycle in order to promote fair 
and equitable treatment for potential suppliers. 
2. Maximize transparency in competitive tendering and take precautionary 
measures to enhance integrity.   
 
B. Good management 
1. Ensure that public funds are used in procurement according to the purpose 
intended. 
2. Ensure that procurement officials meet high professional standards in 
knowledge, skills and integrity. 
 
C. Prevention of misconduct, compliance and monitoring 
1. Put mechanisms in place to prevent risks to integrity. 
2. Encourage close cooperation between government and the private sector to 
maintain high standards of integrity. 
3. Provide specific mechanisms to monitor public procurement as well as detect 
misconduct and apply sanctions accordingly. 
 
D. Accountability and control 
1. Establish responsibility along with control mechanisms. 
                                                 
61 Beth, E. (2009): OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement, 18-19. 
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2. Handle complaints from potential suppliers in a fair and timely manner. 
3. Empower civil society organizations, media and the wider public to scrutinize 
public procurement.  
 
The primary target group of the OECD Principles is policy makers in governments at 
national level, but their implementation can also be essential for the MDBs. Although 
the responsibility for the execution of the MDB-funded projects, including the award 
and management of contracts, lies with the beneficiary countries, the MDBs have to 
ensure that their funds are being used for the purposes they are intended for. 
Therefore, they should encourage, and, if necessary, assist countries receiving their 
funds to enhance integrity and good governance in public procurement. This is 
particularly important, when the procurement of certain goods and services for the 
MDB-funded project is financed by the recipient country itself. In such cases the 
recipient countries can use their national procedures and not those of the MDBs. To 
duly implement the project, they should ensure compliance with good procurement 
practice, which according to Jourdain, promotes four key principles: transparency, 
economy, efficiency and fairness:  
 
• Transparency defined as an objective (neutral) and public (visible)   
mastering of the whole process from call for tender to contract award and 
management. 
 
• Economy expressed through i) contract prices that do not deviate much 
from original estimates; ii) unit rates that are comparable with similar 
conditions/price/indexes; and iii) a number of bids that is enough to reach 
the best possible price. 
 
• Efficiency and timeliness to ensure that the actual procurement schedule 
conforms to the planned one and that there are no delays in public bid 
openings, evaluation and contract award. 
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• Fairness and equity to give all eligible bidders the same information and 
equal opportunity to compete for a contract.62 
 
Failure to comply with these principles can be an evidence of corrupt or fraudulent 
practices, respectively defined as “the misuse of an individual’s position for 
improper/unlawful enrichment”63 or a “misrepresentation of facts”64. As a result of 
these practices, the benefits of free and open competition are reduced.65 
 
 
D.  Corruption in Public Procurement 
 
Public procurement lies at the crossroad of the public and private sectors. A 
significant part of the government budget is spent on procurement of goods and 
services. Total government procurement worldwide is estimated to be roughly 
equivalent to 82.3% of world merchandise and commercial services exports in 1998.66 
Considering this, temptations for the transformation of the public funds into private 
gain are quite high, which makes public procurement more vulnerable to corruption 
than other sectors. In 2004, Transparency International estimated that the amount lost 
due to bribery in government procurement alone was at least $400 billion per year 
worldwide,67 while Daniel Kaufmann estimated it at $1 trillion.68  
 
At the same time, lack of efficiency and waste of donors’ resources as a result of 
corruption can cause the largest damage to the public interest. Instead of focusing on 
the highest quality for the lowest price, the officials can purchase goods or services 
from the best briber. According to the Commission for Africa’s estimations, the false 
costs resulting in worse quality and unnecessary purchases can add at least 25% to the 
                                                 
62 Jourdain, supra note 59, at107. 
63 By offering/receiving anything of value to influence a procurement process or a contract execution. 
64 In order to influence a procurement process or a contract execution. 
65 Jourdain, supra note 59, at107. 
66 OECD (2002): The Size of Government Procurement Markets, 25,  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/14/1845927.pdf (accessed 14 February 2009). 
67 Eigen P. (2004): Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2004, 2, 
http://www.transparency.de/uploads/media/04-10-20_CPI_2004_DEU.pdf (accessed 14 February 2009). 
68 Kaufmann, D. (2005): Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, in: Global 
Competitiveness Report 2005-06, 83,  
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8089/1/MPRA_paper_8089.pdf (accessed 21 July 2009).  
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costs of the government procurement.69 Consequently, too much can be paid for too 
little, or even nothing at all. Thus, preventing and sanctioning corruption in public 
procurement is one of the essential topics.  
 
Tanzi distinguishes between political or high level and administrative or bureaucratic 
corruption.70 He argues that political corruption can take place during the budget 
preparation phase, that is, when political decisions are made. Bureaucratic corruption 
occurs during the budget execution phase. In addition, the report of the Commission 
for Africa of 2005 considers not only politicians and public officials being responsible 
for existence of “signature bonuses” - the euphemism used for bribes - but also the 
bankers, lawyers, accountants, and engineers working on public contracts.71  
 
In fact, there is a potential for and risk of corruption in public procurement in all 
countries and all sectors. Nonetheless, some sectors of public procurement are more 
exposed to corruption due to the complex nature of the works and the large amounts 
of the contracts that are involved (construction of highways, bridges, dams etc.).   
 
Participants of the OECD Global Forum conference on “Fighting Corruption and 
Promoting integrity in Public Procurement”72 agreed that one of the fundamental 
obstacles in combating fraud and corruption in public procurement is the difficulty in 
detecting wrongdoings. This difficulty arises from the fact that there is often no clear 
offender nor victim, rather a group of individuals in collusion with common interests 
in keeping their corrupt acts unrevealed. Besides, corruption in the procurement 
process is far from being limited to direct bribery; there are many complicated ways 
of diverting funds and concealing these diversions. Therefore, efforts aimed at 
enhancing governance and integrity are indispensable for preventing corruption and, 
consequently, waste of public resources.  
 
                                                 
69 Commission for Africa, supra  note 19. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Commission for Africa, supra note 19.  
72 The OECD Global Forum conference took place on 29-30 November 2004 in Paris, papers of the 
Forum are available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/integrity/corrup_proc_OECD-rapport-2005-
aase.pdf (accessed 14 February 2009). 
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OECD defines integrity as “the use of funds, resources, assets, and authority, according to 
the intended official purposes, to be used in line with public interest”.73 In view of this 
definition, the following activities are pointed out by OECD as potential integrity 
violations: 
 
• corruption, including bribery, “kickbacks”, nepotism, cronyism and 
clientelism; 
• fraud and theft of resources; 
• conflict of interest in the public service and in post-public employment; 
• collusion; 
• abuse and manipulation of information; 
• discriminatory treatment in the public procurement process; and  
• the waste and abuse of organizational resources.74  
 
These violations also served as a basis for the forms of corruption in the procurement 
context suggested by Emmanuel L. Lomo addressing Biennial Meeting of the 
International Lending Agencies and the Consulting Industry: 
 
• A “corrupt practice” is offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, anything of value to influence the selection process or the 
execution of a contract. 
 
• A “fraudulent practice” is a misrepresentation or omission of facts in 
order to influence a selection process or the execution of a contract. 
 
• A “collusive practices” is an arrangement between two or more 
competitors with or without the knowledge of each other, in order to 
establish prices at artificial, non-competitive levels. 
 
                                                 
73 Beth, supra note 61, at 19. 
74 Ibid., at 20; see also: Huberts, L.W.J.C., Heuvel, J.H.J. van den (1999): Ethics and Integrity and the 
Public-Private Interface, in: Huberts, L.W.J.C., Heuvel, J.H.J. van den (eds.), Integrity at the Public-
Private Interface, 165-184.  
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• A “coercive practices” is harming or threatening to harm, directly or 
indirectly, persons or their property to influence their participation in a 
procurement process, or affect the execution of a contract.75 
 
E.  Mechanisms Used to Disguise Corruption in Public Procurement  
1. Introduction 
 
To be able to tackle a problem, it is necessary, first of all, to clearly understand it. 
Therefore, in order to eliminate or reduce corruption in the MDB-funded projects, it is 
essential to explore the methods and techniques used to misappropriate funds and 
make a fraudulent transaction look legitimate to auditors. This knowledge contributes 
in developing adequate mechanisms and indicators to prevent fraud and corruption as 
well as helps detect misdeeds when they occur. In the context of this dissertation, it 
also helps better understand what kind of acts might constitute grounds for debarment.   
Schematically, the project cycle can be outlined as follows:76 
 
Figure 1. Project Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Lomo, E.L. (2007): Tackling Demand Side Corruption, presentation at the Biennial Meeting of the 
International Lending Agencies and the Consulting Industry (BIMILACI '07) at the Inter-American 
Development Bank held on 10-11 May 2007, http://www1.fidic.org/resources/bimilaci/2007/10_lomo_ 
ethics_in_procurement.ppt (accessed 5 June 2009).   
76 Jourdain, supra note 59, at 108.  
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From this figure, we can conclude that the project cycle consists of three main phases, 
each containing few stages:  
 
• pre-tendering phase: identification of needs, planning/budgeting and 
defining project specifications;  
• tendering phase: invitation to tender, bidding process, bid evaluation and 
contract award;  
• post-tendering phase: contract implementation, supervision and 
evaluation. 
 
Since all these stages are procurement-related, the term “procurement cycle” often 
refers to the entire project cycle. Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, the 
term “public procurement” should be interpreted in its wider context, covering not 
only tendering, but also pre-tendering and post-tendering phases of the project cycle.  
 
To outline the most common manifestations of corruption and fraud throughout a 
project cycle, the latter can be divided into the following stages: 
 
 
 
Identification 
of needs 
Project 
preparation 
Bidding and 
Contract award 
Contract 
implementation 
Contract 
supervision  
 
Stages covering formation of contracts, that is, from definition of project 
specifications to contract implementation, are defined by OECD as a “tip of iceberg” 
since they are the most regulated and transparent stages of the entire procurement 
process, and, thus, are less exposed to the risk of corruption.77 In contrast, the stage of 
identification of needs and contract implementation are less transparent and proved to 
have a higher risk of corruption as they are usually not reflected in the procurement 
regulations. According to Arrowsmith et al., the most frequent forms of corruption in 
procurement financed by development institutions are the following: 
 
                                                 
77 Beth, supra note 61, at 10. 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
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• corruption in award procedures, usually involving bribes between 
government and contractor officials; 
• fraud by contractors manifesting itself in the submission of false 
information to the procuring entity; 
• the “siphoning off” of loan proceedings by government officials for 
unauthorized use.78  
 
However, as illustrated below, corruption can occur at any stage. Therefore, measures 
should be taken to prevent risks of corruption within the whole procurement cycle 
regardless of how high the risk is. 
 
2.  Mechanisms used during identification of needs 
 
At this stage the government decides what to buy. Normally, the laws on procurement 
and on public works establish that in taking this decision the government must take 
into account the national development plan, technical programs, administrative 
support, the fiscal and financial calendar, maintenance requirements, and the short-, 
medium- and long-term goals and objectives, among other factors.79  
 
In the absence of adequate procurement planning, many agencies decide to acquire 
goods or services directly, through direct negotiation without opening the bid to 
competitors’ offers. The justifications can be urgent needs that arise very late in the 
planning process. Although direct purchases do not necessarily mean occurrence of 
corruption, they can lead to inefficiencies, such as inflated prices and unknown 
companies owned by direct relatives of the head of an agency and have no experience 
in the field of work they are being contracted for.80 
                                                 
78 Arrowsmith, S., Linarelli, J., Wallace, D. (2000): Regulating Public Procurement: National and 
International Perspective, 139.   
79 Haro G. (2005): Mexico: Identifying Risks in the Bidding Process to Prevent Corruption, in: OECD: Fighting 
Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, 191,  
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/integrity/corrup_proc_OECD-rapport-2005-aase.pdf (accessed 14 
February 2009). 
80 Raigorodsky, N. (2005): Argentina: Identifying Risks of Corruption in Public Procurement, in OECD: 
Fighting Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, 178,  
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/integrity/corrup_proc_OECD-rapport-2005-aase.pdf (accessed 14 
February 2009). 
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The following methods can be used at this stage:81 
 
a) Modified or falsified needs  
Changing or falsifying needs is a common way of justifying purchases, works or 
services that are often unnecessary or disproportionate to actual needs.82 The decision 
may not necessarily follow a policy rational or meet an existing need but rather follow 
the desire to bring benefits to an individual or an organization.83 For example, demand 
is created for a good of little or no value to the society to favor particular suppliers.  
 
b) “Tagged” contract 
Sometimes decision-makers can include in the budget a contract with a “certain”, pre-
arranged contractor, to pay back old political favors or kickbacks.84 
 
c) Conflict of interest 
Conflict-of-interest situations might lead to bias and affect the decision-maker's 
decision on the need for contracts that impact their old employers (revolving doors).85 
 
d) Unnecessary, falsified or subjective studies  
Studies are often indispensable in order to identify needs. But sometimes unnecessary 
studies are carried out by a favored firm but never delivered or claimed, even though 
advance payments have been made; or the results of the initial study commissioned 
from a competent organization are passed on to fictive firms that plagiarize them.86 In 
other cases, studies performed by the companies that have a relationship with the 
                                                 
81 This list, as well as all further lists illustrating mechanisms of corruption and fraud during different 
stages of the project cycle are not exhaustive and reflect opinions of different authors based on their 
personal experience. 
82 Bueb, J.-P., Ehlermann-Cache, N. (2005): Inventory of Mechanisms to Disguise Corruption in the 
Bidding Process and Some Tools for Prevention and Detection, in OECD: Fighting Corruption and 
Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, 162,  
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/integrity/corrup_proc_OECD-rapport-2005-aase.pdf (accessed 14 
February 2009). 
83 U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre, Corruption in Public Procurement. General Overview, part 
“How corruption operates in public contracting”, (hereinafter, U4, Corruption in Public Procurement) 
http://www.u4.no/themes/procurement/procurementintro.cfm (accessed 20 February 2009). 
84 Transparency International (2006): Handbook for Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement, 18 
(hereinafter, TI Handbook), www.transparency.org/content/download/12496/120034 (accessed 20 
February 2009). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Bueb, supra note 82. 
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company or companies that will participate in the bidding process can falsely 
conclude that particular services or goods are needed. As such, the studies not only 
generate the need they are intended to identify, but also create an illicit advantage for 
a firm or a group of firms.87 
 
3. Mechanisms used during project preparation 
 
After having identified the needs, it is necessary to establish the precise cost of the 
project and draft project specifications and description of works. The purpose is to 
allow a thorough analysis of tenders and preparation of administrative and technical 
documentation required for issuing a call for tender. 
 
3.1. Determining project budget 
 
At this stage corrupt acts can be committed through deliberate misevaluation (under- 
or overvaluation) of project estimate.  
 
a) Undervalued estimates 
Underestimation is frequent and occurs, so that the proposal can easily be accepted. In 
such cases the expected benefits of the projects are maximized while the expenses to 
realize it are minimized. This raises the risk of being in need of supplementary funds 
at a later stage, which will subsequently inflate the initial cost. But since it is already 
too late to proceed otherwise, the additional costs are rarely negotiable and awarded to 
the winner of the initial contract, who, in its turn, favors the decision-maker.88  
 
b) Overvalued estimates 
When it is high likely that a contract will be awarded due to importance of goods or 
services, the estimate can be overvalued. The awardee of the contract will thus have a 
comfortable margin, part of which may be returned to the decision-maker without 
                                                 
87 Raigorodsky, supra note 80, at 178-179. 
88 Bueb, supra note 82, at 163. 
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increasing the initial cost.89 At the same time there will be no suspicion of any 
“favors”, since the actual price ends up being quite close to the initial estimate.   
 
3.2. Defining project specifications 
 
After estimation of the project's costs it is necessary to set out the technical 
specifications of the project. During this stage, the corrupt acts committed by public 
officials and potential contractors are especially hard to detect, when the latter lack 
knowledge of the technical aspects of a certain project.  
 
a) Preference for a single supplier 
Bidding documents can include hand-tailored specifications that can only be met by 
that particular bidder, making thereby competition either impossible or restricted. 
Another variation on this technique is to transmit the specifications prepared by the 
technical staff of the decision-maker to the bribing company, which will then copy 
them to its bidding documents. Consequently, it will submit to the decision-maker 
exactly what the latter wants.  
 
b) Inaccurate data 
Quite often some information is being deliberately concealed or omitted from the 
specifications available to the potential bidders, while only one or more “favored” 
bidders are provided with the correct data. The informed firm may neglect 
incorporation of a particularly costly requirement in its estimate and win the contract 
thanks to a bid that is lower than those of the competitors but provides for a higher 
margin nevertheless.90 
 
c) Unnecessary complexity of bidding documents or terms of reference 
This technique is used to create confusion to hide corrupt behavior and make 
monitoring difficult.91 In such cases it is reasonable to hire a private company to make 
these documents understandable. However, since the decision-maker's technical staff 
are usually capable to understand and explain these documents themselves, hiring a 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., at 164. 
91 TI Handbook, supra note 84. 
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private company for this purpose can be used to “camouflage” commission payments 
to the decision-maker or his friends.92       
 
d) Excessive technical requirements 
Sometimes technical specifications for a bid may be so specific, that it rules out all the 
competition giving advantages to a bribing company. For example, there might be 
requirements for specific certifications that are unnecessary for or irrelevant to the 
evaluation of the bid. However, failure to fulfill this requirement can result in 
disqualification of a bidder.  
 
4. Mechanisms used during bidding and contract award 
 
This stage begins when a bid is advertised and ends with the selection of the winner. 
Here as well, as at previous stages, different methods can be used to perform 
corruption.  
 
4.1.  Invitation to tender 
 
a) Reduced publicity  
One of the ways to make the bribing company win a contract is to reduce competition 
by limiting the call for bids and keeping the project secret as long as possible. It can 
be achieved by: 
 
• non-publication of calls for bids, justifying it by a state secrecy, exclusive 
rights, research or experimental work or additional supplies;93 
• publication of calls for bids in sources with limited circulation; 
• making the tender public during holiday time, when most administrative 
offices are closed;94 
• invitation to tender sent to a lot of companies to make the competition 
appear real, while these companies have a completely different area of 
                                                 
92 Beth, supra note 61, at 83.  
93 Bueb, supra note 82, at 165. 
94 Søreide, supra note 26, at 14. 
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specialization, or to a limited number of companies putting the blame on 
the mail system afterwards.95 
 
b) Unrealistic deadlines  
Sometimes calls for bids may be disseminated with a close deadline for the 
presentation of applications, depriving bidders not notified in advance of the chance 
to submit a credible offer. As a result, only notified bidders can prepare the bidding 
documents. The shortened deadlines are often justified by false claims of urgency that 
requires a shorter tender period,96  but in fact, their purpose is to exclude undesirable 
candidates. Time restrictions may also lead to the monopoly situation of a bribing 
company, resulting in monopoly prices.97 
 
4.2.  Bidding process 
 
a) Difficult conditions for obtaining documents 
Sometimes conditions for obtaining the project specifications may allow only the 
limited number of bidders to do so. For example, they might have to be obtained 
exclusively on the spot without any possibility available for them to be posted to the 
potential bidders. Or, the costs for obtaining these documents might be too high.98   
 
b) Confidentiality abuse 
A company may pay to obtain inside information about minimum and maximum 
price thresholds, average-offer prices, and project evaluation criteria,99 and as a 
result, can obtain the contract formally without any irregularity.100 Although 
corruption in the divulgence is difficult to prove in court, it is also difficult for a 
company to be sure that it is the only buyer101 - “the value of ‘confidential’ 
information is inversely proportional to the number of people who possesses 
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Beth, supra note 61, at 92. 
99 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 27.  
100 Søreide, supra note 26, at 15; see also della Porta, D., Vanucci, A. (2001): Corrupt Exchanges: 
Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption, 9-10.   
101 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25. 
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it”.102 Besides, it has no judicial guarantee of obtaining what it has paid for 
(unless the courts are corrupt as well).103  
 
c) Split contracts 
In some cases, large contracts can be split up into several smaller ones, so that they 
will be exempt from an open bidding process and avoid legal obligations regarding 
publicity. As a result, these contracts can be awarded to “ghost” companies.104  
Although the bills are submitted under different company names, in fact all the work 
is done by the same company.105 For example, instead of purchasing a large quantity 
of personal computers in one process, the contract may be split in several direct 
purchases, avoiding an open tendering process.  
 
d) Collusive agreements  
Sometimes companies that are regularly selected may collude amongst themselves or 
with contracting authorities to secure contracts without having to compete. This 
practice enables them to share markets by dividing contracts among themselves 
according to their own criteria (work planning, difficulty of the work, deadlines etc.). 
As a result, those in collusion increase prices to be able to “compensate” their 
colleagues who have not been selected because of artificially losing bids, or not 
presenting offers (through subcontracting or various forms of compensation) and 
decision-maker (via commissions).106  
 
4.3. Bid evaluation and award 
 
a) Short-listing/ pre-qualification 
When short-listing/ pre-qualification are applicable in order to limit the number of 
competitors according to their previous experience, a company may pay a bribe to be 
included in the list of pre-qualified bidders.  
 
                                                 
102 Ibid.; see also della Porta, D. and Vanucci, A. (2001): Democracy and Corruption in Europe, 9. 
103 Søreide, supra note 26, at 5. 
104 Raigorodsky, supra note 80, at 162. 
105 Bueb, supra note 82, at 164. 
106 U4, Corruption in Public Procurement, supra note 83; see also Beth, supra note 61, at 94.  
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b) Biased criteria   
Decision makers may be biased due to involvement of bribes or conflict of interest. 
This corrupt behavior may remain unnoticed, when selection criteria stated in tender 
documents are vague enabling the classification of bids to be changed and leaving 
room for subjective evaluation of bids and biased assessments.107 
 
5.  Mechanisms used during contract implementation 
 
Corruption can also take place once the contract has been awarded. There are following 
possible forms of misappropriation during the implementation of the contract: 
 
a) Lower quality 
Winning bidders/ contractors compensate bribes and other extra payments with poor 
quality, defective or different specifications than those contracted.108 It can happen 
that contracts are awarded and prices are agreed on based on the reputation of 
international companies, and in fact the work is carried out by consultants from local 
companies who lack experience and qualifications.109 Another example is delivery of 
goods of lower quality than that specified in the contract. Lower quality is difficult to 
detect, especially in works, since its consequences do not appear immediately.  
 
 
b) Modified orders 
Sometimes after the award, substantive changes may be introduced to the contract 
such as changes in specifications or cost increases. But it can also happen, that the 
supplier is asked to change the order for a less expensive product just before delivery. 
Since the product is already billed and the price is higher than that of the goods 
delivered, the supplier posts a credit voucher or cheque equal to the difference to an 
account in a name not identical, but so similar to that of the authority, that a “mistake” 
                                                 
107 Bueb, supra note 82, at 165. 
108 TI Handbook, supra note 84, at 19. 
109 Sacerdoti, G. (2005): Main findings of the Forum Workshop on “Identifying Risks in the Bidding 
Process to Prevent and Sanction Corruption in Public Procurement”, in OECD: Fighting Corruption 
and Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, 156,  
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/integrity/corrup_proc_OECD-rapport-2005-aase.pdf (accessed 14 
February 2009). 
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can easily be made.110 To make this process work, it is necessary that the purchaser be 
in collusion with the person in charge of verifying the goods supplied since they do 
not conform with those in the invoice.  
 
c) Sub-contracting 
The involvement of a large number of firms, either members of a consortium which 
has been awarded a contract or a group of sub-contractors, is an easy way to hide 
fraud and corruption. The risks for corruption are becoming higher when a cascade 
sub-contracting takes place, that is, sub-contractors themselves sub-contract work, 
since there is often little or no vigilance over the selection of the sub-contractor. 
These cascaded contracts can be used to produce amounts to be remitted afterwards to 
the decision-maker using methods of false invoices or undeclared work.111  
 
d) False payment claims 
Contractor’s claims are false, inexistent or inaccurate, and nonetheless they are filed 
and protected by those in charge of revising them.112 A claim may be considered false 
in case of submission of the invoice for the services not rendered, goods not delivered 
or delivered of lower quality than that specified in the contract as well as false 
documents during the bid or in an effort to get the invoice paid. 
 
e) Double (or multiple) payments 
Another mechanism is paying for a study, which has already been received but under 
another title, and has been paid for. This practice, known as “recycling”, is quite 
profitable, easy to use (even several times), and hard to detect without knowledge of 
the existence of the initial study issued under a different name.    
 
f) Late payments 
Late payments of invoices, postponement of payments to have prices reviewed in 
order to increase the economic value of the contract.113  
 
                                                 
110 Bueb, supra note 82, at 166. 
111 Beth, supra note 61, at 102.  
112 U4, Corruption in Public Procurement, supra note 83. 
113 OECD (2007): Integrity in Public Procurement: Good Practices from A to Z, 25. 
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6. Mechanisms used during contract supervision 
 
a) Biased decisions 
Contract supervisors and auditors (where applicable) may be “bought” or biased due 
to the conflict of interest. As a result, they are closing their eyes to all the false 
claims, certificates, changes in quality, specifications etc.  
 
b) Inability or failure to apply penalties 
Sometimes it is impossible to apply sanctions for violations of the specifications due 
to the deliberate omission of the relevant clauses (for example, penalty clauses for the 
missed deadlines, modified orders, etc.) from the contract or unwillingness of the 
decision-maker to enforce them.114      
 
 F.  What can be done by MDBs to tackle corruption?  
 
At the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference in May 2003, anticorruption 
activists stated that “[w]hen international agencies are found to have financed [. . .] 
corrupt transactions, they - not the consumers - must bear appropriate responsibility 
for outstanding loans and credits.”115 
 
In fact, the role of the MDBs in public procurement is complex. On the one hand, they 
are funding projects and bearing the main responsibility for defining, planning and 
supervising them. But on the other hand, the mandates, powers and jurisdictions of the 
MDBs are in the most cases limited. For example, the MDBs, as administrative 
organizations, can exercise administrative sanctions. They do not, however, have the 
subpoena powers or the prosecutorial powers of governmental agencies. The success 
of these institutions’ efforts to fight corruption relies to a great extent on cooperation 
with law enforcement, other state agencies and with other organizations.116 
                                                 
114 Bueb, supra note 82, at 165-166. 
115 Vallette, J. (2003): World Bank Knew about Enron’s Payoffs in Guatemala, citing Final 
Communique of Anticorruption Activists, 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Seoul, Korea 
(May 2003), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=7828 (accessed 26 October 2009). 
116 Sacerdoti, supra note 109, at 159-160. This can explain, for example, why in Lesotho case, the 
World Bank had to rely on Lesotho prosecutors and court proceedings, to provide the evidence of what 
took place in order to be able to debar the companies that had engaged in corrupt practice in the project 
funded by the World Bank. See case study in Chapter IV, C (10).    
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To improve aid effectiveness through better coordination mechanisms, the official 
donor aid community initiated in 2003 an Aid Effectiveness High Level Forum (HLF) 
in Rome.117 In Paris Declaration, adopted as an outcome of the Second HLF in 2005 
the official donors undertook some commitments on governance, transparency and 
mutual accountability. During the Third HLF in Accra, in September 2008, an issue of 
the lack of transparency on how official donor monies were being spent was raised, 
which was later included in the final resolution “The Accra Agenda for Action”.118 
 
Discussing the role of the MDBs at reducing corruption, Winters suggests 
distinguishing between efforts on a micro level - in projects and programs financed by 
the MDBs, at a middle level - within societies, and at a macro level - in relations and 
transactions among countries globally.119 According to him, the most efficient 
strategy for the MDBs to combat corruption would be to focus on micro level (Bank 
project supervision) and macro level (international coordination). Combating 
corruption within countries is not MDBs’ job, but that of each society, which is better 
equipped to put in place checks and balances. MDBs can and should help countries 
that request them to support their efforts in reducing corruption (for example, 
conducting reform of the civil service or of budgetary and financial management 
systems, and strengthen international cooperation and coordination in this regard), but 
it is not right to make reducing corruption across the country the centerpiece of their 
response to this problem.120    
 
The core of the MDBs response to corruption should be supervision and auditing of 
their own loans - that is where they can control through their internal procedures how 
these loans are used and take necessary steps in case of their misallocation. Rose-
Ackerman argues that aid and lending organizations must review their own control 
mechanisms to remove their shortcomings, and either carry out the oversight function 
                                                 
117 Kaufmann, supra note 37, at 26. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Winters, supra note 23, at 104. Although Winters refers to the World Bank, this approach can apply 
to all MDBs. 
120 Ibid., at 105. Winters regrettably argues that the World Bank has decided to focus exactly at the 
middle level of corruption problem. For example, about 20% of the Bank’s lending goes to governance 
and public sector reform, see World Bank website at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040922~menuPK:34480~p
agePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 16 October 2009).  
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themselves, or involve outside observers to do it for them.121 They should realize that 
a problem exists and take the necessary steps to reduce the harm caused by corruption 
in aid and lending projects.122    
 
On 14 November 2005 the ex-US President George Bush signed into law legislation 
urging stricter anti-corruption controls in the MDBs.123 The new law contains 
provisions requiring financial disclosure by development bank employees similar to 
that required for U.S. government officials and members of Congress; improvement 
of the quality and oversight of development bank loans; strengthening of 
whistleblower policies; and support of the independence and efficacy of the audit 
functions. Welcoming the legislation, Patricia Adams said that it “would help reduce 
the endemic corruption that has plagued MDB projects, but only if implemented fully 
and effectively by the boards of the MDBs".124 
 
From my point of view, MDBs should keep funding projects even in countries with 
high level of corruption, since the poorest people in the world quite often live exactly 
in those countries where corruption is indeed a real problem for the whole society. 
But by doing so, they should at the same time launch country assistance programs 
focusing on governance and anti-corruption issues in order to ensure the recipients’ 
compliance to the anti-corruption measures. Besides, they should have a monitoring 
mechanism to make sure that these funds are being spent for the intended purpose 
with remedial measures in place in case of their misallocation. As the chief of the 
Zambian anti-corruption task force told diplomats from rich nations, “Don’t sit silent. 
You don’t know how much influence you have.”125   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 182. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Multilateral Development Bank Law, 14 November 2005, http://www.odiousdebts.org/ 
odiousdebts/publications/MultilateralDevelopmentBanklaw.pdf (accessed 9 October 2009). 
124 Odious Debts Online (2009): World Bank Reform Signed into Law¸ http://www.odiousdebts.org/ 
odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=15484 (accessed 9 October 2009).  
125 Dugger, C.W. (2009): Battle to Halt Graft Scourge in Africa Ebbs,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/africa/10zambia.html?em (accessed 26 July 2009). 
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CHAPTER II.  DEBARMENT AS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOL 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Despite existence of laws and regulations forbidding corruption, it still takes place on 
a broad scale. As it was mentioned before, in order to fight corruption there is an 
increasing tendency of developing and implementing debarment policies both at 
national and international level. One of the oldest debarment systems is the one in the 
US, which can apply based on the anti-trust violations, tax evasion and false 
statements as well as bribery in procurement-related activities. Currently, many other 
countries have or plan to introduce it.126 At the international level the oldest 
debarment policy is that of the World Bank, which was made publicly available in 
1998. By now, all other MDBs also have debarment systems in place.  
 
1. Historical background of debarment 
 
Blacklists have existed for centuries to identify undesirable individuals or 
organizations for the purpose of discrimination. History of blacklisting traces back to 
the Middle Ages, where there were the lists of the towns and population affected by 
the plague, later the lists of evangelic villages and persons in the period of 
recatolization or lists of the persons allegedly possessed by the Devil and suspected of 
sorcery.127  
 
Majority of blacklists nowadays are legal. For example, it can be a list of persons 
involved in the organized crime, a list of unreliable airlines or a list of unreliable clients 
who have not paid their bills and are denied credit privileges. 
 
                                                 
126 In 2005 these countries included: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
India, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, South 
Korea, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, the United States and Zimbabwe. See Olaya, J. (2005): 
Blacklisting Corrupt Companies, in: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report, 60,  
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2005#download (accessed 
30 January 2009).    
127 Vymětal, P. (2007): Blacklisting and Public Procurement, in: Transparency International - Czech 
Republic, Blacklisting in the Public Procurement System, 25, 
http://www.transparency.cz/pdf/vz_cernelistiny2007_en.pdf  (accessed 3 April 2009). 
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But since the purpose of blacklists is to exclude and discriminate, sometimes they can 
also result in unfair and illegal discrimination. The examples can include lists of 
dissenters in non-democratic regimes, list of individuals who will not be allowed 
entry into the country or who will be denied access to employment.128  
 
There can also be some variations of blacklisting. One of them is blackballing, the 
manner, in which some private (“gentlemen’s“) clubs allow any existing member to 
reject the application for the membership of the new candidate in such a manner that 
he throws at voting the black ball into the ballot box among the other (white) balls.129 
Another variation is blocklisting used in the past in the United States to exclude, 
reject and discriminate Afro-American population in different areas of life.130  
 
2. Blacklisting vs. white listing 
 
Blacklists often apply, whether formally or informally, in combination with so-called 
white lists. As it appears from the name, white lists are the opposite of the blacklists, 
comprising the reliable and trustworthy entities, which fulfill certain preconditions for 
qualification, do not break the valid rules and act ethically. In principle, white listing 
is connected with the certification, the main purpose of which is to grant the mark of 
quality and trustworthiness to those products and entities, which fulfill the pre-
established criteria. Examples of certification include declaration on conformity with 
EU standards, homologation certificates, hygienic and ISO standards etc.  
 
In the field of public procurement white listing can be considered as an incentive 
instrument whereby companies eligible to participate in tendering are pre-selected 
because they have demonstrated the ability to perform in a responsible manner and 
the willingness to abide by applicable rules and regulations. Their reliability is judged 
upon the pre-established criteria. For example, in the EU-wide study on procurement 
and organized crime, the possibility of creation of an EU-wide White List was 
                                                 
128 For example, during the cold war motion picture companies, radio and television broadcasters, and 
other firms in the entertainment industry in the US developed blacklists of individuals accused of being 
pro-Communists. Those companies then denied employment to those whose names were on those lists. 
See Vaughn, R. (1972): Only Lies: A Study of Show Business Blacklisting.  
129 Vymětal, supra note 127, at 29. 
130 Ibid. 
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suggested for discussion. To be put on the White List, the tenderer should 
demonstrate that within the EU territory he/she:  
• has no past involvements in financial crimes or irregularities of any kind; 
• has never been in breach of contract through the quality of work; 
• has never failed to pay social security contributions; 
• has no outstanding tax or duties debt; 
• is not blacklisted; 
• has never had a professional or other license withdrawn.131 
 
Under the suggested criteria, the tenderer also volunteers to have checks being carried 
out by the national authorities in the Member States, which will be taken into account 
not only in this country but throughout the EU, and agrees to his details being kept by 
the EU coordinating body on procurement.132  
 
An EU White List would compliment blacklists existing in some Member States. The 
difference between these two lists is that not being on the white list would not 
automatically lead to exclusion from tenders.  
 
The problem with white lists is that it is easier to buy a certificate than to be removed 
from the blacklist using unfair practices. For this reason, although blacklisting and 
white listing usually apply concurrently, on practice blacklists are applied more often 
than certification, at least in the case of the public procurement. Vymětal argues, that 
“if the entity is to be put on the grey133 or blacklist in the consequence of suspicion of 
the corruption and misuse of public means, the costs for avoiding this (pay to avoid 
costs), and thus also the necessity to corrupt the debarment process are much higher 
than in the case of the white lists. In that case the costs for including in the white list 
                                                 
131 White, S. (Ed.) (2000), Procurement and Organized Crime: An EU-Wide Study, 34. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Grey lists are the certain transitional type between the blacklists and white lists. They are the lists of 
the entities, the rights of which are suspended or limited temporarily for the reason of the suspicion of 
the breach of rules, possibility of continuing these activities and high probability of their including in 
the blacklist. The main purpose of their use is to prevent the serious failures arising from continuing of 
the unfair activities of the entity. However, the incurred losses (whether economic or non-economic) 
are usually not compensated in the case of not proving of the wrongdoing. See Vymětal, supra note 
127, at 29. 
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and also the possibility to manipulate the certification process in its favor are lower 
(pay to get a benefit)”.134 
 
B.  Debarment in the Realm of Public Procurement 
 
Although debarment is also applicable to other resource allocation processes where 
there is a granting principal and a beneficiary responsible of performing services or 
delivering goods (for example, grants, fund allocation systems, etc.),135 for the 
moment, one of the most discussed applications of blacklists is connected to the 
public procurement as one of the tools which might potentially help to prevent losses 
and costs related to corruption in the field of public procurement. 
 
In 2005 Transparency International published a list of recommended minimum 
standards to be applied to all public contracts.136 Blacklisting the companies and 
debarring them was listed as standard No.3.137  
 
Being a restrictive measure, debarment is based on the idea that only those companies 
and individuals who play fairly to win a competition for public funds can be awarded 
a contract. The aim is to protect these funds from those using unfair practices, in 
which case they are disqualified and forced to change their policy. The United States 
Federal Government links debarment to the concept of “responsibility”, requiring that 
contract awards be made only to “responsible” bidders, offerors, or sources.138 Sope 
Williams, having the same approach in so far as the idea of responsibility is 
concerned, argues that exclusions which are directed towards maintaining the 
integrity of the procurement process protect the government since the latter only 
transacts with responsible contractors and is prevented from entering into business 
                                                 
134 Vymětal, supra note 127, at 38-39. 
135 Transparency International (2006): Publicity of Debarment and Current Debarment Systems in 
Place in International Organizations and Some Countries, 1 (hereinafter, TI, Publicity of Debarment). 
136 TI Minimum Standards, supra note 14.  
137 “3. Maintain a blacklist of companies for which there is sufficient evidence of their involvement in 
corrupt activities; alternatively, adopt a blacklist prepared by an appropriate international institution. 
Debar blacklisted companies from tendering for the authority’s projects for a specified period of time.” 
138 Schooner, S.L. (2004):  The Paper Tiger Stirs: Rethinking Suspension and Debarment, Public 
Procurement Law Review, Vol.13, No.3, 212. 
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with an unreliable contractor, evidenced by that contractor’s lack of business 
integrity.139 
 
Considering the above-mentioned and using the language of Moran et al., debarment 
in relation to the public procurement can be defined as a process, whereby a company 
(and usually the companies with which its directors or principles are engaged) or an 
individual is formally prohibited from tendering for further projects that the donor is 
funding (or supporting the funding for) for a specified period of time if, after enquiry 
and examination by the donor, wherever in the world the projects may be, and 
whatever they may involve, that company or individual has been convicted of having 
been involved in the use of corruption to secure previous or ongoing projects.140 In 
this context, corruption should be considered as the payment and receipt of some 
benefit, financial or in kind, between a public official and a company or an individual, 
that gives some advantage to the latter.  
 
Thus, in principle, debarment process is a possibility to create lists of untrustworthy, 
unreliable and irresponsible companies and individuals, on the basis of which it would 
be possible to prevent participation in public contracting of those competitors, with 
whom it has been proven that they participated in acts of corruption in any of the 
phases of the public procurement cycle.141    
 
All MDBs following the example of the World Bank, have introduced debarment to 
deter and – if detected – sanction those companies or individuals that have engaged in 
fraud or corrupt practices. The EBRD’s decision of 8 February 2007142 on debarment 
of the German consulting engineer Lahmeyer International based on evidence of fraud 
in connection with a project financed by the World Bank, makes it increasingly likely 
                                                 
139 Williams, S. (2006), The Mandatory Exclusions for Corruption in the New EC Procurement Directives, 9, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_procurement/publications/Sope_Exclusions_in_proc.pdf  
(accessed 6 April 2009).  
140 Moran, J., Pope, J., Doig, A. (2004): Debarment as an Anti-corruption Means: a Review Report, 5, 
http://www.u4.no/themes/debarment/debarmentreport.pdf (accessed 6 April 2009). 
141 Ondráčka, D., Cisařová, E. (2007): Blacklisting in the Public Procurement System, 25, in: 
Transparency International - Czech Republic, Blacklisting in the Public Procurement System, 
http://www.transparency.cz/pdf/vz_cernelistiny2007_en.pdf  (accessed 3 April 2009). 
142 EBRD, Procurement – Fraud and Corruption, http://www.ebrd.com/oppor/procure/guide/fraud.htm 
(accessed 30 January 2009).  
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that cross-debarment, that is, debarment by one MDB will lead to debarment by 
another, could become a new trend. 
 
 
C. Debarment Procedure 
1. Pre-debarment stage 
 
Debarment may be preceded by so-called “pre-debarment stage”, whereby companies 
or individuals are warned of likely debarment should the conduct persist, the conduct 
be repeated, or occur under aggravated circumstances. This “notice” would be given 
on the grounds of proportionality and in order to leave debarment as a last resort in 
cases where, for example, the alleged behavior is real but negligible.143 
 
2. Grounds for debarment  
 
The criteria by which the contracting authority can justify debarment may include a 
confession by someone involved in the corruptive activities, reliable information by 
third parties, circumstantial evidence as well as evidence and convictions emerging in 
courts.  
 
The grounds for debarment can range from failure to meet contract specifications to 
corruption and in case of administrative approach  shall be determined and publicized 
in advance. Sope Williams distinguishes three kinds of behavior, which can result in 
debarment.144 First, debarment could be directed at past violations of law, ethics, or 
anti-corruption norms that are unrelated to public procurement. Second, a supplier 
may be debarred from a particular procurement for a breach of the rules of that 
process without any consequential effect beyond the particular contract. Third, a 
supplier could be excluded from future contracts for past procurement violations.  
                                                 
143 Transparency International (2006): Recommendations for the Development and Implementation of 
an Effective Debarment System in the EU, 7, (hereinafter, TI Recommendations), 
www.transparency.org/content/download/5661/32802/ file/TI_EU_Debarment_Recommendations_06-
03-28.pdf (accessed 30 May 2009). 
144 Williams, S. (2007): The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-Financed Contracts, 
Public Contract Law Journal, Vol.36, No.3, 284. 
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3. Judicial vs. administrative debarment  
 
An investigation that could lead to debarment may be triggered by an existing judicial 
decision, or when there is a strong evidence of unethical or unlawful professional or 
business behavior.145 The first form of debarment, considered as mandatory, requires 
a contracting body to exclude from tendering any company or an individual, which 
has been convicted of corruption.146 This means, that debarment should be automatic 
in cases of a final criminal conviction ("res judicata") in any state with a functioning 
legal system based on the rule of law.147 The second form of debarment is 
discretionary ("non res judicata") and based on “sufficient evidence”, does not 
depend on a conviction and is used in cases of “grave professional misconduct”.148 In 
principle, it allows a much more timely and effective intervention. 
 
In other words, debarment procedure can be either judicial (involving the courts) or 
administrative (part of the procurement procedure) in nature. Moran et al. point out 
that although the grounds for debarring a person or company may highlight evidence 
of criminal wrongdoing, the judicial procedure, unless the very material breach of the 
legal order is concerned, may lead to serious delays and is unnecessary.149 
Conversely, administrative process, with sufficient checks and balances, is faster, less 
costly and less complex, and thus is more effective.150 Especially in the field of 
corruption it turns out that the best way to tackle corruption is not adopting new laws 
and legal procedures, but adopting flexible administrative and organizational 
approach.151  
 
In practice, majority of debarment systems in place both nationally and internationally 
apply an administrative approach. The arguments brought against involving courts in 
debarment procedure are as follows: 
 
                                                 
145 Olaya, supra note 126, at 59. 
146 For example, exclusion under the EU Procurement Directives.  
147 TI Recommendations, supra note 143, at 6. 
148 Ibid. For example, debarment by MDBs.  
149 Moran et al., supra note 140, at 17. 
150 Drew, K. (2005): The Challenges Facing Debarment and the European Union Public Procurement 
Directive, in: OECD: Fighting Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, 268-269, 
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/integrity/corrup_proc_OECD-rapport-2005-aase.pdf (accessed 1 June 2009).    
151 Moran et al., supra note 140, at 23. 
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a) Limited number of criminal convictions 
In corruption cases there are often no direct victims to raise a case and no direct 
witnesses to the act. As a result, not every allegation of corruption can be 
investigated, and relatively high thresholds will be needed to screen out vexatious 
complaints152 though the problem of corruption in public procurement remains 
alarmingly high.153 This makes a system based solely on criminal convictions limited 
in scope and effectiveness. If, for example, a prosecution fails to get a conviction 
against an individual suspected in corrupt practices, perhaps for technical reasons, the 
company this individual is employed by cannot be debarred. Besides, a court-based 
process will most likely have stricter procedural requirements but will be less 
efficient, since evidential requirements will be at their most demanding.154 
 
b) Untimely outcome  
Debarment should protect the integrity of public funds by keeping corrupt companies 
and individuals away from public contracts. As it may take many years before a 
conviction is reached, the debarment of a tenderer often applies too late to have a 
deterring effect as more funds may have been misappropriated and the direct 
perpetrator may already have left the company. The time delay can also result in 
unfairness in the debarment, since the company may have introduced significant 
changes in its anti-corruption policies since the beginning of the trial. Administrative 
procedures allow for much quicker action, keeping the crucial deterring effects of the 
debarment system, while maintaining a due process similar to the courts.155 
 
c) Non-compliance with court decisions  
There is the risk that donor agencies may not respect the court decisions debarring the 
company and will insist on its being entitled to tender for projects that they are 
                                                 
152 Ibid., at 17. 
153 Only four countries of 36 signatories of the OECD convention on countering bribery (adopted in 1999) 
did judicial enforcement in 2005. This was despite the fact the 60% of the respondents to the World Business 
Environment Survey indicated that a bribe above 5% of the value of the contract is typically needed in doing 
business with the government (WBES 2000). See Transparency International (2007): Policy and Guidelines 
on Fighting Corruption, Fraud, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism,  a draft submitted to the 
European Investment Bank, 5, (hereinafter, TI Submission to the EIB), 
www.eib.europa.eu/attachments/strategies/comments_first_round_TI.pdf (accessed on 1 May 2009).  
154 Moran et al., supra note 140, at 17. 
155 TI Submission to the EIB, supra note 153. 
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financing (in the name of “international competitive bidding”) or the financing will 
not go ahead.  
 
4. The objectives and impact of debarment  
 
As argued by Thornburgh, the short-term goal of debarment is to protect the donor’s 
funds, while the broader goal is “to segregate out firms that engage in fraud and 
corruption so as to leave a pool of honest and capable firms to undertake projects”.156  
These goals can be achieved through the following impact of debarment: 
 
a) Incapacitation 
Debarment precludes a firm/individual from engaging in future corrupt and/or 
fraudulent practices at least for as long as it persists. This can be considered as an 
analog of imprisonment in the criminal justice context, when the defendant is unable 
to harm others at least for a period of time.157 As Giudo Penzhorn claimed, because 
firms cannot be sent to prison, the only penalty that would match taking away a 
natural person’s liberty is “sanctions by the international donor/lending agencies”.158 
 
b) Deterrence 
Only the fact of the existence of debarment procedures and their likely enforcement 
can have psychological influence on those bidding for public contracts since the 
consequences of being debarred can be quite serious. Schooner compares the threat of 
debarment with a Sword of Damocles.159 Benefits derived from such a sword are due 
to fear which serves as a useful incentive. Being aware of all the risks arising from 
corruption (harm to their reputation, banning from participation in tenders for a 
certain period of time, increased possibility of being investigated criminally), the 
companies/ individuals can be discouraged from the idea of acting in a corrupt 
manner, for example, winning a contract through bribery. That is exactly the aim of 
                                                 
156 Thornburgh, D., Gainer, R.L., Walker, C.H. (2002): Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of 
the World Bank , 60. 
157 Ibid., at 59, 61. 
158 Penzhorn, G. (2004): Comments on the Current Lesotho Bribery Prosecutions, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/SenatePaperJuly04.pdf (accessed 8 October 2009). 
159 Schooner, supra note 138, at 215.  
 53 
 
debarment – to ensure a certain change in the acting of competitors finding 
themselves in this moral dilemma.   
 
c) Incentive 
While the individual wrongdoers within the corporation may be, and often are, 
debarred as individuals, their conduct can also be imputed to the entire corporation, if 
the actions are intended, at least in part, to benefit them.  In this case not only the 
company’s future is at stake, but also its affiliates, principals and employees, as well 
as its stockholders. And although the corporations themselves can be victims of the 
wrongdoings, they are held accountable if they do not eliminate conditions which 
might lead to wrongdoings. Any allegation of improper activity has the potential for a 
determination of non-responsibility.160 Thus, when wrongdoing is committed on 
behalf of or for the benefit of the organization, corporations that ignore responsible 
governance161 or fail to demonstrate that the errors were inadvertent, and occurred 
despite the exercise of reasonable care162 run a higher risk of being debarred from 
public contracting. Therefore, companies are encouraged to set up effective anti-
corruption programs and step forward if they discover irregularities. Richard J. 
Bednar suggests the following elements to be the minimum constituent part of an 
effective anti-corruption program:163 
 
• corporate standards of conduct and internal controls; 
• support of the standards and controls from the governing authority of the 
corporation by words and actions; 
• communication of the standards and controls to all level of the 
organization by training and otherwise; 
• auditing and monitoring of the effectiveness of the policy; 
• an internal system by which employees and agents may report or seek 
guidance regarding potential or actual violations of law; 
                                                 
160 Pachter, J.S. (2004): The New Era of Corporate Governance and Ethics: The Extreme Sport of 
Government Contracting, Public Procurement Law Review, Vol.13, No.3, 248.     
161 Bednar, R.J. (2004): Emerging Issues in Suspension & Debarment: Some Observations from an 
Experienced Head, Public Procurement Law Review, Vol.13, No.3, 225. 
162 Patcher, supra note 160, at 250. 
163 Bednar, supra note 161, at 226. 
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• disciplinary action for misconduct; 
• prompt correction of failures in internal controls. 
 
Thus, debarment of the companies is intended, inter alia, to encourage them and others to 
raise their standards of conduct to a level where they can demonstrate their commitment to 
transparency and honesty during the public procurement procedure. Another way to 
demonstrate a responsible behavior by companies and individuals is a voluntary disclosure, 
whereby they communicate information concerning errors, omissions, irregularities or 
illegal acts committed by them or by others as well as results of an internal investigation 
into past corrupt acts in these projects to donor agencies or relevant public authorities. In 
return for their cooperation, the self-disclosers can expect some leniency to be exercised. 
They can avoid debarment in case they do not engage in further misconduct, their identities 
are being kept confidential, and they remain eligible to participate in tender procedure.164  
 
Clearly, the availability of debarment will strengthen transparent and open public 
contracting, but by itself it will not be able to create clean markets. As in anti-
corruption strategies generally, there is no “silver bullet”,165 debarment should only be 
seen as an effective complement to other preventive and remedial measures taken in 
order to tighten up public procurement procedures. 
 
5. Elements of debarment procedures 
 
To be efficient and achieve their objectives, debarment procedures tend to fulfill 
certain criteria. When debarment is carried out by state authorities, these criteria are 
set by law, constituting thereby legally binding requirements. On the other hand, in 
international organizations debarment is regulated by their internal rules and 
procedures. Therefore, the latter cannot be considered as requirements in a legal 
sense, but rather as voluntary criteria adopted from national laws, and in particular 
those of the US, to avoid a public criticism and be accepted by the parties involved. 
This could be compared with an issue of procedural guarantees in the alternative 
                                                 
164 The Voluntary Disclosure Program exists in the WB, AfDB, European Commission, the United 
States, Japan, Brazil, and some other countries.  
165 Moran et al., supra note 140, at 16. 
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proceedings in lieu of the criminal prosecution (i.e. mediation, reconciliation etc.). 
This similarity makes the elements of debarment procedure be handled as 
“requirements”, which are set forth below. 
 
a) Fairness  
All rules and procedures relating to debarment should meet due process requirements. 
This means that companies and individuals facing debarment should be given an 
adequate opportunity to defend themselves, which is, first of all, the opportunity to be 
heard by presenting evidence before the decision-making body.166 In its discussion 
paper, the UK Anti-Corruption Forum makes recommendations concerning fairness of 
debarment procedures, which varies depending on whether debarment is of mandatory 
or discretionary nature.  
 
i) When a company or an individual has been convicted of corruption, and is facing 
debarment under a mandatory procedure, the UK Forum suggested the following 
recommendations:167 
 
• If the company or the individual facing debarment is appealing the conviction, 
the debarment should not take effect or be publicized unless and until the 
conviction is upheld by the appeal body. 
 
• The company or the individual facing debarment should be permitted a 
reasonable time, prior to the debarment becoming effective, to present evidence 
to the debarring authority that the conviction was obtained in a jurisdiction 
which did not follow due judicial process. If the company or an individual can 
provide satisfactory evidence to this effect, debarment should not be 
implemented under the mandatory procedure. 
 
                                                 
166 Friend, J. (2002): Debarment, Blacklisting and Due Process, 
http://www.ecaonline.net/March,_2002x.html (accessed 29 May 2009). 
167 UK Anti-Corruption Forum (2007): Fair and Efficient Debarment Procedures, 2, 
http://www.anticorruptionforum.org.uk/acf/fs/groups/fair_efficient.pdf (accessed 30 January 2009). 
Although the discussion paper refers only to companies, it should be interpreted in a broader sense 
extending to individuals as well.  
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ii) When a company or an individual is accused of a corruption offence, and is facing 
debarment under a discretionary procedure, the UK Forum suggested the following 
recommendations:168 
 
• The company facing debarment should be notified about the initiation of 
the process, the grounds for it and provided with the evidence that it was 
involved in a corrupt act.169 
 
• The company facing debarment should be permitted a reasonable time to 
prepare its defense against the allegations. 
 
• The company facing debarment should be permitted to deny, correct or 
clarify the facts that underlie the accusation and to provide the debarring 
authority with its documentary and witness evidence, and legal 
argument.170 
 
• The debarring authority should only debar when it is satisfied beyond all 
reasonable doubt that the company facing debarment was involved in a 
corrupt act.171 
 
• The company facing debarment should be allowed a reasonable time to 
appeal the debarment decision to an independent appeal body. 
 
• If the company facing debarment does appeal the decision, the debarment 
should not take effect or be publicized unless and until the debarment 
decision is upheld by the appeal body. 
 
• Where a company has been convicted or debarred, and the company is 
appealing such conviction or debarment, a procuring entity shall be 
entitled to request the company facing debarment to provide reasonable 
                                                 
168 Ibid. 
169 See also TI Recommendations, supra note 143, at 6. 
170 Ibid.  
171 As it will be shown in the following Chapters, the MDBs took a different approach in this regard. 
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proof that it has implemented an effective anti-corruption program as a 
condition of allowing it to tender during the period prior to the appeal 
being decided. 
 
b) Proportionality   
For some companies, being debarred might mean bankruptcy. But since the aim of 
this measure is rather to force companies to act correctly and change their policies, the 
penalties should be reasonable and the debarment period should be proportional to the 
type and severity of the conduct that led to the process in the first place.172 The 
following factors should be taken into account in determining the length of the 
debarment period:173 
 
• the severity of the offence; 
• the magnitude of the loss caused by the offence; 
• whether it is a first offence or a repeated offence; 
• the seniority of the relevant individuals responsible for the offence; 
• whether the board of the company had authorized or acquiesced in the 
offence; 
• the steps taken by the company to prevent the offence occurring, that is, 
whether the company had effective standards of conduct and internal 
control systems in place at the time of the offence;174 
• whether the company/ individual reported the offence to the debarring 
authorities; 
• whether the company has fully investigated the circumstances of the 
offence and, if so, made the result of the investigation available to the 
debarring authorities;175 
• the extent to which the company/ individual co-operated with the 
authorities after the offence had been discovered; 
                                                 
172 TI Recommendations, supra note 143, at 7. 
173UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 3. 
174 Zucker, J.S. (2004): The Boeing Suspension: Has Consolidation Tied the Defense Department’s 
Hands?  Public Procurement Law Review, Vol.13, No.3, 264.    
175 Ibid., at 265. 
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• whether the relevant individuals responsible for the offence have been 
dismissed or appropriately disciplined by the company; 
• the impact on the company and its non-offending employees of a 
debarment. 
 
A tariff should be developed and published which lists the approximate length of the 
debarment taking into account the factors listed above. The intent should be that the 
debarment creates a result proportionate to the circumstances of the offence.176 Besides, 
availability of the mitigating circumstances might promote behavioural change and 
encourage cases of corruption to be brought out into the open rather than be concealed.177 
Although the threat of debarment must be real and serious, which therefore acts as a 
deterrent, there should also be incentives for companies to implement anticorruption 
policies, and to deal openly and actively with respect to suspected acts of corruption. 
 
For example, if a company knows that the same debarment sanction will be applied to 
it irrespective of whether or not it itself uncovers and reports the offence, it will have 
no incentive to undertake internal audits and co-operate with the authorities. On the 
contrary, it is more likely that it will try to hide the offence, since reporting will only 
alert the authorities and result in no benefit, but only punishment for the offending 
company. As a result, corruption will be driven underground, when preventing 
corruption is best achieved by bringing it out into the open.178 
 
Therefore, debarment procedures should allow for a sliding scale of penalties, that is, 
provide entry (listing) and exit (delisting) rules.179 First of all, the length of debarment 
should take account of the circumstances listed above. Besides, if a company can 
provide satisfactory proof to the debarring authority that, after the offence, it has 
implemented an effective anti-corruption corporate program, for example, by 
enforcing codes of conduct, or changing policies and practices, it should be possible 
to reduce or lift the debarment.  
 
                                                 
176 UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 3. 
177 TI Recommendations, supra note 143, at 8. 
178 UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 4. 
179 Olaya, supra note 126, at 60. 
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Many contracting authorities require disclosure by bidding companies of previous 
debarments. Criminal convictions are treated as “spent”, and do not require disclosure 
after a certain period. Similarly, after the debarment had been ceased, it should be 
deleted from the register and treated as “spent”.180 
 
c) Transparency 
In order to prevent corruption, the debarment system should be transparent itself. 
Transparency and effectiveness go hand in hand with each other due to their mutual 
influence. A system that is not transparent cannot be effective, whereas transparent 
debarment system will produce the desired impact, that is, deterrence of corrupt 
behavior and promoting trust among users, managers and providers of funds that are 
subject to public trust.181  
 
Transparency is rooted in the provision of access to information. The rules regarding 
debarment procedures, including grounds for debarment and possible penalties, 
should be made public. It must be quite clear how debarment should be determined; 
what the range of debarment periods is, and which procedures for appealing or lifting 
debarment are available.182 These rules should be part of all the documents in the 
public contract to be made known to all the parties involved in a public procurement 
process in advance.183  
 
According to Transparency International, the outcome of the debarment procedure 
should also be public and easily accessible. There should be a register containing 
details of all debarred companies and individuals, reasons for the debarment, length of 
the debarment, the name of the project, the country of origin of debarred companies or 
individuals, as well as the rules governing the process. 
 
Transparency International pointed out several reasons why it is necessary that 
debarment lists are publicly available:184 
                                                 
180 UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 4. 
181 TI Recommendations, supra note 143, at 4. 
182 UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 3. 
183 Ondráčka, supra note 141, at 15. 
184 TI, Publicity of Debarment, supra note 135, at 2. 
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• The publication of debarment lists will have an important impact on 
legitimacy, credibility and accountability of debarment agencies. It will 
also give the possibility for independent parties to monitor the fairness of 
the debarment system. 
 
• The publication of debarment lists will minimize the risk of the debarment 
system being subjected to manipulation, abuse and pressure. 
 
• Contracting authorities and organizations, as part of their due diligence, 
need to know whether or not a company or an individual has been 
debarred. Therefore, procurement officers who do not have or have only 
limited access to this information (for example during a tender overseas 
regarding the debarment system in their home country) may end up 
evaluating contractors inappropriately.  
 
• Since the main objective of debarment is prevention, it will be more 
effective if other companies and individuals are aware of debarment of 
their competitor or business partner engaged in corrupt practices. 
 
• There is always a possibility that the owners of the debarred companies 
may start up a new company under a new name or simply founded 
elsewhere. Publicity of debarment lists can help procurement officers and 
due diligence analysts detect these cases.  
 
• Publicly available debarment lists may facilitate information sharing 
internationally. Such networking may even reduce operating costs, and 
make systems more effective. Ideally, one international register should 
contain details of all debarments, so that information can be obtained 
from a single source.185 
 
                                                 
185 UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 4. 
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d) Timeliness  
Debarment systems should be timely to be able to protect the integrity of funds by 
keeping corrupt companies and individuals away from public contracts. Delays in 
beginning of the debarment procedures may result in further misappropriation of 
funds and lead to the increased costs, as it was discussed above.   
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CHAPTER III. ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN MDB-FUNDED PROJECTS 
 
A. General Overview 
 
Any organization sooner or later can become a victim of fraud or corruption. 
Irrespective of the nature of the organization, that is, whether it is a business 
corporation, national government agency or international organization, they can 
respond to these financial crimes in the following ways:186 
 
• Refer a matter for investigation and criminal prosecution in a nation with 
domestic jurisdiction over the acts.  
 
• Institute a lawsuit for civil recovery, launched in such a nation against an 
offending company or individual, but such civil suits can be 
extraordinarily costly as well as problematic in their outcome, and even if 
a judgment is favorable, it can prove difficult to collect. 
 
• Refer the matter to supervisory officials in professional or trade 
associations, or to consumer protection agencies, but such entities are 
often ineffective and even successful referrals are of limited utility. 
 
• Take preventive actions within their own organizational structure (by 
means of employee education, regular audits, etc.) to lessen the likelihood 
of such problems in the future. 
 
• Preclude an offender from future contracts. 
 
 
National government agencies apply more often debarment in conjunction with a 
criminal proceeding in the national courts or a civil action for recovery of the loss.187 
To encourage a regular use of debarment, they set up simple procedures whereby the 
                                                 
186 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 2.        
187 Ibid., at 3. 
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decision to debar is made by a lawyer in the general counsel’s office or procurement 
office after reviewing the agency records of the matter.188  
 
International organizations can also bring suits to national courts, but because a fraud or 
corruption has resulted in a loss to an international organization and not to a national 
economy, there is less incentive for law-enforcement bodies to proceed with the case. 
As a result, such cases can be so lengthy and costly, that international organizations 
tend not to refer allegedly corrupt activity to national prosecutorial bodies. Nonetheless, 
in 2002 the United States District Court for the District of Colombia initiated two cases 
based on criminal referrals from the World Bank’s Legal Department, where former 
World Bank employees pled guilty to corrupt activity they engaged in while employed 
at the World Bank.189 For the first time, an international financial institution (even 
without a relevant mutual assistance treaty) assisted national prosecutors of a Member 
government.190 But these kinds of cases are rare. 
 
Hence, a likely recourse for international organizations is taking preventive measures 
against fraud and corruption as well as remedial measures of administrative nature as 
discussed below.  
 
 
B. Preventive Measures 
 
The projects funded by the MDBs are implemented by means of procurements in the 
borrowing countries. The actual contracts for their implementation are concluded 
between these countries and the private contractors. Thus, under contractual 
arrangements, it is the borrower, and not the MDB, which is responsible for the 
procurement process. Meireles points out the complexity of the relationship between 
the Bank, the Borrower and bidders. While the Bank and the borrower have a 
contractual relationship under the Loan Agreement, and the borrower and the bidders 
build their relationship according to the bidding documents, the relationship between 
the Bank and the bidders is unclear since they do not have any legal relationship with 
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190 Ibid., at 4. 
 64 
 
each other.191 However, as it will be demonstrated below, the MDBs impose their own 
rules and procedures on the procurement process and supervise that the latter are 
observed.192 
 
Based on a “zero tolerance” policy against fraud and corruption in the project they 
fund, MDBs have to ensure that their funds are only disbursed to finance goods, 
works and services approved in the Loan Agreement. Therefore, they require 
borrowers as well as bidders, suppliers and contractors to observe the highest 
standards of ethic during the procurement procedure and the execution of contracts.  
 
MDBs can prevent fraud and corruption in the projects they fund through effective 
supervision. This supervision takes place from project design through completion of 
the project to ensure that necessary management, procurement, and financial controls 
are in place. 
  
1. Project design 
 
To minimize the risk of fraud and corruption during implementation, MDBs, based on 
the country risk analysis, identify projects which are particularly prone to corruption, 
and pay careful attention to these risks when designing projects. Among tools for 
detecting risks of fraud or corruption during the project cycle are, for example, the 
Integrity Risks Reviews (IRR) program and the Red Flags Matrix launched by the 
IADB in 2008. An IRR is a risk analysis based on the collection and analysis of 
information from the investigated cases. Red Flags Matrix is an interactive checklist 
for detecting and managing risks of fraud and corruption in the procurement processes 
of IADB-financed projects which is based on indicators found in the investigations in 
IADB operations.193 
 
                                                 
191 Meireles, M. C. (2006): The World Bank Procurement Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the 
Enforcement Mechanism and of the Application of Secondary Policies in Financed Projects, 110, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_procurement/theses/ Marta_Meireles_master_FINAL.pdf 
(accessed 13 October 2009). 
192 Shihata, I.F.I. (2000): The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: In Practice, 12; see also Arrowsmith et 
al., supra note 78, at 137;  
193 IADB, Office of Institutional Integrity: Annual Report 2008, 15, 17, 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1927592 (accessed 25 October 2009). 
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At this stage, the MDBs also review preparation work done by the borrower and 
others, including consultants and project cost estimates. As pointed out by Aguilar, 
the latter must be realistic, since excessively generous cost estimates, especially in 
projects involving only a few large contracts, present a big temptation for fraud and 
corruption by borrowers and contractors.194  
 
To ensure integrity in its projects, MDBs include anticorruption clauses and 
consequences thereof in the loan documents and project documentation and require 
that their policies and procedures to be applied for the procurement of goods, works, 
and services as well as for selecting, contracting, and monitoring consultants required 
for loan and technical assistance projects. 
 
To make sure that even in countries with weak public administration, or lax or non-
existent public procurement regulations the project procurement is conducted in an 
open, transparent, and competitive manner, without interfering in their internal 
administration, MDBs usually require the use of their own rules and procedures. They 
become binding on the borrower through their incorporation, with relevant 
amendments, if needed, in every loan agreement.  
 
The only exception when the national laws can apply, is when MDBs permit a 
borrower to introduce an undertaking of the bidder to observe, in competing for and 
executing a contract, the country’s laws against fraud and corruption, including 
bribery (“no-bribery pledge”).  
 
The objective of a “no-bribery pledge” is to discourage bribes by committing firms to 
bid on a bribe-free basis, while ensuring them that competitors are similarly binding 
themselves. The most basic form of the no-bribery pledge is a letter from the chief 
executive of each bidding company promising that the firm will obey the laws of the 
country and not bribe to obtain the contract. This could solve the “prisoner’s 
dilemma” discussed above, but there is always risk that some bidders will sign and 
                                                 
194 Aguilar M.A., Gill, J.B.S., Pino L. (2000): Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank 
Projects: A Guide for Stuff, 13.   
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bribe again. However, introduction of a “no-bribery pledge” provision might be 
possible when the laws are satisfactory to the MDBs and the contracts are large.195 
 
In addition, ADB takes measures to prevent "enclaving" - the creation of quasi-
independent units, with their own accounting and reporting procedures, within a 
broader organization - in the financial management and administration of ADB-
funded projects.196 
 
2. Supervision 
 
During implementation stage, depending on the value of the contract, MDBs can 
conduct either prior or post review of the procurement arrangements for their 
conformity with the Loan Agreement and procurement rules and procedures.  
 
Under a prior review, all procurement-related documents drafted by the borrower 
shall be approved by the MDBs before they are released to the public or to bidders.197 
Thus, a prior review is intended to ensure that the procurement process is in 
conformity with the MDBs’ requirements and prevents misconduct such as a 
particular bidder-tailored equipment specifications or too short deadlines to benefit 
the informed bidder. In 2009, the WB developed the Company Risk Profile Database 
(CRPD), which can alert the operational staff conducting a prior review of possible 
risks related to companies recommended for contract award.198 However, prior 
reviews are applied only to the largest contracts. Thresholds for prior review vary 
                                                 
195 The use of such pledges has been criticized, mostly by the World Bank Legal Department itself, due 
to the lack of the judicial and prosecutorial machinery to enforce laws in developing and transitional 
countries, even when they have in place laws prohibiting fraud and corruption. See Arrowsmith et al., 
supra note 78, at 142. 
196 ADB (1994): Task Force on Improving Project Quality, Executive Summary, para. 11, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Project_Quality/pq000.asp (accessed 26 October 2009). 
197 These document include, inter alia, the advertising procedure, prequalification documents when 
applicable, bidding document and any addenda, bid evaluation and proposal for award of contract, the 
contract documents and any significant modification agreed during execution. 
198 World Bank (2009): Integrity Vice Presidency’s Annual Report, 34 [hereinafter, INT Report 2009], 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTDOII/Resources/WBG_INTAnnualReport2009_web.pdf 
(accessed 21 November 2009). 
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from loan to loan and from country to country and are specified in the procurement 
schedule of the project's loan agreements.199 
 
For contracts below prior review threshold MDBs conduct a post review, which 
means that within defined period of time after the closing date of the Loan 
Agreement, they can request the borrower to provide them with all the major 
documents referent to the procurement process.  
 
One of the means by which MDBs monitor the progress of the projects they fund and 
ensure that loan resources are used for the intended purpose is by requiring borrowers 
and other beneficiaries to provide them with annual audited financial statements and 
other selective financial information. Audits must be carried out by a competent 
independent auditing firm, to certify the reliability of the information and data 
contained in the financial statements. 
 
In addition to the annual financial audits, MDBs can conduct project procurement 
related audits to detect fraudulent and corrupt practices relating to procurement of 
goods and services. For this purpose, MDBs may require that a provision be included 
in bidding documents and in contracts allowing them to do so. Under procurement 
audit, MDBs review procurement documents, financial management system, contract 
price analysis and potential conflicts of interest. Besides, they are granted access to 
the project sites, in order to verify the compliance of the completed work, delivered 
goods or services provided with the requirements and specifications defined in the 
contract. However, procurement audits are conducted only in selected projects. 
Among criteria for their selection are consent of the borrowing country, size of the 
contract, project implementation phase etc. 
 
Considering the above-mentioned, based on open, competitive tendering with pre-
disclosed evaluation and selection criteria, as well as supervision, the procurement 
rules and procedures of the MDBs should on their own be sufficient deterrents to 
                                                 
199 WB, Summary and Detailed Borrower Procurement Reports, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:2025
1613~pagePK:84269~piPK:84286~theSitePK:84266,00.html (accessed 21 November 2009).  
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corruption. But despite this, fraud and corruption still occur in MDB-funded projects. 
For example, Winters estimated the WB’s loss to corruption since the beginning of its 
lending activity at about 30 percent of its funds.200 Hobbs, in a more recent research 
argued that many WB-financed projects were still subject to corruption and as a result 
were losing from 10 to 15 percent of contract value.201  
 
Among the causes which considerably contribute to the misprocurement in its 
projects, the World Bank pointed out institutional problems in the borrowing 
countries - such as low pay, lack of experience, lack of effective legislation, cultural 
practices together with the desire of firms to obtain financed contracts at any cost.202 
 
The persistence of corruption in spite of the MDBs’ efforts could also be explained by 
insufficient supervisory processes. If they were actually applied, they could detect and 
prevent many cases of corruption. However, the prior review although being one of 
the main procurement supervisory tools, is only used on a quarter of Bank contracts 
due to its applicability only to contracts above a certain value threshold, which varies 
from case to case.203 Procurement audits are not conducted that often. And even when 
these supervisory mechanisms are used, they are unable to detect and prevent 
corruption in the form of ‘speed money’204 or corruption that helps being awarded a 
contract.205  
 
Another factor explaining the insufficient supervision, as suggested by Hobbs in 
relation to the WB, is recognition by the Bank of the fact that in many countries 
where corruption is systematic, it is necessary to accept certain amount of corruption 
in order to ensure success and timely delivery of its projects. Project success is crucial 
for the Bank to maintain its credibility to creditor countries which make financial 
                                                 
200 Winters, supra note 23, at 102, 111.  
201 Hobbs, N. (2005): Corruption in World Bank Financed Projects: Why Bribery is a Tolerated 
Anathema, 24-29, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/wp65.pdf (accessed 16 October 2009).   
202 World Bank (1997): Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, 2-9 
[hereinafter, WB Helping Countries 1997] 
203 Due to the fact that the cost of using prior review is more than 10-15% of contract value, smaller 
contracts “are not cost-effectively handled through prior review”. Ibid., at 15.  
204 ‚Speed money‘ is a term used by Hobbs meaning a corruption payment made to foster and facilitate 
different procedures during procurement in order to fulfil the contract in a timely manner. 
205 Hobbs, supra note 201, at 22.  According to the Bank officers interviewed by Hobbs, these forms of 
corruption are quite common in World Bank projects, but are rarely detected by the Bank. 
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contributions and to debtor countries which borrow its funds.206 Thus, it is more 
rational to continue anti-corruption efforts, but not to spend too many resources trying 
to bring the level of corruption in the Bank-funded projects to zero. As Leff argued, 
this may overweigh the benefits gained and be a detrimental distraction from policy 
and projects that could otherwise be much more developmentally beneficial.207 
 
 
 
C. Remedial Measures 
 
In pursuing their anti-corruption policies, the MDBs can take the following remedial 
measures:  
 
• reject a proposal for an award if they determines that the bidder 
recommended for award has, directly or through an agent, engaged in 
sanctionable practices in competing for the contract in question; 
 
• cancel the portion of the loan allocated to a contract if they determine at 
any time that representatives of the borrower or of a beneficiary of the 
loan engaged in sanctionable practices during the procurement or the 
execution of that contract, without the borrower having taken timely and 
appropriate action satisfactory to the Banks to address such practices 
when they occur; 
 
• sanction a firm or individual, including issuing a letter of reprimand, 
debarring or imposing debarment-related sanctions, if they at any time 
determine that the firm/individual has, directly or through an agent, 
engaged in sanctionable practices in competing for, or in executing, a 
Bank-financed contract.208 
                                                 
206 Ibid., at 29. 
207 Leff, N. (1964): Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption, in: 8 American 
Behavioural Scientist, 8-14.  
208 Guidelines on Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Art. 1.14(b)-(d), Guidelies on 
Selection and Employment of Consultants by WB Borrowers, Section 1.22(b)-(d); ADB Procurement 
Guidelines, Art. 1.14(b)-(d), ADB Guidelines on the Use of Consultants, Art. 1.23(b)-(d); Policies for 
the Procurement of Goods and Works financed by the IBRD, Art. 1.14(b), Policies for the Selection 
and Contracting of Consultants financed by the IADB, Art. 1.21(b); AfDB Rules and Procedures for 
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Thus, not only borrowers are subjected to the remedial decisions, but also bidders 
despite the non-existence of any contractual connection between them.209 
1. Rejection of a proposal for award  
 
Rejection of a proposal for award appears to be part of the procedures for prior review 
of the procurement process. As argued by Sope Williams in the context of the WB, it 
is not clear how during the review process it is determined that the tender is tainted 
with corrupt activity, which investigative tools are used, if any, but in any case this 
procedure is less rigorous than the one leading to a debarment.210 Usually, the prior 
review is only limited to ensuring that the procurement documents comply with the 
conditions of the Loan Agreement, without verifying the accuracy of those 
documents211 and checking whether a bidder is on the list of the debarred firms or 
individuals.212 However, the latter can only show the past practice of the bidder but is 
not enough to determine occurrence of fraud or corruption in competing for a contract 
in question. This, coupled with the fact that the prior reviews are conducted only in 
limited number of contracts, could explain why allegations of fraud and corruption 
arise mainly after the contract had been awarded. Moreover, if the Bank has sufficient 
evidence to make such determination during the prior review, it is unclear, why it 
serves only as a ground for rejection and, thus, affects only bidder’s inability to be 
awarded the contract in question. From my point of view, the language of this 
provision contradicts the requirement to sanction a firm or an individual, if the Bank 
at any time (emphasis added) determines that the firm or the individual has engaged in 
sanctionable practices in competing for (emphasis added), or in executing, a Bank-
financed contract. In addition, it contradicts the MDBs’ aim to eliminate corrupt 
bidders from the projects they fund and to prevent misappropriation of their funds in 
the future.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Procurement of Goods and Works, Art. 1.14(b)-(d), AfDB Rules and Procedures for Recruitment of 
Consultants, Art. 1.22(b)-(d); EBRD Enforcement Policy and Procedures, Art. 7.2. 
209 Meireles considers it as “creating requirements for third parties”. See Meireles, supra note 191, at 115.   
210 Williams, supra note 144, at 292. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Personal communication with a WB representative. 
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Therefore, the provision on rejection set forth in the procurement rules of all MDBs 
except for the EBRD, should be interpreted in a way that it only applies to cases 
where a firm or an individual competing for an MDB-funded contract, is debarred by 
the MDB and has not been reinstated by the time of the bidding.  
 
At the same time, if the prior review reveals information on fraud and corruption 
allegedly occurred in competing for the MDB-funded contract, it would make more 
sense to reject the proposal and initiate an investigation. This is the case in the EBRD. 
After revision in 2009, EBRD’s Procurement Policies and Rules do not provide for 
any remedial actions like Procurement Guidelines in all other MDBs but refer directly 
to the Bank’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures (EPPs) to deal with the 
sanctionable practices. As a result of the investigations and enforcement proceedings, 
EBRD can impose one or more sanctions available. Rejection is one of those. Thus, in 
the EBRD the decision to reject a proposal is taken as a result of the same procedure 
which can also lead to debarment. The choice of the sanction depends on the 
mitigating and aggravating factors.  
 
2. Cancellation of the portion of the loan  
 
If as a result of the prior review of procurement decisions, an MDB concludes that the 
borrower had strictly followed its rules, it issues a “no objection” notice, which is a 
notification to the procuring entity in the borrowing country, stating that based on the 
information received from the procuring entity the Bank has no objection to its 
decisions. In case those decisions are inconsistent with the rules imposed by an MDB, 
the latter declines to issue its “no objection” and declares “misprocurement”. As a 
consequence thereof, the Bank will cancel that portion of the loan, which had been 
misprocured. Even once the contract is awarded after obtaining a “no objection” from 
the Bank, the latter may still declare misprocurement if it concludes that the “no 
objection” was issued on the basis of incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading 
information furnished by the borrower or the terms and conditions of the contract had 
been modified without Bank’s approval.  
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3. Debarment 
 
Debarment constitutes the core of the MDBs’ remedial measures. On 17 September 
2006, at the World Bank’s annual meeting in Singapore, the heads of the African 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank announced a 
Joint International Financial Institutions (IFI) Anti-Corruption Task Force Framework 
in order to have a harmonized strategy to combat corruption in the activities and operations 
of the member institutions.213        
 
Since a common understanding of the prohibited practices was considered to be crucial to 
the success of a harmonized approach, the IFIs agreed on the standardized definitions of 
fraudulent corrupt, coercive and collusive practices, which have been implemented by all 
MDBs by now. These definitions followed by explanations are given below:  
 
a)  Corrupt practice  
A “corrupt practice” is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another 
party.  
 
This definition can be interpreted as either active or passive bribery, which can occur 
both during the procurement process and the execution of the contract. For example, a 
company/individual can be awarded a contract in exchange for a bribe or kickbacks. 
Kickback can occur when a company/individual in exchange of the awarded contract 
“kicks back” money – usually a percentage of the value of the contract - to the 
government official who made a selection. Bribery may occur where the contractor 
bribes to “close” borrower’s eyes to undue fulfillment of the contractual obligations.  
 
                                                 
213 International Financial Institutions Anti – Corruption Task Force Uniform Framework for 
Preventing and Combating Fraud and corruption, signed on 17 September 2006, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/FinalIFITaskForceFramework&Gdlines.pdf 
(accessed 5 September 2009). 
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b) Fraudulent practice 
A “fraudulent practice” is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, 
that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a 
financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation.  
 
In other words, fraudulent practice is an intentional documentation-based change 
made to influence the procurement process or contract execution. Hence, negligent 
misrepresentations or omissions are not covered by this definition It can be 
misrepresentation of the supplier’s qualifications, financial misrepresentations, the 
falsification of accounting records and invoices, overbilling etc.214 For example, the 
poor performance of the key consulting firm during the execution of the project can 
be a result of the misrepresentation of its experience, qualifications and certifications 
during bidding procedure in order to meet the selection criteria.  
 
c) Collusive practice 
A “collusive practice” is an arrangement between two or more parties designed 
to achieve an improper purpose, including to influence improperly the actions of 
another party. 
 
Collusion was described by Klitgaard as an “agreement among possible suppliers 
before submitting their bids”, wherein they form a kind of cartel to agree on a bid 
price, which is over competitive minimum, and choose one supplier with the winning 
bid – although it is still artificially high, it is much lower than those of other suppliers, 
which have no chance of winning.215 The profits from the winning bid may be divided 
among the “defeated” suppliers, or they may choose on a rotation basis the next 
“winner” to make sure that each participant in the arrangement is awarded a contract 
at certain point regardless that participant’s competitiveness.216 The impact of the 
collusion is that winning bid prices are significantly higher than they would have 
                                                 
214 Aguilar et al., supra note 194, at 2. 
215 Klitgaard, R. (1988): Controlling Corruption, 136. 
216 Williams, supra note 144, at 288. 
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through a fair competitive bidding, which undermines the project’s development 
value and confidence in the Bank’s procurement system.217       
 
d) Coercive practice 
A “coercive practice” is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, 
directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence 
improperly the actions of a party.  
 
The term “coercion” means the use of force or personal violence to cause something 
to occur. In public procurement it usually goes hand in hand with collusion and 
expresses the intention of the actor that is pre-determined to win, to use the violence 
in order to prevent outsiders from participation in the procurement process or force 
the “victims” to submit inflated bids.218  
 
Apart from the harmonized definitions, IFIs also elaborated common principles and 
guidelines for the conduct of investigations and agreed on enhancing exchange of 
information among themselves. As for the sanctions procedures, they still vary from 
one MDB to another. It is currently under discussion among MDBs whether to 
harmonize them or keep them different while mutually recognizing them.  
 
However, irrespective of the sanctions procedure, none of the MDBs can sanction 
public officials involved in corruption or fraud in Bank-financed projects, since it has 
no authority or the capacity to take any actions against them. Therefore, in order to 
ensure effective and comprehensive fight against corruption, the MDBs should make 
referrals to, cooperate with, and provide evidence to the relevant authorities of the 
countries involved. In case of lack of willingness to cooperate from the side of the 
government, the MDBs can take action under the legal agreement with the country, 
                                                 
217 World Bank (2007): The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: 
Benefiting the Poor by Helping to Prevent and Combat Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects: 
A User’s Guide, 8, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1173795340221/RevisedPMNDFinaluserGuideline031607.pdf [hereinafter, WB’ User’s Guide]. 
218 Williams, supra note 144, at 288; see also WB Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 216, at 7. 
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namely suspend disbursement of the loan and/or cancel undisbursed loan amounts 
and, may even require early repayment of the loan.219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 World Bank (1999): Toward a Comprehensive Development Strategy, Independent Evaluation Group’s 
Annual Review of Development Effectiveness, 6 [hereinafter, WB Development Effectiveness], 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/04/07/000094946
_99122006064936/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf  (accessed 13 October 2009) 
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CHAPTER IV.  THE WORLD BANK 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The World Bank was founded in 1946 to assist countries devastated by the Second 
World War in reconstructing their economies.220 Within the following years, the 
World Bank expanded its operations and today it is a leading multilateral organization 
with the main purpose to reduce poverty. The major institutions within the World 
Bank providing financial aid to developing countries in the form of low-interest loans, 
interest-free credit, and grants to specific predefined projects are the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development 
Association (IDA).  
 
Over the past five decades, the World Bank has loaned more than half a trillion 
dollars for economic development with an average of $20 billion per year.221 
Consequently, it should impose good-governance and anti-corruption requirements in 
the bank-financed projects. Bank’s former legal counsel argues, that “as the world’s 
major development finance institution and the coordinator of foreign aid to many of 
its members, the Bank cannot realistically ignore issues which significantly influence 
the effective flow and appropriate use of external resources in its borrowing 
countries”.222 Besides, if the Bank advises countries on the control of corruption, it 
should first of all ensure that its own loans are, to the maximum extent possible, free 
of corruption.223  
 
During the last few years, the Bank had been criticized for the high number of failures 
of projects that it had funded.224 The Bank’s own analysis in 1999 showed the 
importance of the Bank’s supervision and the borrower’s implementation 
                                                 
220 IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 29, Article I. 
221 Berkman, S. (2008): The World Bank and the Gods of Lending, 3.  
222 Shihata, I.F.I. (1997): Corruption: a General Overview with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank, Dickenson Journal of International Law, Vol.15, 476.  
223 WB Helping Countries 1997, supra note 202, at 29.  
224 Head, J. W. (2004): For Richer or for Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms Directed at the Multilateral 
Development Banks, University of Kansas Law Review, Vol.52, 241. 
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performance in the outcome of the projects.225 Therefore, to increase the credibility of 
its projects, it was essential for the World Bank to adopt efficient procurement 
procedures and introduce enforcement mechanisms that guarantee the observance of 
the rules.226 
 
 
B. Tackling Corruption in the WB-funded Projects  
1. The WB’s fiduciary responsibility 
 
Under Article III, Section 5(b) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement, the Bank is 
required to make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only 
for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations 
of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other noneconomic 
influences or considerations. Similar requirements are specified in Article V, Section 
1(g) of the IDA Articles of Agreement. Since fraud and corruption can divert loans 
and credits to purposes other than those for which they were granted and affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the concerned projects, the WB has a fiduciary 
responsibility to prevent fraud and corruption in projects it funds. This legal 
obligation means that the Bank’s failure to take effective measures against losses of 
its loans to corruption violates the requirements of the Articles of Agreement and 
makes the Bank legally responsible for a share of the corrupted funds.227  
 
Besides, as a development institution, the WB shall ensure that projects achieve their 
development objectives, and in particular, help borrowing countries in identifying and 
solving the problems emerging during their implementation. No matter how well the 
project is prepared, it will lose its value, if it is not properly executed.228  
 
                                                 
225 WB Development Effectiveness, supra note 219, at 8, Box 2.1. As it can be seen from the Box, 
while borrower compliance increases the project’s chances to success by about 20%, improved Bank 
supervision increases it by 51 % and borrower performance by 43 %.  
226 Meireles, supra note 191, at 72.  
227 Winters, supra note 23, at 102. 
228 Shihata, supra note 192, at 8-9.  
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2. The WB anti-corruption policy 
2.1.  General overview 
 
As it was mentioned before, till the beginning of 1990s, the World Bank’s approach to 
the issues of fraud and corruption affecting Bank-funded projects could have been 
described as the “three-monkey policy”: “see nothing, hear nothing, say nothing”. The 
lack of an explicit requirement in the IBRD’ Articles of Agreement to take measures 
against corruption in the Bank-financed projects and of any official policy to do so, as 
well as the provisions prohibiting the Bank from interfering in the internal affairs of a 
borrower country229 were for many years given as the reasons of the Bank’s silence 
with regard to the allegations of corruption in borrower countries and in Bank 
projects.230 
 
The Bank’s initial approach to the corruption problem can be found in internal 
memoranda231 which pointed out the issue of corruption and concluded that the Bank 
can take some aspects of national governance into consideration. Since then 
corruption has been incorporated into the Bank’s development agenda. 
 
Upon taking office in September 1991, Lewis T. Preston, the then new President of 
the World Bank, being aware of the Bank’s questioned performance decided to 
review the overall efficiency of its operations, and in particular, of its loan portfolio. 
For this purpose, a Task Force was convened in February 1992 headed by an 
experienced senior manager Willi A. Wapenhaus. One of the main findings of the 
Task Force’s report known as “Wapenhaus Report”232 was that the Bank’s staff was 
often more concerned about “pushing” as many projects as possible, while paying less 
attention to the commitments of the borrowing countries or their contractors. 
                                                 
229 IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 29, Article IV, Section 10. 
230 Thornburgh, D. (2000), Report to Shengman Zhang, Managing Director and Chairman of the 
Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption, the World Bank, Concerning Mechanisms to Address 
Problems of Fraud and Corruption, 8-9.   
231 Legal Memorandum of the General Counsel, SecM91-131, Issues of Governance in Borrowing 
Members – The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, 21 December 
1990 (5 February 1991); Legal Opinion of the General Counsel, SecM95-707, Prohibition of Political 
Activities in the Bank’s Work  11 July 1995 (12 July 1995).       
232 The findings of the Task Force were submitted to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in November 
1992 as Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact (R92-125) (November 3, 1992).  
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Therefore, it concluded that the Bank should, inter alia, improve the performance of 
its portfolio through changes in its own policies and practices.233  
 
First active steps to address the problems of corruption began when James 
Wolfensohn came to the presidency in 1995. In July 1996 a paper formulating the 
Bank’s sanctions process was presented to the Executive Directors.234 But the turning 
point in breaking the ice, as it was already stated earlier, was the address of 
Wolfensohn to the Boards of Governors in October 1996235 where he stressed out that 
the “cancer of corruption” was a major problem for the Bank and those countries it 
was trying to assist. Following this, the Bank took steps to ensure transparency in its 
procurement procedures and revised its procurement guidelines to identify actions to 
be considered as violations and introduce procedures for their investigation and 
sanctions.  
 
In August 1997, the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network of the 
Bank issued a major report called “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role 
of the World Bank”.236 One of the main reasons for the Bank’s anti-corruption policy 
pointed out in the Report was that corruption diverts public services from those who 
need them most,237 and undermines public support for development assistance by 
creating an erroneous perception that all assistance is affected by corruption. This 
report for the first time set out a general framework for addressing corruption as a 
development issue and announced the Bank’s anti-corruption strategy consisting of 
four main dimensions: 
 
• preventing fraud and corruption in Bank-financed projects; 
 
                                                 
233 Shihata, supra note 192, at 2-3.  
234 Fraud and Corruption – Proposed Amendments in the Bank’s Loan Documents for the Purpose of 
Making Them More Effective in the Fight against Fraud and Corruption, dated 11 July 1996 [Board 
Paper R96-112/1]. This paper was implemented in a January 1998 Operational Memorandum. 
235 Wolfensohn, supra note 11.  
236 The paper was approved by the Executive Directors and published in September 1997 together with 
the paper The World Bank’s Role in Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Guidelines to Staff.  
237 As Steve Berkman correctly pointed out, inefficient projects undermine development and break the 
promises of progress and alleviation of poverty given to the poor, see Berkman, supra note 221, 2; see 
also Winters, supra note 23, 120. 
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• helping countries that request Bank assistance in their efforts to reduce 
corruption; 
 
• mainstreaming a concern for corruption in Bank’s work, that is, including 
the corruption issue in country assistance strategies, country lending 
considerations, the choice and design of projects etc.; 
 
• Adding support to international efforts to reduce corruption. 
 
Following the adoption of this strategy, concrete steps were taken to prevent fraud and 
corruption in Bank projects, including but not limited to: the introduction of a 
confidential hotline, tightening of procurement guidelines, intensive audits of projects, 
and support for improving procurement systems in client countries.238  
 
Paul Wolfowitz, who replaced James Wolfensohn in 2005, picked up the 
anticorruption torch and since first days of his presidency made the fight against 
corruption a major priority. Identifying it as the single largest obstacle to 
development, he gave a pledge to "move from talking about corruption to dealing 
with corruption" in Bank-funded projects. For this purpose he suspended or delayed 
loans to India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Chad due to corruption concerns and increased 
the budget of the Bank’s anti–corruption unit.239 “This is about making sure that the 
bank’s resources go to the poor and don’t end up in the wrong pockets. It is about 
fighting poverty”, Wolfowitz said in an interview to US News & World Report.240   
 
On 15 October 2006 the Bank adopted a new framework document entitled 
“Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects 
Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants” (the Anti-Corruption 
                                                 
238 Huther, J., Shah, A. (2000): Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A framework for Evaluation, 5, 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/ 2001/01/06/0000949 
46_00121906063771/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed 4 September 2009).  
239 Bosshard, P., Lawrence, S. (2006): The World Bank’s Conflicted Corruption Fight, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/1256 (accessed 31 August 2009). 
240Pound, E.T., Knight, D. (2006): Cleaning Up The World Bank, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/ 
biztech/articles/060403/3worldbank.htm (accessed 1 September 2009). 
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Guidelines).241 These Guidelines included the expanded definitions of the practices 
constituting fraud and corruption and set out the basic actions that borrowers and 
other recipients of loan proceeds are required to undertake to prevent and combat 
fraud and corruption in Bank-financed projects. They also set forth sanctions and 
related actions that the Bank may take in cases of fraud and corruption. These 
Guidelines should be incorporated into the legal agreements for each project, and the 
Borrower should distribute them to all project participants to make sure that they are 
aware of their content.242  
 
In March 2007, the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved the Governance and 
Anticorruption Strategy (GAS) which has three main pillars:  
 
• Helping countries build capable, transparent, and accountable institutions.  
 
• Expanding partnerships with multilateral and bilateral development 
institutions, civil society, the private sector, and other actors in joint 
initiatives to address corruption.  
 
• Minimizing corruption in World Bank-funded projects by assessing 
corruption risk in projects upstream, actively investigating allegations of 
fraud and corruption, and strengthening project oversight and 
supervision.243  
 
For the purpose of my research, I will only focus on the third pillar. 
 
                                                 
241 World Bank (2006): Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects 
Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants [hereinafter, WB Anti-Corruption Guidelines] 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WB_Anti_Corruption_Guidelines_10
_2006.pdf (accessed 5 September 2009). 
242 World Bank (2009): Sanctions System: Tackling Corruption through a Two-Tier Administrative 
Sanctions Process, 4 [hereinafter, WB Sanctions System], 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/OESFactSheet09.pdf?resourceurlname
=OESFactSheet09.pdf (accessed 5 September 2009). 
243 World Bank (2004): Reform of the World Bank’s Sanction Process, 2-3 [hereinafter, WB Sanctions 
Reform], http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/ 
29/000160016_20040629112806/Rendered/PDF/295270rev.pdf (accessed 29 August 2009) 
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2.2.  Procurement reforms 
 
In light of changes in the Bank’s anticorruption policy, relevant amendments were 
made to the Guidelines on Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (WB 
Procurement Guidelines) in 1996 and to the Guidelines on Selection and Employment 
of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers (WB Consultants Guidelines) in 1997. In 
terms of corruption control, the review of the Bank’s procurement policies in 1996 
and 1997 was the most significant one since 1964, when the first formal direction on 
Bank procurement was issued. The Bank introduced new sections regarding fraud and 
corruption in its Procurement and Consultants Guidelines. The watershed of these 
sections was providing the Bank with the right to debar companies or individuals 
which had engaged in fraudulent or corrupt practices in competing for, or in 
executing, a Bank-financed project and permitting borrowers to include a “no-
bribery” pledge in bid documentation.244  
 
In 2004 provisions on corruption in the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines were 
revised again245 and, as a result, the list of sanctionable activities was completed by 
collusive and coercive practices246 and the Bank was granted contractual access to bid 
and contract documentation and the power to audit the accounts of suppliers.247      
 
On 1 August 2006, the Executive Directors of the Bank approved a series of 
reforms,248 which came into force in July 2007. The most significant changes with 
regard to procurement were as follows: 
 
• Adoption of new definitions of corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, and 
coercive practices, which inter alia expanded coverage of the sanctions 
beyond procurement. If prior to the reforms the Bank imposed sanctions 
                                                 
244 “With the specific agreement of the Bank, a Borrower may introduce into bid forms for large 
contracts an undertaking of the bidder to observe, in competing for and executing a contract, the 
country’s law against fraud and corruption (including bribery)[…]”. See WB Procurement Guidelines, 
Section 1.15.  
245 WB Sanction Reform, supra note 243, at 2-3. 
246 WB Procurement Guidelines, Section 1.14(a)(iii)-(iv).  
247 Ibid., Section 1.14(e). 
248 World Bank’s Sanctions Procedures (2006) [hereinafter, WB Sanctions Procedures], Section 1, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EX
TOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:21299248~menuPK:3726884~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~th
eSitePK:3601046,00.html (accessed 5 September 2009).  
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for those sanctionable practices, as defined under the Bank’s Procurement 
and Consultants Guidelines only in the context of procurement of works, 
goods, and services, the selection and employment of consultants, and the 
execution of contracts resulting from such procurement or selection, after 
the reforms they can also be sanctioned when occurred during the 
preparation or implementation of a Bank-financed project outside the 
procurement or selection or contract execution249 (for example, fraud and 
corruption committed by NGOs or financial intermediaries that were not 
selected through procurement).250 
   
• Adoption of a new sanctionable offense of “obstructive practice”, defined 
as both non-compliance with the Bank’s third-party audit rights and 
deliberate obstruction of Bank investigations into fraud and corruption.251  
 
 
C. The WB’s Debarment Policy 
1. Introduction 
 
In the beginning of 1990s, three cases of fraud and corruption were referred by several 
Bank officials to the Legal Adviser for Procurement and Consultant Services and to the 
Chief of the Bank’s Central Procurement Office. Investigation in each case was 
conducted by these two officials in consultation with others. After having examined the 
evidence, they gave the suspected companies a chance to defend themselves. 
Eventually, all these companies were found to be involved in fraud and corruption and 
deprived of the eligibility to get Bank contracts for a period of two years.252      
 
Lack of any guidelines on Bank’s responses to this kind of irregularities raised certain 
difficulties in assessment of the cases. Therefore, likelihood of similar cases in the 
                                                 
249 World Bank, Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime beyond Procurement and 
Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/ 
Resources/40940-1173795340221/SanctionsReformNoteBorrowers.pdf (accessed 5 September 2009). 
250 Ibid.; see also WB User’s Guide, supra note 217, at 4-5.    
251 Ibid. 
252 For more information about the case see Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 10-11. 
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future was an incentive for the Bank to undergo significant changes in order to 
recognize fraud and corruption as problems to be tackled with and, consequently, to 
find relevant solutions.  
 
As it was discussed above, in order to prevent fraud and corruption in Bank-financed 
projects and fulfill the mandate of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the first thing 
the Bank did was revision of its procurement guidelines and related provisions.253 One 
of the key changes was enabling the Bank to debar firms and individuals involved in 
corruption in the Bank-funded projects.  
 
In order to implement the new provisions in the Procurement and Consultants 
Guidelines regarding fraud and corruption, on 5 January 1998, the Bank approved the 
Operational Memorandum called “Fraud and Corruption under World Bank 
Contracts: Procedures for Dealing with Allegations against Bidders, Suppliers, 
Contractors, or Consultants”. Under this Memorandum, an Investigation Unit was 
established within the Internal Auditing Department to investigate allegations of fraud 
and corruption, which was transferred a year after under the supervision of the then 
newly set up Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption, and later on became an 
essential part of the new Department of Institutional Integrity.254 Assessment of the 
allegations and evidence gathered during the investigations was entrusted with the 
Sanctions Committee, established in November 1998, which was also responsible for 
making recommendations to the President regarding appropriate sanctions to be 
imposed on those companies or individuals found to have engaged in fraudulent or 
corrupt activities.255  
 
On 2 August 2001, the Bank issued written procedures for the Sanctions Committee 
which had three main objectives: 
 
• To reflect certain institutional changes, including clarification of the 
particular steps the Bank was taking to implement the general provisions 
                                                 
253 WB Procurement Guidelines, WB Consultants Guidelines, General Conditions Applicable to Loan 
and Guarantee Agreements, General Conditions Applicable to Development Credit Agreements.   
254 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 10-11. 
255 The Committee itself is not involved in sanctioning those accused of such activities. 
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of the Operational Memorandum, and the creation of the Department of 
Institutional Integrity (INT) responsible for conducting fraud and 
corruption investigations and preparing the notices of debarment 
proceedings; 
 
• To formalize practices of the Sanctions Committee in the context of the 
earlier work by the Bank’s investigators; and 
 
• To provide an improved process to the companies and individuals alleged to 
have engaged in fraudulent or corrupt activities, including a more uniform 
conduct of the Committee’s hearings and stricter division of responsibilities 
between INT, the Sanctions Committee and its Secretariat.256  
 
The Sanctions Committee composed of senior Bank managers was making 
recommendations to the President for decision.  
 
As a result of the reforms of 2006, mentioned above, the President has been removed 
from the sanctions process and, instead, a new staff position of “Evaluation and 
Suspension Officer” (EO) has been established. The Sanctions Committee which was 
composed only from the Bank staff was replaced by Sanctions Board including three 
Bank staff appointed by the President, and four non-Bank staff appointed by the 
Executive Directors. The Sanctions Board may also form a Panel comprising two 
non-Bank staff and one Bank staff. Both the EOs and the Sanctions Board are 
independent of INT.257 
 
 
 
                                                 
256 World Bank (2001): Sanctions Committee Procedures, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:5000
2288~pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html (accessed 8 September 2009). 
257 WB Sanctions Reform, supra note 243, at 4-5; see also Statute of the World Bank Group Sanctions 
Board with amendments dated 17 February 2009 [hereinafter, WB Sanctions Board Statute], 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/Sanctions_Board_Statute_FINAL_A
mended_February_17,_2009%29.pdf (accessed 6 September 2009).    
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2. Grounds for debarment 
 
For the purpose of the anti-corruption policy, the Bank defines corruption as the 
“abuse of the public office for private gain”.258 This definition is quite broad, which 
can cover acts like bribery, theft of state assets, fraud, nepotism, the misallocation of 
government benefits and other forms of bureaucratic corruption.259 With regard to the 
Bank-financed projects, the WB Procurement and Consultants Guidelines 
differentiate the following five kinds of sanctionable offences which constitute 
grounds for debarment: corrupt, fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices as 
defined in the IFI’s Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and 
Corruption,260 and an additional offence of obstructive practice which definition is as 
follows:   
 
An “obstructive practice” is deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or 
concealing of evidence material to the investigation or making false statements 
to investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation into 
allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; and/or 
threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its 
knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the 
investigation, or acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s 
inspection and audit rights.261 
 
Before introduction of this offence, the destruction of the evidence could only be 
considered as an aggravating circumstance while determining sanctions in case the 
fact of corruption has been proved. A firm could also get away with preventing the 
Bank from gathering sufficient evidence to prove the allegation of corruption.262 
Currently, even the refusal to allow access to the Bank investigators to the financial 
records of the Bank-financed project by the company implementing it is considered an 
offence and can lead to the debarment of the company.263    
 
                                                 
258 WB Sanctions Reform, supra note 243, at 8.  
259 Ibid., at 8-12.  
260 WB Procurement Guidelines, Section 1.14(a)(i)-(iv).  
261 Ibid.,, Section 1.14(a)(v). 
262 WB Sanctions Reform, supra note 243, at 5. 
263 WB User’s Guide, supra note 217, at 9. 
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There is no requirement in the WB Procurement Guidelines that the above-mentioned 
acts be completed or successful for them to constitute a sanctionable offence. For 
example, offering a bribe to another party constitutes a corrupt practice and may be 
resulted in debarment even if the offer is not accepted or the purpose of the payment 
is not achieved.264   
 
Besides, debarment can apply against sanctionable offences committed both in pre- and 
post-contract stages of procurement. Nonetheless, the Bank will not take any measures 
against a firm or an individual involved in corruption occurring outside the Bank 
projects.265  
 
3. Initial sources of allegations 
 
The Bank can receive allegations of suspicions of the sanctionable offences from 
different sources, such as procurement auditors, personnel involved in procurement 
matters in countries where projects are being funded, government officials in those 
countries, employees of companies alleged to be involved in fraud or corruption or 
those of competitor companies, NGOs, media, witnesses, anonymous sources, etc.266 
This information can be communicated directly with Bank’s auditors or investigators, 
or indirectly using the Fraud and Corruption Hotline operated by an independent third 
party.267 In case the informant wants his/her identity to be kept confidential, the Bank 
will not reveal any information that may disclose it to anyone outside the investigative 
team and its managers and attorneys unless the Bank determines that this person made 
an intentional misrepresentation or omission, or the Bank is required to do so by 
law.268 Information from anonymous sources is also accepted and assessed in the 
same manner as information originated from the identifiable person.   
                                                 
264 Ibid. 
265 Williams, supra note 144, at 284. 
266 According to the World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Report 2009, in 2009 38% of total 
allegations were received from the WB staff which is the main source of allegations of sanctionable 
offences, 33% were received from contractors, government officials and employees of NGOs, and 28% 
of the allegations were reported to INT anonymously, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/ 
Resources/WBG_INTAnnualReport2009_web.pdf (accessed 16 October 2009), 11. 
267 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 16. 
268 World Bank, Report Suspected Fraud and Corruption, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EX
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4. Investigation process  
4.1.  Preliminary assessment of allegations 
 
All received allegations of fraud and corruption are referred to the Bank’s Integrity 
Vice-Presidency (INT).269 But not all allegations lead to investigations. When an 
allegation is received, a Centralized Case Intake Unit (CCI) established in 2007, 
conducts an initial screening and assessment of all received complaints concerning 
fraud and corruption in Bank-financed projects. As a result, it determines whether the 
allegation is prima facie credible and related to the WB-funded activities. The initial 
assessment is recorded in a Preliminary Inquiry Report (PIR), which provides a 
summary of the allegation and evaluates the impact that the alleged corrupt practices 
could have on the Bank’s reputation, finances, and development goals which is used 
to determine the ranking of cases.270 Preparation of PIRs by CCI and not by 
investigators, which used to be the case before, allows INT’s investigators to focus 
purely on their investigative activities. 
 
If based on the PIR, INT determines that the allegations are outside of INT’s 
jurisdiction, it redirects them as appropriate. Those allegations that fall under INT’s 
jurisdiction are investigated if they are determined to be of a higher priority.  
 
4.2.  Full investigations 
 
Under the current triage system, all cases are ranked as High, Medium and Low 
Priority according to a number of criteria including: impact on development 
outcomes; impact on the Bank’s reputation and finances; impact on present and future 
Bank engagements; ability to deter future corrupt practices; estimated cost of 
resolution; likelihood of resolution; and safety of Bank staff and witnesses. 
Depending on the availability of resources, INT focuses first on the High Priority 
                                                                                                                                            
TDOII/0,,contentMDK:20659616~menuPK:1702202~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:
588921,00.html (accessed 6 September 2009).  
269 The Bank’s Integrity Vice-Presidency was previously known as Department of Institutional 
Integrity established in 2001 as the investigative arm of the WB, which was elevated to a Vice 
Presidency in 2008. 
270 World Bank (2007): Integrity Vice Presidency’s Annual Report, 15 [hereinafter, INT Report 2007], 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ fy07report-complete.pdf (accessed 7 
September 2009).  
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cases in order to ensure that those cases are investigated more rapidly. Medium 
Priority cases are reviewed monthly to determine whether their priority should be 
adjusted up or downwards, where relevant in relation to new incoming cases. These 
cases may be upgraded to High Priority if new information is received and/or 
additional resources become available. This allows for more realistic and effective 
management of major investigations. Low Priority cases are closed automatically 
after 30 days if no other information becomes available that justifies a change in the 
priority rating. 271 
 
Following Volker’s recommendation, INT is striving to complete normal external 
investigations within 12 months and complex ones within 18 months. For this purpose 
INT designed tracking systems to meet standards and is recruiting staff to achieve 
required resource-to-case ratio.272 
 
If, as a result of investigation, the Director of INT believes that an offence that may 
lead to debarment has occurred and there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the 
allegations, it should refer the evidence and a recommendation of appropriate sanction 
in the form of a document entitled the Proposed Notice of Sanctions Proceedings 
(NoSP) to the Evaluation and Suspension Officer (Evaluation Officer).273 To speed up 
the transition from closing an investigation to imposing sanctions, INT created a 
specialized litigation unit, which is dealing with drafting and preparing proposed 
NoSPs.274 
 
5.  Sanctions Process 
5.1.  Submissions to the Evaluation and Suspension Officer 
 
The decision whether a firm or individual has engaged in a sanctionable practice and, 
if so, what sanction should be imposed, is determined through a revised two-tiered 
sanctions process involving the EOs and the Sanctions Board (for a flowchart 
                                                 
271 Ibid.  
272 INT Report 2009, supra note 198, at 4, 8-9. 
273 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Sections 2-3. 
274 INT Report 2009, supra note 198, at 20. 
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illustrating the sanctions process in the WB see Annex III). Both the EOs and the 
Sanctions Board are independent of INT.275  
 
Submission of the NoSP by INT to the EO is the first tier. The EO shall examine the 
received evidence within forty-five (45) days276 and decide whether it leads to a 
finding that Respondent277 is engaged in a sanctionable practice.278 If it does, the EO 
issues the NoSP to the Respondent stating the allegations and the recommended 
sanction, attaching the evidence, and explaining the Respondent’s right to contest the 
allegations and/or recommended sanction.279 Within forty-five (45) days after the date 
of issuance of the NoSP the Respondent has the right to explain in writing why it 
should remain eligible to be awarded future Bank contracts pending the final outcome 
of the proceedings.280  
 
Except for cases regarding allegations on violation of a Material Term of Voluntary 
Disclosure Program’s Terms and Conditions, and unless the EO, based on the 
explanation submitted by the Respondent under Section 5(5) of the Sanction 
Procedures, determines, that temporary suspension shall not be imposed, “the 
Respondent shall, seventy-five (75) days after the date of issuance of the NoSP, 
automatically be temporally suspended, pending a final outcome of the sanctions 
proceeding”.281 To this end, in May 2009, the Bank adopted a procedure for Early 
Temporary Suspension, which will be put into practice in 2010. This new procedure 
                                                 
275 Before the Reform of the World Bank’s Sanctions Process of 2006, the sanctions process was also 
two-tiered, with a Sanctions Committee composed of senior Bank managers making recommendations to 
the President for decision. The Reform removed the President from this process. Instead, a new staff 
position of “Evaluation and Suspension Officer” was established, and a Sanctions Board including three 
Bank staff appointed by the President, and four non-Bank staff appointed by the Executive Directors, 
unlike the former Sanctions Committee which was composed only from Bank staff. The Sanctions Board 
may also form a Panel comprising two non-Bank staff and one Bank staff. See Sanctions Reform, supra 
note 243, at 4-5; see also WB Sanctions Board Statute, supra note 257.    
276 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 5(1). 
277 “Respondent” in the context of the WB sanctions process means “a firm or individual alleged to 
have engaged in a Sanctionable Practice and who has been designated as such in a Notice”. See WB 
Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Introduction.   
278 “Sanctionable Practice” in the context of the WB’s sanctions process means “any corrupt, 
fraudulent, coercive, collusive or obstructive practice in a Bank Project […], or any violation of a 
Material Term of the Voluntary Disclosure Program Terms and Conditions”. See WB Sanctions 
Procedures, supra note 248, Introduction (J). Information about the WB Voluntary Disclosure Program 
(VDP) will be given further. 
279 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 5(3). 
280 Ibid., Section 5(5).  
281 Ibid., Section 5(6).  
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allows for the temporary suspension of a company’s eligibility to receive Bank-
financed contracts when the EO has determined that there is sufficient evidence that 
the company has engaged in some misconduct, but INT continues to investigate other 
related allegations. It aims to prevent the risk of additional corrupt activities by a firm 
while INT completes an investigation (for example, see below the case of Acres). The 
Bank will not make public the identity of firms until the final decision is taken.282 
 
5.2.  Submissions to the Sanctions Board 
 
If the Respondent does not contest the allegations and/or the sanction recommended 
by the EO in the NoSP within ninety (90) days after the date of its issuance, the matter 
is referred to the Sanctions Board, which automatically, without a review and a 
hearing, issues a decision imposing the sanction recommended by the EO in the 
NoSP.283  
 
If the Respondent decides to contest the allegations and/or the sanction recommended, 
the matter is referred to the Sanctions Board for its review and decision pursuant to its 
Statute.284 In this case, the Respondent within ninety (90) days after issuance of the 
NoSP may submit a written response to the allegations and recommended sanction 
(“Response”).285 After this, within thirty (30) days INT may submit a written reply to 
the arguments and evidence contained in the Response.286  
 
The Respondent and INT have an opportunity to present their case by requesting the 
Sanctions Board to hold a hearing.287 At the hearing the Respondent may be self-
represented or represented by an attorney or any other individual authorized by the 
Respondent, at his own expenses.288 Hearings are limited to arguments and evidence 
contained in the written submissions to the Sanctions Board. Witnesses may be called 
                                                 
282 INT Report 2009, supra note 198, at 22. 
283 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 5(8). 
284 Ibid., Section 5(7).  
285 Ibid., Section 6(2). 
286 Ibid., Section 6(3). 
287 Ibid., Section 10. 
288 Ibid., Section 11(2). 
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and questioned only by the Sanctions Board. Cross-examination is not allowed, while 
it is possible to present rebuttal evidence during the hearing.289     
 
5.3.  Standard of proof 
 
The standard of proof requires, that on the basis of preponderance of evidence, the 
Sanctions Board or the Sanctions Board Panel shall decide whether it is “more likely 
than not” that the Respondent had engaged in the sanctionable practice.290   
 
5.4.  Imposition of sanctions  
 
a) Range of sanctions 
If the Sanctions Board or the Sanctions Board Panel determines that it is more likely 
than not that the Respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice, it shall impose an 
appropriate sanction from the following range of five possible administrative 
sanctions irrespective of the recommendation of the EO:291  
 
• Formal letter of reprimand of the Respondent’s conduct;292 
 
• Debarment, which means that the Respondent is declared ineligible, either 
indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to be awarded a contract in 
Bank projects293.   
 
• Conditional non-debarment, which means that the Respondent is required 
to comply with certain remedial, preventive or other measures to reduce the 
likelihood of the fraud and corruption in the future. A failure to carry out 
the required acts would result in the Respondent’s debarment.294 The 
measures to be taken may include firing employees involved in fraud or 
                                                 
289 Ibid., Section 12(2)(c)-(d). 
290 Ibid., Section 15(2)(a). As a result of sanctions reform, the standard of proof was changed from 
“reasonably sufficient” to “more likely than not” in order to increase the clarity and achieve more 
uniformity in application. See Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 50. 
291 Ibid., Section 15(2)(d). 
292 Ibid., Section 15(3)(a). 
293 Ibid., Section 15(3)(b); see also WB Procurement Guidelines, Section 1.14(d). 
294 Ibid., Section 15(3)(c). 
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corruption, introducing and/or implementing ethics programs, adopting a 
compliance program incorporating audits, correcting corporate deficiencies 
that could affect the honesty of the Respondent’s dealings etc.295     
 
• Debarment with conditional release, which operates as a normal 
temporary debarment, but the Respondent’s period of debarment would 
be reduced or terminated if the specified conditions similar to those for a 
conditional non-debarment have been complied with.296 
 
• Restitution, which means that the Respondent would be required to pay 
back the diverted funds to the affected government or any other party.297 
 
b) Length of debarment 
Debarment can be imposed either indefinitely or for a stated period of time. At the 
inception of the sanction process the most frequently employed sanction was debarment 
for an indefinite period, which was treated in fact as a permanent debarment.298 However, 
length of debarment of the currently debarred parties varies from three (3) to fifteen (15) 
years.299 For cases involving the violation of a Material Term of the VDP Terms and 
Conditions the only applicable sanction is a ten (10)-year debarment.300 
 
c) Mitigating and aggravating factors 
In determining an appropriate sanction as well as the length of a debarment, various 
mitigating or aggravating factors can be taken into account: 
 
• severity of the Respondent’s actions; 
• degree of involvement of the Respondent in the Sanctionable Practice; 
                                                 
295 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 62. 
296 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 15(3)(d). 
297 Ibid., Section 15(3)(e). 
298 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 58.  
299 WB, Listing of Ineligible Firms, http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=84266 
&content-MDK=64069844&menuPK=116730&pagePK=64148989&piPK=64148984 (accessed 8 
September 2009).   
300 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 15(3)(b)(iii).   
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• the losses and damage caused by the Respondent to the procurement 
process; 
• the Respondent’s past conduct involving the Sanctionable Practice; 
• the Respondent’s cooperation in the investigation; 
• period of temporary suspension already served etc.301  
 
The Decision of the Sanctions Board enters into force immediately.302  
6. Parties subject to sanctions 
 
Under the WB Procurement Guidelines, both natural and legal persons can be subject 
to debarment.303 In order to “circumvent the consequences of a debarment 
decision”,304 a debarred firm can create a new firm and bid under different corporate 
identity or have access to Bank contracts through its subsidiaries, affiliates, and other 
related companies that have a common ownership with it.305 In recognizing this risk, 
the Bank extends the debarment to “any individual or organization that, directly or 
indirectly, controls or is controlled by the Respondent”.306 This can be achieved 
through in-depth investigations into the business history of the liable company and the 
networks of its ownership, which might be quite challenging and costly for the 
Bank.307 
 
In establishing a relationship between the respondent firm and its affiliates, the Bank 
focuses on control and not ownership,308 since it is possible to control the activities of 
                                                 
301 Ibid., Section 15(5). 
302 Ibid., Section 16(1).   
303 WB Procurement Guidelines, Section 1.14(d). 
304 WB Sanctions Reform, supra note 243, at 13. 
305 Williams, supra note 144, at 295. 
306 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 15(4). 
307 Williams, supra note 144, at 295; see also Anechiarico, F., Jacobs, J.G. (1995): Purging Corruption 
from Public Contracting: The “Solutions” Are Now Part of the Problem, in: New York Law School 
Law Review, Vol.40, 172. 
308 Under the Operational Memorandum, debarment automatically extends to “any firm that owns the 
majority of the accused firm’s capital, or of which the accused firm owns the majority of the capital”, 
Memorandum on Fraud and Corruption under Bank-Financed Contracts: Procedures for Dealing with 
Allegations Against Bidders, Suppliers, Contractors, or Consultants (Operational Memorandum), 5 
January 1998, §5.  
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a separate firm without owning a majority interest in that firm.309 Considering this, the 
sanctions can mainly be extended to the firms that have a common ownership with the 
respondent (for example, sister companies) and firms that bear some degree of 
responsibility for the sanctionable offences, even if they do not have a direct 
connection with the latter (for example, parent/holding companies).310  
 
7. Appeals 
 
The World Bank does not provide the debarred parties with any possibility to appeal 
decisions of the Sanction Board.  
 
Back in 2002, in his report concerning debarment in the WB, Thornburgh criticized its 
sanctions process claiming that the Bank personnel were serving as investigators, 
prosecutors, judge and jury whose decision was final and there was no opportunity to 
appeal it.311  
 
In order to eliminate this conflict of interest, the reforms of the Sanctions Process 
introduced position of the Evaluation Officer and changed the composition of the 
Sanctions Board, which consists now from both internal and external members, 
enhancing thereby the independence of this body and lessening the rationale for 
subjecting their decisions to additional review by the outside panel. Following Volker’s 
Recommendations, external member was appointed as Chair of the Sanctions Board in 
February 2009.  
 
8. Disclosure and information sharing 
 
Information about the identity of each sanctioned party and the sanctions imposed are 
published on the Bank’s website.312     
                                                 
309 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 76. Talking about control, Thornburg clarifies, that it has not 
necessarily be a complete control, but can also be limited to an influence exerted by a debarred 
individual to another firm’s activities where he moved to a managerial position.  
310 Williams, supra note 144, at 296. 
311 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 79. 
312 WB Listing of Ineligible Firms, supra note 299. The information about debarred firms appears also 
in the Bank’s Press Releases. 
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Until December 2008, the Bank was disclosing only the names of companies it 
debarred from contract work on loans and projects in borrowing countries as well as 
those of their affiliates, while the identities of companies debarred from working 
directly for the Bank itself were secret. It has changed after the Bank had been 
criticized for the lack of transparency with respect to the Indian IT Company Satyam. 
Although the Bank suspended it from consideration for future direct contracts on the 
grounds of fraud and corruption in February 2008 and debarred it in September 2008, 
the information became public only in December. In the meantime, UNDP awarded a 
six-million dollar contract to the company. Therefore, in January 2009, “in the interest 
of fairness and transparency”, the World Bank decided to make public the names of 
all companies it debars, including those debarred from its corporate procurement.313 
 
Besides, INT publishes annual reports with statistics on trends in allegations, reporting, 
and investigative outcomes, and following Volker’s Recommendations, it has started 
disclosing redacted investigative reports on its website since 13 September 2007.314 
 
The WB may at any time make materials submitted to the Sanctions Board available 
to other organizations, including another MDB, if they have an agreement on 
reciprocal sharing of this kind of information.315 Moreover, if the WB determines that 
there is evidence of a sanctionable practice in connection with a project funded by 
another international organization, including another MDB, it may at any time share 
this information with this organization.316 Likewise, the WB may at any time share 
information with national authorities of a member state, if it determines that the 
sanctionable practice has violated the law of that country.317 
 
      
                                                 
313 World Bank (2009): Statement: World Bank Group Discloses Debarments under Corporate 
Procurement Program, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22030864~pagePK:6425704
3~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 11 October 2009). 
314 World Bank, Status of Recommendations from Volcker Independent Review of INT, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21924818~menuPK:34480~p
agePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 16 October 2009). 
315 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 18(3). 
316 Ibid., Section 18(2). 
317 Ibid., Section 18(1). 
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9. Avoiding debarment: the Voluntary Disclosure Program   
 
In August 2006 the World Bank introduced a new anti-corruption tool called 
“Voluntary Disclosure Program” (VDP), to “uncover corrupt and fraudulent schemes 
and patterns in Bank-financed projects through the voluntary cooperation of 
participating firms and individuals”.318 The VDP allows the World Bank contractors 
to “self-police”, meaning to identify, investigate and rectify privately, and thereby 
avoid debarment.319  
 
All companies and individuals involved in Bank-financed projects are eligible to 
participate in the VDP unlesss they are Bank staff or under active investigation by the 
Bank320 or any relevant jurisdiction.321 For this purpose, program participants commit 
themselves to standardized, non-negotiable Terms and Conditions322 requiring them to:  
 
• cease corrupt practices and commit to not engage in misconduct in the 
future;  
• disclose to the Bank the results of an internal investigation into all their 
Bank-project-related contracts for the last five years including fraudulent, 
corrupt, collusive or coercive acts in Bank-financed projects or contracts; 
and  
• implement a robust “best practices” internal compliance program 
monitored by a Bank-approved third party for three years.  
 
                                                 
318 World Bank (2006): World Bank Launches Voluntary Disclosure Program, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21011609~menuPK:34464~p
agePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 10 September 2009). 
319 Dubois P., Matechak, J. (2006): World Bank Battles Corruption through New Voluntary Disclosure 
Program, International Government Contractor, Vol.3, No.9 ¶ 73, 4. 
http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/World_Bank_Battles_Articles.pdf (accessed 10 September 2009).  
320 WB Voluntary Disclosure Program, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ 
ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/EXTVOLDISPRO/0,,contentMDK:20996886~menuPK:27205
24~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:2720459,00.html (accessed 11 September 2009). 
321 Dubois, supra note 319, at 1.  
322 Terms and Conditions of the WB VDP, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVOLDISPRO/ 
Resources/VDPTermsandConditions.pdf (accessed 11 September 2009). 
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In exchange for these commitments and full cooperation, VDP participants avoid 
debarment for disclosed past misconduct, they may continue to compete for and 
participate in Bank-financed projects,323 and their identities are kept confidential.324 
 
However, if the participant of the VDP breaches the conditions of the VDP Terms and 
Conditions by, inter alia, continuing to engage in misconduct, withholding the 
information relating to past or current misconduct, or failing to implement a 
compliance program or cooperate with a compliance monitor, the Bank will impose a 
mandatory ten-year debarment on that participant.325 This debarment will be 
conducted through the Bank’s regular debarment process326 and will be publicized. 
       
The importance of the VDP for the Bank’s anti-corruption efforts stems from several 
factors. First, it gives the Bank an alternative source of information which might help 
fight corruption.327 Second, it gives the Bank the ability to establish the nature, forms, 
and patterns of corruption in Bank projects and increases the range of tools that the 
Bank may use in its anti-corruption policies and operations.328 In addition, the VDP 
helps ensure proper use of Bank and donor funds as well as provides incentives to the 
contractors with “less-than-perfect pasts” stop corrupt behavior and become 
compliant with Bank rules and guidelines.329 As it was argued by Dubois and 
Matechak,  “[t]he VDP is a win for the private sector, a win for the World Bank and a 
win for international development”.330 
                                                 
323 However, participation in the VDP does not provide immunity from prosecution in any jurisdiction. 
The World Bank may promise not to impose debarment, but it cannot prevent the national authorities 
from enforcing their national anticorruption (bribery, fraud, kickback, etc.) laws if they independently 
investigate the participant’s activities. See Dubois, supra note 319, at 3. 
324 WB VDP, supra note 320. 
325 Terms and Conditions of the WB VDP, supra note 322, §5.8. 
326 WB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 248, Section 15(3)(b)(iii). 
327 While the VDP’s informational value must, by nature of the program, remain confidential, a 
properly structured VDP can identify corrupt actors in specific instances. 
328 Williams, supra note 144, at 300; see also WB VDP, supra note 320. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Dubois, supra note 319, at 4. However, not everyone shares this opinion. For example, Patricia 
Adams of the Canadian-based foreign aid watchdog, Probe International, argues that the VDP is “bad 
for developing country citizens and taxpayers, and the rule of law," since it “allows 'confessors' 
confidentiality and thus allows the Bank to cover-up its own negligence or complicity, which 
undermines the administration of justice in countries where it is a criminal offense to bribe a foreign 
official." Odious Debts Online (2006): German Firm Barred by World Bank for Bribery in Lesotho 
Project,http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=16566 
(accessed 14 September 2009). 
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10.  Case study: Lesotho Highlights Water Project 
10.1. General overview of Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) 
 
The bi-national Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) between the Kingdom of 
Lesotho (Lesotho) and the Republic of South Africa (RSA), is one of the most 
comprehensive engineering projects of its kind in the world designed principally to 
transfer water from the Senqu/Orange river in eastern and central Lesotho to the 
Gauteng Province, RSA’s industrial heartland.331 Comprising several large dams and 
tunnels throughout Lesotho and South Africa and involving five rivers, LHWP is 
Africa's largest water transfer scheme. If carried out as originally planned, it will by 
2027 divert about 40% of the Senqu/Orange River’s water which will be piped into 
200 Km of tunnels to be delivered to the South African Guateng River. 
 
The purpose of the project was to meet the growing demand for water in the RSA, 
generate Muela hydroelectric power for Lesotho (currently almost 100% of Lesotho's 
requirements), as well as provide an annual income for the impoverished country. 
Because the apartheid regime of South Africa was under international sanctions at that 
time, the money was officially lent to Lesotho, and Pretoria was in charge of servicing 
and repaying the debt and $ 40 million a year as royalties on imported water while 
Lesotho was going to pay only for the hydroelectric plant. Much of the funding by 
Lesotho was received in the form of international aid from a wide range of 
international and private commercial banks, particularly the World Bank. The signing 
of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project Treaty by the Government of Lesotho and of 
the Republic of South Africa on the 24th October 1986 officially launched the 
project.332  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
331 LHWP website, Project Overview, http://www.lhwp.org.ls/overview/overview.htm (accessed 14 
September 2009). 
332 Phase IA and IB of the project have been completed by 2004. Phases II-IV due to the changes in the 
projection of water demand in South Africa, along with concerns over negative social and 
environmental impacts of the project are under negotiation between RSA and Lesotho. 
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10.2. Actions by Lesotho authorities 
10.2.1.  Investigations 
 
At the outset of the project, in November 1986, Masupha Ephraim Sole was 
appointed to the post of Chief Executive - a position of great power and 
responsibility. Step by step, he started abusing his powers of the office increasing the 
control and influence he had over the award of the contracts in the project.333 In 1993, 
serious concerns about his management style, and in particular, staff appointments 
and finance made the Minister for Water and Energy hire Ernst and Young to audit 
LHWP’s account. The audit identified some irregularities, such as abusing the hosing 
scheme, charging personal expenses to work accounts, nepotism etc.334 These 
“irregularities” prompted the Minister to order a full-scale disciplinary enquiry at the 
end of 1994, which concluded with the dismissal of Sole from the LHDA in 1996. 335  
 
In 1996, LHDA started civil proceedings against Sole to recover the money he 
misappropriated during his employment. Further investigation showed that Sole had 
received large transfers to his Johannesburg bank accounts from accounts in his name 
at three Swiss banks – Union Bancaire Prive and Banque MultiCommercial in 
Geneva, and UBS in Zurich.336 In 1997, thanks to some changes in the Swiss banking 
secrecy laws in the mid-1990s, the Lesotho prosecutors were able to request access to 
Sole’s banking records, which they gained in early 1999.337  
 
The received data from the Swiss banks allowed the prosecution to conclude 
successfully the civil case as it had proved Sole had large funds at his disposal, 
outside the country, he had not declared. In October 1999, the court awarded damages 
                                                 
333 Darroch, F. (2004): Lesotho Highlands Water Project – Corruption and Debarment, in: Moran et al, 
see supra note 140, 62-63. Fiona Darroch, Barrister-At-Law, UK had been following the trials closely 
and is in regular contact with members of the prosecution team.  
334 Earle, A., Turton, A. (2005): Corruption on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project – a case study, 10, 
http://www.swedishwaterhouse.se/swh/resources/20051010164821Earle_Turton_Presentation_Corr_ca
se_study.pdf (accessed 23 September 2009). 
335 Darroch, F. (2004): At Goliaths Feet: the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme Corruption and Bribery 
Trials, 4, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/Gauteng.pdf (accessed 17 September 2009). 
336 Henry, J.S. (2003): High Crimes in Lesotho: Transnational Criminals – Part 3, 7, 
http://bloodbankers.typepad.com/submerging_markets/first_world_criminals_part_3_lesotho_112003jsh.
pdf (accessed 22 September 2009). 
337 Earle, supra note 334, at 12-13. 
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of M8.900.000338 to LHDA against Sole.339 The LHDA concluded that bribery had 
been taking place on a massive scale and froze payments to contractors.  
 
In July 1999, Lesotho authorities opened a criminal proceeding against Sole, accusing 
him of the offence of bribery – an offence of common law. The same fate was 
awaiting a number of contractors, consultants and intermediaries through whose 
accounts the money had passed. With the assistance of lawyers and auditors, Lesotho 
authorities managed to establish who had allegedly paid bribes and how the money 
had flowed. In July 1999, the Maseru Magistrate's Court charged nine companies, 
three international consortiums and three officials with bribery and fraud and 
provided initial estimates of the amounts they had allegedly paid.340 
 
Realizing the complex issues of the trials, a former Chief Justice of Lesotho, Acting 
Judge Brendan Cullinan of Ireland, was appointed to conduct the trials due to his long 
experience. Besides, being expatriate he could not be accused of biased judgment.341 
 
10.2.2.  Major Trials by Lesotho Authorities 
 
a) Sole 
Sole was the first to be tried in Lesotho case. His trial started on 11 June 2001. Sole 
was charged with sixteen counts of bribery, and two of fraud.  
 
In the indictment, in the charge for each bribery count, it was alleged that within 
certain periods, but on unknown dates and at unknown places, the 
contractors/consultants offered payments to Sole, which he “unlawfully, intentionally 
and corruptly” accepted, and in return he had to exercise his influence and power, in 
his official capacity, to further their private interests. 
 
The results of a forensic analysis of Sole’s banking records set out what payments had 
been made, when, by whom, and to whom. A total amount paid to Sole over a period 
                                                 
338 The loti (pl. moloti) is the currency in Lesotho. 1 LSL = 0.13USD (as of 2 October 2009).  
339 Darroch, supra note 335, at 6; see also Earle, supra note 334, at 13.  
340 Greybe, D. (1999): Official Faces Charge over R12m Bribes, 3, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/DamsOnTrial.pdf (accessed 6 October 2009). 
341 Darroch, supra note 335, at 6. 
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of nine years was established in the amount of M8.058.877. Most of the payments he 
was receiving from contractors on the project through the intermediaries, namely Mr. 
Jacobus Michiel Du Plooy, Mr. Zalisiwonga Bam and Mr. Max Cohen. Within few 
days after having received the money, the intermediaries were making payments to 
Sole’s Swiss bank accounts. The analysis showed that there was a stable ratio in case 
of Du Plooy (60%) and Bam (50%), while Cohen was paying to Sole less plus various 
percentages.342  
 
In May 2002, after a year-long trial, Sole was found guilty on 11 counts of bribery and 
2 counts of fraud (concerning fabricated expense claims while on an overseas trip) in 
Lesotho High Court and sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment.343 The Court of 
Appeal reduced the term of imprisonment to 15 years.344  
 
His conviction was a kickoff of the long-running series of corruption trials against 
leading international construction companies in Lesotho.  
 
b) Acres 
Acres, a Canadian consultancy company, got involved in LHWP in February 1991, 
with a signature of a “sole source contract” with LHDA. The Contract 65 funded by the 
World Bank included the provision of services relating to the establishment and 
implementation of the construction contract of the Katse dam, the transfer tunnel and 
delivery tunnels. Acres continued to render services under this contract until November 
1999. 
 
In the Indictment, Acres was charged with two counts of bribery. The company was 
alleged to have made payments into a Swiss bank account held by Zalisiwonga Mini 
Bam (deceased by the time of a trial) and into a Swiss bank account held by Margaret 
Bam - the wife of Zalisiwonga Mini Bam - who transferred the said amounts to a 
Swiss account held by her husband, who in turn thereafter paid/transferred or was 
                                                 
342 Earle, A. (2007): The Role of Governance in Countering Corruption: an African Case Study, 
http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/009S2/0069/009S20069.pdf (accessed 23 September 2009), 8; see also 
Earle, supra note 334, at 18. 
343 Case Rex vs. Sole (2002): Sentence by Hon. Mr Acting Justice B. P. Cullinan, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/SoleSentence.pdf (accessed 23 September 2009). 
344 Darroch, supra note 335, at 17. 
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supposed to pay/transfer the said sum, or part thereof, to Mr. Sole.345 The core of the 
prosecution case was that both payments amounted to bribes.  
 
Acres’ trial began in February 2002, which made it the first corporate defendant to be 
tried in Lesotho. Acres’ defense was claiming that Bam had been the company’s 
representative in Lesotho and had been paid for his services under the terms of the 
representation agreement (RA).  It was denying the company’s knowledge that the 
money would be passed on to Sole.346  
 
The prosecution claimed that the RA was a sham intended to conceal the true nature 
of the relationship agreement between the company and Sole. Darroch pointed out 
several corruption red flags in this RA, such as a lack of need for the services 
provided under RA and no evidence of their performance by the agent, non-
proportionality between the value of services and the payments for them, making 
payments to secret Swiss accounts, etc.347 Penzhorn argues, that since the RA 
contains a “no duck – no dinner” clause, that is, unless the contract is obtained the 
agent will not be paid, it “has bribery written all over it”, particularly where the agent 
seeks to secure the contract outside the formal bidding process.348   
  
The Court found that RA was just a sham. It rejected Acres’ theory that it did not 
know that Bam was paying Sole with the money obtained from Acres. It also 
determined that the money which Bam paid in the ration of 60% to Sole while leaving 
40% for himself were bribe money to ensure that Acres’ interests in the LHDA were 
secured.349 
 
                                                 
345 Case Crown vs. Acres International Limited (2001): Court indictment and charges of bribery 
against Canadian company, Acres International Limited, in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/AcresIndictment.pdf (accessed 4 October 2009). 
346 Darroch, supra note 335, at 18. 
347 Ibid., at 20. 
348 Penzhorn, G. (2004): Three strikes against graft: assessing the impact of high-profile corruption, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=10173 (accessed 7 
October 2009).  
349 Case Rex vs. Acres International Limited (2002): Judgment, 254, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/JugdmentAcres.pdf (accessed 4 October 2009). 
 104 
 
Acres was found guilty on two accounts of bribery and fined an amount of 
M22.058.091, which was reduced to M15.000.000 by the appeal court.350  
 
c) Lahmeyer 
Next defendant to be tried was Lahmeyer, a German construction company. 
Lahmeyer was involved in the construction of the delivery tunnel from Muela storage 
dam to the outflow in South Africa. This contract was also funded by the World Bank. 
The charges were similar to those against Acres, namely paying, with intent to bribe, 
varying sums of money into Swiss bank accounts held by Bam who afterwards, acting 
as intermediary, was transferring the amounts in question, or part thereof, to Sole. The 
alleged amount of the bribes paid by the company to Sole via Bam was M2.300.000 
over a six-year period.351 
 
Lahmeyer was found guilty on seven counts of bribery and fined M10.650.000. This 
was appealed by the prosecution, with the final judgment being against Lahmeyer on 
nine counts of bribery and sentencing it to a fine of M12.000.000.  
 
d) Spie Batignolles 
Next in line for Lesotho prosecution was a French company Spie Batignolles. The 
case was complicated because in 1995 it was merged with another French company, 
one of the world's leading electrical companies, Schneider Electric. The latter claimed 
that it was not brought properly before the Lesotho court and could not be tried.  
 
According to Darroch, on 19 May, 1995, Spie Batignolles had entered into a 
‘contribution and divestment agreement’, with a French company called Gesilec. With 
this, all Spie's assets and liabilities, including those in LHWP contracts, were 
transferred to Gesilec, which renamed itself Spie Batignolles, on 27 June 1995. On the 
same date, the original Spie Batignolles merged with Schneider Electric.352 
  
                                                 
350 Case Rex vs. Acres (2003): Appeal Judgment, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/ 
AcresAppealJudgementAug2003.pdf (accessed 4 October 2009).  
351 International Rivers (2003): Lesotho Judge Convicts German Engineering Firm of Bribery Charges, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/lesotho-water-project/lesotho-judge-convicts-german-
engineering-firm-bribery-charges-0 (accessed 22 September 2009). 
352 Darroch, supra note 333, at 65. 
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Although being legal, acts of merger and the name change seemed more as a different 
line of defence to avoid being brought to trial on corruption charges. The EU, being 
involved in this project since the early 80s via its specialist anticorruption unit OLAF, 
assisted the Lesotho prosecution in tracing the corporate relationships of the aforesaid 
companies.353 Confronted with the findings, Schneider/ Spie pleaded guilty on 16 
counts of bribery involving the payment of M16.000.000 to Sole via Max Cohen as an 
intermediary. It was fined M10.000.000 in February 2004.  
 
 
Impregilo was also tried, having been charged with five counts of bribery. The 
company was fined an amount of M15.000.000. 
 
 
Other companies are either being tried or still awaiting their trials.  
 
 
10.3.  The World Bank actions 
 
The World Bank financed the design of the project and lent a $110 million loan under 
phase 1A in 1989 and another loan in the amount of $ 45 million in 1998 under phase 
1B.
 
In both phases the Bank was responsible for promoting the project, increasing the 
overall financing package, supervising design and construction, transferring 
engineering and other technical skills to local staff, and monitoring social and 
environmental impacts. 
  
According to the World Bank, it first learned about possible cases of corruption in 
LHWP with the public disclosure of the criminal summons served on Sole in July 
1999.354 Following this, the matter was referred to the Bank’s Oversight Committee 
for Fraud and Corruption (current INT) which initiated its own investigation on 
possible cases of corruption which may have occurred in the contracts it has financed. 
 
                                                 
353 OLAF (2006): Three European Companies Guilty in African Aid Fraud Case, 
http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/press_room/pr/2006/13_en.html (accessed 6 October 2009).  
354 World Bank (2001): Notice to Acres on Debarment Proceedings, 15 [hereinafter, WB Notice], 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/ odiousdebts/publications/DebarmentProceedings.pdf (accessed 6 October 2009).  
 106 
 
a) Acres 
Following public disclosure of the allegations of corruption in LHWP, Acres wrote to 
the Bank denying its involvement in any improper conduct in connection with its 
contract on the project.355 Upon request of the Bank, although with a delay, Acres 
provided it with the documentation on its work on the project and its relationship with 
Bam, including copies of the documents served on Acres by the prosecuting authorities 
handling the criminal case in Lesotho.356 To coordinate its investigation, in fall 1999, the 
World Bank hired an American law firm Arnold and Porter.  
 
Based on the evidence collected during investigation, the Bank stated in its proposed 
Notice of Debarment Proceedings to Acres that “[t]he evidence is reasonably sufficient to 
conclude that Respondent Acres engaged in corrupt practice by paying monies to Mr. 
Sole through Mr. Z.M. Bam so that Acres could influence Mr. Sole and the LHDA in 
connection with work being performed by Acres on the LHWP.”357  
 
However, at the end of the investigation, the Sanctions Committee of the Bank 
concluded that the evidence was not reasonably sufficient to show that the firm had 
engaged in corrupt practices and as a result postponed the debarment of Acres. But 
the Bank reserved the right to reopen the investigation in case any additional 
information surfaces, including from the public proceedings in Lesotho.358  
 
The investigation was reopened following the conviction of Acres in the High Court 
of Lesotho in September 2002. Having failed to keep its promise given back in 1999 
at a closed-door meeting that it would provide financial support to the Lesotho 
prosecutors359 on the grounds that the country would recoup its costs on gaining 
                                                 
355 Letter from Oskar T. Sigvaldason to Shengman Zhang, Callisto Madavo and Alfonso Sanchez, 20 
August 1999, 2. 
356 WB Notice, supra note 354, at 43. 
357 Ibid., at 48. 
358 World Bank Press Release (2004): World Bank Sanctions Acres International Limited, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20229958~menuPK:34463~p
agePK:64003015~piPK:64003012~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 6 October 2009).  
359 van Vuuren, H. (2006): Time to Listen to Lesotho! – The World Bank and its New Anti-Corruption 
Agenda, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-542425 (accessed 8 October 2009).   
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convictions,360 the Bank benefited from the investigative work which had been done 
by the Lesotho authorities.361  
 
Seven months after, the Court of Appeal had upheld on one of the two counts in 
August 2003, the Bank’s Sanctions Committee having studied the court records, 
found that Acres had been engaged in corrupt activities for the purpose of influencing 
the decision-making of the then Chief Executive of the LHDA, the implementing 
agency for the LHWP.362 Since this activity violated the Bank’s procurement 
standards, it issued a notice that the debarment case had been reopened.363 As a result, 
Acres was debarred for three years. The period of debarment which was shorter than 
it might have been was justified by the mitigating factors: the fact that Acres had 
already been ordered to pay a criminal fine by the Lesotho courts364 and that the 
persons involved "are no longer in positions of responsibility in the company".365 
 
One month before the Sanctions Committee gave its ruling, Acres was bought by a 
larger Canadian firm Hatch Ltd. To the question of Probe International, whether the 
change in ownership would affect Acres’ debarment, the Bank first replied that both 
companies would be ineligible to receive any Bank contracts. But then, referring to 
confusion based on conflicting interpretations by its own lawyers, it said that "Hatch, 
not being a party to the Lesotho case, can bid."366 
 
While some anti-corruption campaigners were applauding the World Bank’s decision 
to debar Acres, others were expressing their dissatisfaction by the fact that it took it 
five years to do so. According to Patricia Adams, Executive Director of Probe 
                                                 
360 Darroch, supra note 333, at 69. 
361 It should also be mentioned, that upon announcement of the indictments in mid-1999, the World 
Bank provided extensive evidentiary support to the Lesotho prosecutors, made Bank staff available for 
interviews, and later assisted the Government by bringing together the Lesotho prosecutors with the 
various project funding agencies and EU anti-fraud officials. 
362 Darroch, supra note 333, at 69. 
363 Bretton Woods Project (2004): Acres Debarment: Litmus Test for Bank on Corruption, 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-42230 (accessed 7 October 2009).  
364 Using fine as a “mitigating factor” by the Sanctions Committee, when the fine has not yet been paid, 
was questioned by Fiona Darroch, see Bretton Woods Project (2004): Landmark Decision: Canadian 
Company Debarred, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-62691 (accessed 8 October 2009).   
365 World Bank Press Release, supra note 358.  
366 Peryman, L. (2004): Fighting Corruption Alone, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/ 
index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=11703 (accessed 8 October 2009). 
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International, the World Bank debarred Acres “more in name than in fact”.367 After 
Acres was charged, it continued to receive World Bank contracts, winning over $2.3 
million in new contracts - last one signed just a week before its debarment – none of 
which was supposed to be affected by the debarment decision.368     
 
Another concern after Acres had been debarred by the World Bank, was due to the 
absence of uniformity amongst development agencies in recognizing each other’s 
sanctions rules. According to Peryman, a company "can be debarred by one financial 
institution for corrupt behaviour one day and be awarded a contract with another the 
next."369  
  
 
b) Lahmeyer 
The World Bank’s actions towards Lahmeyer were similar to those towards Acres. 
Likewise, due to insufficiency of evidence, the World Bank decided not to sanction 
the company in October 2001 reserving the right of re-examining its findings in light 
of any additional relevant information. Following the convictions of Sole and 
Lahmeyer by the High Court of Lesotho in 2002 and 2003, respectively, upheld by the 
Court of Appeal of Lesotho in April 2003 and in April 2004,370 respectively, the 
World Bank re-opened debarment proceedings against Lahmeyer in August 2005.371  
 
Having established that Lahmeyer had paid bribes in connection with the LHWP, the 
WB debarred Lahmeyer for a period of seven years, from 3 November 2006 to 3 
November 2013. The period of ineligibility could have been reduced by four years 
(till 3 November 2009), if the company had introduced a “satisfactory corporate 
compliance and ethics program” and fully cooperated with the Bank in disclosing any 
                                                 
367 Adams, P. (2004): Statement to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
http://old.probeinternational.org/catalog/content_fullstory.php?contentId=1680&cat_id=15 (accessed 8 
October 2009).  
368 Bretton Woods Project, supra note 363. 
369 Peryman, L. (2004): Fighting Corruption Alone, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/ 
index.cfm? DSP=content&ContentID=11703 (accessed 8 October 2009).  
370 Lahmeyer's conviction was upheld on six of seven counts. 
371 World Bank (2006): World Bank Sanctions Lahmeyer International for Corrupt Activities in Bank-
Financed Projects, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21116129 
~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 8 October 2009).  
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other past sanctionable misconduct, presumably under the Bank’s Voluntary 
Disclosure Program (VDP).372 But it is still on the WB list of ineligible firms.373 
 
Again, as in case with Acres, the World Bank was accused of a slow reaction. "It 
sends the wrong signal to other corporate bribers," argued Patricia Adams.374 "In 
those seven years since the original indictment, Lahmeyer was able to carry on 
business as usual. Rather, the Bank should have taken swift action and suspended the 
company's right to do business with the Bank when they were originally indicted – as 
is allowed for under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – pending a decision by 
the Lesotho courts."375 International Rivers commented that “the World Bank’s kid–
glove treatment of companies convicted of bribery in Lesotho thus far is an insult to 
the Lesotho government’s courageous efforts to hold both bribe–takers and bribe–
payers to account”.376 Patricia Adams claimed that the Bank should have debarred the 
companies immediately after the decision of the Court of Appeal had been taken. “I 
don’t think there could be any better test than what they’ve gone through and the due 
process they received in Lesotho. They were convicted, they appealed, they lost, and 
they should be debarred”.377 
 
Decision by the EBRD to debar Lahmeyer in February 2007,378 following a 
debarment by the World Bank, a so-called “cross-debarment”, was considered as an 
important step towards consistency among the MDBs. It was the first time when any 
of the development banks made a company ineligible for fraud or corruption 
committed in a project financed by another bank.379 
    
                                                 
372 Ibid. 
373 WB Listing of Ineligible Firms, supra note 299.. 
374Adams, P. (2006): German Firm Barred by World Bank for Bribery in Lesotho project, 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=16566 (accessed 8 
October 2009).  
375 Ibid.  
376 International Rivers Network (2003): Lesotho Judge Convicts German Engineering Firm of Bribery 
Charges, http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/lesotho-water-project/lesotho-judge-convicts-
german-engineering-firm-bribery-charges-0 (accessed 10 October 2009).    
377 Hearne, B. (2004): The World Bank and Action on Corporate Corruption, 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=2079 (accessed 10 October 2009).  
378 Transparency International (2007): Transparency International Urges Debarment Consistency 
among Development Banks, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2007/ 
2007_02_26_ti_urges_debarment_consistency (accessed 9 October 2009).  
379 For more details about EBRD debarment, see Chapter VIII, C (8).  
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CHAPTER V.  THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The idea of a financial institution that would be Asian and foster economic growth 
and cooperation in the region was born during postwar rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the early 1960s.380 Established in 1966, with the headquarter in 
Manila, ADB is an international development finance institution which mission is to 
help its developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life 
of their people. From 31 members at the time of its establishment in 1966, ADB has 
grown to 67 members - of which 48 are regional members and 19 are non-regional 
members.381  
 
To pursue its mission, ADB lends loans to prepare and implement technical assistance 
projects and programs in development member states and, if necessary, consults 
people from all sections of society to ensure that its projects and programs address 
their needs. Countries with limited debt repayment capacity in the region receive 
additional help through the Asian Development Fund (ADF), set up in 1973 to 
provide grants and low-interest loans.382 
 
Given the high level of corruption in most of the ADB borrowing countries,383 dozens 
of billions are lost due to corruption in procurement of goods and services.384 
Therefore, adequate measures are required from the ADB to respond the challenge of 
corruption in its lending operations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
380 ADB, Responding to Challenges of a Changing Region, http://www.adb.org/About/history.asp 
(accessed 22 October 2009). 
381 For more information on ADB member states see http://www.adb.org/About/membership.asp 
(accessed 22 October 2009).  
382 ADB Operations, http://www.adb.org/About/operations.asp (accessed 22 October 2009).  
383 Transparency International Perception Index, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed 24 October 2009).  
384 ADB Anticorruption Policy (1998), paras.21-31, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/ 
Anticorruption/anticorruption.pdf (accessed 24 October 2009). 
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B. Tackling Corruption in the ADB-funded Projects 
1. The ADB’s fiduciary responsibility  
 
ADB’s response to the threat of corruption in its projects and programs derives from 
the Article 14(xi) of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, which 
imposes on the Bank the obligation to “take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
proceeds of any loan made, guaranteed or participated in are used only for the 
purposes for which the loan was granted and with due attention to considerations of 
economy and efficiency.” 
 
This provision clearly states that Bank management and staff should take any 
measures that are necessary to eradicate corruption from ADB-financed projects and 
programs. 
 
2. The ADB’s anti-corruption policy  
2.1.  General overview 
 
Following a fundamental change in the approach to anticorruption issues in the mid-
90s, ADB affirmed that like in any other region corruption had a negative impact on 
development also in Asia and recognized the importance of governance. In 1995, 
ADB became the first MDB to adopt a special policy on governance in its paper 
approved by the Board - Governance: Sound Development Management.385 This 
document, known as a Government Policy, did not address corruption directly. But it 
officially recognized, for the first time, the importance of accountability for public 
officials, and transparency and predictability in government operations in fight against 
corruption and achieving positive development outcomes.  
 
To broaden and strengthen the ADB’s work on governance, which had started under 
its Governance Policy and addressed, in particular, corruption issues, the Bank’s 
Board of Directors unanimously approved an Anticorruption Policy on 2 July 1998.  
 
                                                 
385 ADB (1995): Governance: Sound Development Management, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/default.asp (accessed 24 October 2009).  
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The policy is focused on three objectives: 
• supporting competitive markets, and efficient, effective, accountable, and 
transparent public administration; 
• supporting promising anticorruption efforts on a case-by-case basis and 
improving the quality of the ADB’s dialogue with its developing member 
countries (DMCs) on a range of governance issues, including corruption; 
and 
• ensuring that the ADB’s projects and staff adhere to the highest ethical 
standards.386 
 
The third objective of the Bank’s Anticorruption Policy calls for more firm internal 
measures to enhance the integrity of Bank operations through establishing priorities 
for fighting corruption. Highest priority was given to maintaining the integrity of the 
Bank’s lending and technical assistance operations. It means that the ADB could 
either change its lending policy between sectors, or lower its lending to a country if 
corruption threatens the development impact of Bank projects or that country’s 
broader development prospects. A second priority is strengthening the Bank’s 
procurement policy by enabling the Bank to cancel a contract or loan if there is 
evidence of corruption, debar firms and audit companies working on Bank-financed 
projects. Other priorities include, inter alia, improving the quality of oversight and 
management of ADB loans and technical assistance grants; and ensuring that all ADB 
staff and Bank counterparts within the DMCs are familiar with the Anticorruption 
Policy.387 
 
In 2000, ADB developed a Medium Term Agenda and Action Plan,388 to assess 
progress and lessons learned to improve its approach to governance for the next five 
years (2000-2004). One of the major areas of the Action Plan was fighting corruption 
by setting an example of zero tolerance by, inter alia, strengthening the control 
systems of executing agencies and identifying fraud and corruption through project 
procurement related audits. 
                                                 
386 ADB Anticorruption Policy, supra note 384, para.14.  
387 ADB (2000): Anticorruption Policy, Description and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, 4, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Anticorruption/anti.pdf (accessed 24 October 2009).  
388 ADB (2000): Promoting Good Governance: ADB’s Medium-Term Agenda and Action Plan, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Good_Governance/default.asp (accessed 24 October 2009). 
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In 2005, ADB conducted a joint review of implementation of its governance and 
anticorruption policies to assess and refocus its efforts. As a result of its findings, 
ADB decided to improve its performance by launching its Second Governance and 
Anticorruption Action Plan (GACAP II) in 2006.389 Among the aims of GACAP II 
are strengthening of governance and anti-corruption components in program and 
project design as well as strengthening of program and project administration and 
portfolio management. 
 
2.2.  Procurement reforms 
 
In 1994, ADB’s Task Force on Improving Project Quality found that ADB did not 
pay adequate attention to the project design and processing, while putting emphasis 
on “achieving annual levels of programmed lending”.390 This so-called “approval 
culture” was aimed at approving new projects without ensuring that existing ones 
achieve their objectives.391 As a result, the Task Force urged the ADB to increase its 
accountability for project quality.392  
 
Shortly before promulgation of the ADB’s Anti-Corruption Policy, an Anti-
Corruption Task Force was convened to examine the ADB’s procurement policy. 
Based on its conclusions, the ADB decided to introduce anticorruption provisions 
identical to those adopted by the WB in 1996 and 1997 for the rejection of proposals, 
loan cancellation, debarment, inspection rights and “no bribery pledge”. These 
modifications have been incorporated into its Procurement Guidelines and Guidelines 
on the Use of Consultants by the ADB and its Borrowers (Consultants Guidelines) 
following the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Policy and their approval by the 
Board.393 
                                                 
389 ADB (2006): Second Governance and Anticorruption Action Plan (GACAP II), 
http://www.adb.org/Governance/gacap.asp (accessed 24 October 2009).  
390 ADB (1994): Task Force on Improving Project Quality: Executive Summary [hereinafter, ADB Task 
Force], http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Project_Quality/pq000.asp (accessed 26 October 2009). 
391 One former Board member interviewed by Steve Herz said that the focus of project staff “is on 
getting a paper to the Board. After that, it’s not [their] problem, even if the project flops.” See Herz, S. 
(1994): “Zero Tolerance?” Assessing the Asian Development Bank’s Efforts to Limit Corruption in its 
Lending Operations, 17, http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/Zero_Tolerance_Report.pdf (accessed 26 
October 2009).  
392 ADB Task Force, supra note 390, Executive Summary, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Project_Quality/pq000.asp (accessed 26 October 2009). 
393 ADB Anti-Corruption Policy, supra note 384, paras.58-60. 
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C. The ADB’s Debarment Policy 
1. Introduction 
 
To implement the debarment provisions introduced in 1998 in the ADB’s 
procurement policies, the Anti-Corruption Policy designated the Office of Auditor 
General (OAG) as the initial point of contact for allegations of fraud and corruption in 
ADB-financed projects. In September 1999, ADB established an Anticorruption Unit 
(OAGA) within OAG to deal with such allegations. Effective 1 January 2005, the 
OAGA became the Integrity Division (OAGI). And as of 1 October 2009, the OAGI 
became the Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI).394 
 
To determine, whether the respondent failed to comply with the Anticorruption Policy 
or procedures and, if so, impose the appropriate sanction, the ADB established an 
Integrity Oversight Committee (formerly Oversight Committee on Anti-Corruption). 
  
2. Grounds for debarment 
 
Due to absence of universal definition of corruption, the ADB Anticorruption Policy 
defined it as “the abuse of public or private office for personal gain”.395 
 
Corrupt, fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices which may constitute grounds 
for debarment are set forth in the ADB Procurement Guidelines396 and Consultants 
Guidelines397 and reflect the language of the IFI’s “Uniform Framework for 
Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption”.398 These practices comprise 
corruption, which involves behavior on the part of officials in the public and private 
sectors, in which they improperly and/or unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those 
                                                 
394 Due to all these changes, titles “OAGA”, “OAGI” and “OAI” are interchangeable in this 
dissertation and should be considered as equal.   
395 ADB Anticorruption Policy, supra note 384, para.17.  
396 ADB Procurement Guidelines (2007), http://www.adb.org/documents/guidelines/procurement/ 
default.asp?p=prcrmnt (accessed 26 October 2009). 
397 ADB Guidelines on the Use of Consultants (2007), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/ 
Consulting/Guidelines-Consultants.pdf (accessed 26 October 2009) [hereinafter, ADB Consultants 
Guidelines]. 
398 ADB Procurement Guidelines, Art. 1.14(a) and ADB Consultants Guidelines, Art. 1.23(a). 
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close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are 
placed.399  
3. Initial sources of allegations 
 
Initial concerns, allegations, or evidence recognized in the ADB as “complaints” can 
be received by the OAI from ADB staff, contractors, consultants, third parties by 
email, fax, mail, in person, or by telephone. Information concerning the identity of a 
complainant is strictly confidential and will not be released to other ADB staff or to 
anyone outside ADB without prior authorization of the complainant. Allegations may 
also be reported anonymously.400 According to the OAGI Annual Report 2007, within 
period of 1998-2007, 54% of the allegations were received from the ADB staff 
members, while 34% were received from the outside sources and 12% from the audit 
reports.401  
 
4. Investigation process 
4.1.  Preliminary assessment 
 
Each complaint received by the OAI shall be registered and scanned to determine 
whether it is:  
 
• relevant to OAI's mandate; 
• credible (depends on the source of the complaint and the credibility of the 
evidence presented);  
• verifiable (depends on the age of the issues, the availability of information, 
and the specificity, sufficiency, and reliability of the information received); 
and 
                                                 
399 ADB Anticorruption Policy, supra note 413, para.17. 
400 ADB, How to Report Fraud and Corruption, http://www.adb.org/Integrity/howto.asp (accessed 19 
October 2009). 
401ADB (2008): OAGI Annual Report, 11, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Anticorruption/OAGI-Annual-Report-2008.pdf (accessed 19 
October 2009).  
 116 
 
• material (depends on the seriousness and implications to ADB 
operations).402 
 
As a result of a screening, OAI will decide either to: 
• close the case due to insufficient evidence; or 
• warrant investigation; or 
• refer the allegation to the relevant department/ office, when it is beyond 
OAI’s  jurisdiction (even if the case is closed).403 
 
To be warranted an investigation, the allegation should be within OAI’s jurisdiction, 
credible, verifiable, and material (for a flowchart illustrating the process of dealing 
with allegations of fraud or corruption in the ADB see Annex IV).  
 
4.2.  Full investigations 
 
Investigations are conducted by OAI, which may also, with the concurrence of the 
Auditor General, engage external auditors, investigators, or other experts to assist in 
the investigation of specific allegations of fraud and corruption. OAI shall coordinate 
all investigative work performed by such experts.404 
  
During the course of investigation, OAI may gather documentary, video, photographic, 
computer forensic, or tape-recorded evidence, as well as interview witnesses.405 
 
In certain cases, the Integrity Oversight Committee, with the concurrence of the 
President, also may refer matters for investigation to appropriate authorities of a 
concerned member government. This may include the borrowing country, the country 
of which the subject of investigation is a national, or the country where the alleged 
incident occurred.406 
                                                 
402 ADB Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, para.53, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/ 
Integrity-Guidelines-Procedures/chap3.asp?p=antipubs    (accessed 21 October 2009). 
403 Ibid., para. 54.    
404 Ibid., para. 61. 
405 Ibid., para. 57. 
406 ADB, OAI’s Investigative Process, http://www.adb.org/Integrity/investigative-process.asp (accessed 
19 October 2009). 
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If as a result of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence to support the matter of 
investigation or any other sanctionable offence, OAI will document its findings, and 
both the Director of OAI and Auditor General must endorse closing the case.407 
 
If OAI has sufficient evidence to believe that the Respondent (bidder, consultant, 
contractor, or other party involved in an ADB-funded project) is engaged in a corrupt 
or fraudulent practice, it will present its findings to the Respondent, explain the basis 
for such findings and give the latter an opportunity to comment in writing upon the 
allegation(s) and submit any other relevant information before OAI presents its case 
to the Integrity Oversight Committee.408 When the Respondent is a firm, OAI will 
also notify it that debarment might be imposed on its officers, directors and associated 
firms, and at OAI’s discretion, it may present investigative findings to those 
associated parties.409   
 
5.  Sanctions Process 
5.1.  Submissions to the Integrity Oversight Committee 
 
Upon completion of the investigation, OAI shall present a report together with all 
investigative findings and the explanation from the Respondent (if available), as well 
as recommendations of a sanction to the Integrity Oversight Committee (formerly 
Oversight Committee on Anticorruption).410 The Integrity Oversight Committee 
(IOC) consists of three members appointed by the President at the Auditor General’s 
recommendation among ADB’s senior staff, including one as Chair, to serve normally 
for 12 months.411  
 
The IOC has a sole power to decide whether bidders, consultants, contractors, or other 
party involved in an ADB-funded project (other than ADB staff) had engaged in a 
sanctionable practice and if so, which sanction to impose.412 
                                                 
407 ADB Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, para.63. 
408 Ibid, para.25, 
409 ADB Integrity Principles and Guidelines (2006), para.57, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Integrity-Principles-Guidelines/integrity-guidelines-
procedures-2006.pdf (accessed 19 October 2009). 
410 ADB Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, para.68. 
411 Ibid., para. 29. The Auditor General and/or President may determine a different term. 
412 OAI’s Investigative Process, supra note 406. 
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5.2.  Standard of proof 
 
The standard of proof for OAI investigations shall be preponderance of evidence, 
showing that it is more probable than not that the Respondent had engaged in a 
sanctionable practice.413 
 
5.3.  Imposition of sanctions 
 
a) Range of sanctions 
Sanctions that ADB may impose include reprimands and debarment of a company or 
an individual proved to have been engaged in a sanctionable practice. When debarred, 
an individual or a company is ineligible to participate in ADB-financed activity. 
Although usually debarment affects only future contracts, the IOC may also 
recommend the cancellation of existing obligations.414 
 
b) Length of debarment 
In determining debarment period, the IOC usually first debars the Respondent for a 
minimum period from 1 to 7 years. Upon completion of the minimum period, the IOC 
may "reassess" the sanction period in order to extend (for example, if the entity is 
known to have engaged in other sanctionable practices during its debarment period) or 
end (for example, the entity demonstrates rehabilitation) the debarment period. 
Maximum debarment period for the first violation is “indefinitely” for individuals and 
7 years for companies. Debarment period for the subsequent violation (after being 
reinstated) is “indefinitely” for individuals and up to 10 years for companies. Only 
under extraordinary circumstances (for example, repeated violations of ADB's 
Anticorruption Policy or procedures) can the companies be debarred indefinitely.415  
 
c) Mitigating and aggravating circumstances 
When determining a sanction, the IOC shall consider all mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances relevant to the case, such as: 
                                                 
413 Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, paras.7 and 18. 
414 ADB Integrity Principles and Guidelines, supra note 409, para.64. 
415 Ibid., paras.33-35. 
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• whether the individual or a company continued the sanctionable practice 
after becoming aware of OAI's investigation; 
• the degree of cooperation with OAI or any attempt to conceal the 
sanctionable practice; 
• evidence of restitution and steps taken to address the concerns; 
• the nature of the fraud and/or corruption and the circumstances and 
manner under which the fraud and/or corruption was committed (that is, 
attempted fraud or corruption versus committed fraud or corruption); 
• arguments provided by the individual or the company under investigation 
against allegations;  
• the background of the individual or the company’s management; and 
• if another multilateral development bank or international organization 
debarred the individual or other entity.416 
 
d) Reinstatement  
At the end of the minimum sanction period debarred individuals and firms may 
request reinstatement.417 Requests for reinstatement shall contain the reason for the 
sanction and provide a basis for which ADB should consider the reinstatement.418  
 
In determining whether to reinstate an individual or a firm OAI may consider the 
following factors: 
 
• the reason a sanction was imposed; 
• restitution; 
• changes in management or ownership; 
• verifiable mechanisms to improve business governance; 
• effective administrative, civil or criminal action initiated by the debarred 
individual or firm as a result of debarment imposed by ADB; 
                                                 
416 Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, para.37. 
417 OAI may remind them of this opportunity approximately 45 days before the end of the minimum 
sanction period. 
418 ADB Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, para.75. 
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• information indicating that the debarred individual or firm engaged in a 
sanctionable practice after being debarred by ADB, including sanctions 
imposed by other international organizations; and 
•  results of administrative or criminal investigations.419 
 
At the conclusion of its review or investigation, OAI will prepare a report to the IOC 
with a recommendation regarding reinstatement. The IOC may decide to either 
reinstate eligibility or extend the debarment for another year (after which the 
individual or other entity may again apply for reinstatement).420 
 
In cases where ADB extended debarment to the respondent firm's principals or related 
parties, the decision of the IOC may also address ADB's sanction of those entities.421  
 
If the IOC decides to extend debarment, the individual or a firm may appeal the 
decision to the Sanction Appeals Committee within 90 days of the date of OAGI’s 
notice of the decision.422 
 
6. Parties subject to sanction 
 
The IOC can debar both individuals and firms. When the IOC debars a firm that is 
proved to have engaged in sanctionable practice, it may also extend the sanction to the 
principals (owners, directors, officers, or major shareholders) of a firm, as well as 
related parties, if it determines that there is a legitimate basis to do so.423 A “related 
party” is one that has:  
 
• the ability, directly or indirectly, to control or significantly influence the 
respondent party;  
• a familial relationship;  
                                                 
419 Ibid., para.76. 
420 Ibid., para.77. 
421 Ibid., para.78. 
422 Ibid., para.79. 
423 Ibid., para.39. 
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• common or related ownership, management, or control (for example, 
affiliated or associated firms); or  
• an agreement or dependency for a specific or limited purpose, such as a 
joint venture, with the respondent party.424  
 
In determining relationship and deciding whether circumstances warrant sanctioning 
the related parties as well, the IOC considers, in particular, management and 
organizational structure, and if the related party was involved in or influenced the 
sanctionable practice which was the subject of investigation, or it influenced such 
practice itself. In this context, the IOC focuses on major shareholding, control of or 
influence over a firm, and not on ownership.425  
 
While debarred individuals and firms may not participate in ADB-financed projects 
during the debarment period, related parties remain eligible to do so if the IOC 
decides not to extend the debarment to them. Conversely, firms in which a sanctioned 
individual holds a principal interest will be ineligible to participate.426 
 
7. Appeals 
 
A Respondent may appeal the IOC's decision to a Sanction Appeals Committee 
(formerly Review Committee on Anticorruption) within ninety (90) days from the 
date of OAI's notice of the IOC's decision. An appeal must be in writing, stating the 
reason(s) for the requested review of the IOC's decision. The Sanction Appeals 
Committee (SAC) will consider only appeals that include new information that was 
not known, or could not reasonably have been known, to the Respondent party at the 
time that explanations were sought by OAI, and such information would have been 
relevant to the decision of the IOC.427  
 
                                                 
424 ADB Integrity Principles and Guidelines, supra note 409, para.71. 
425Ibid., paras.72-73.  
426 ADB (2008): Frequently Asked Questions on Anticorruption and Integrity, 36, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Brochures/FAQs-Anticorruption-Integrity/default.asp (accessed 22 
October 2009). 
427 Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, para.72. 
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After having considered the appeals, the SAC may reduce or lift the imposed 
sanctions, or require the IOC to reconsider a case.428  
 
The SAC consists of three vice presidents, out of which the one with the longest ADB 
vice presidential tenure will chair it. The SAC renders its decision only on the basis of 
a consensus of all members.429 In case of failure to reach consensus the Chair requests 
the President’s involvement.430 The decision of the SAC on any appeal is final and 
binding and not subject to further appeal.431 
 
8. Disclosure and information sharing 
 
In accordance with ADB’s Public Communications Policy, ADB discloses statistical 
information concerning results of its investigations into fraud and corruption, as well 
as incorporates significant recommendations and issues from audits into its Annual 
Report.432 However, ADB does not disclose the names of debarred individuals and 
firms except for two cases when it makes a Notice of Sanctions on its website: 
 
• if a debarred individual or firm attempts to participate in ADB-funded 
project while ineligible (it will also result in an extension of the sanction 
period);  
• if OAI cannot reach a debarred individual or firm.433  
 
However, in the interest of cooperation, harmonization, and transparency, ADB shares 
the Anticorruption Sanctions List, on a confidential basis, with other MDBs and 
international organizations on a need-to-know basis. On the same basis, it can extract 
and share certain information on the list with any of ADB’s member countries.434 
                                                 
428 Ibid., para.40. 
429 Ibid., para.41. 
430 Ibid., para.42. 
431 Ibid., para.41. 
432 ADB (2005): The Public Communications Policy of the Asian Development Bank: Disclosure and 
Exchange of Information, para.100,  
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/PCP/PCP-R-Paper.pdf (accessed 20 October 2009). 
433 ADB Integrity Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 402, paras.81-82; see also ADB Integrity 
Principles and Guidelines, supra note 409, para.86.  
434 ADB Integrity Principles and Guidelines, supra note 409, para.87. 
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ADB believes that the practice of not publicizing the Anticorruption Sanctions List 
best supports fair and consistent implementation of its anticorruption policy justifying 
it by the following reasons: 
 
• the ADB’s debarment procedure is an administrative tool, not a legal or 
judicial assessment of fraud or corruption - terms that have different 
definitions and carry significant legal implications in ADB’s member 
countries;  
• firms, in particular those with significant resources, are more likely to 
present challenges to decisions that publicly classify them as corrupt or 
fraudulent, requiring ADB’s time and expenses to address rebuttals;  
• the deterrent effect believed to be the benefit of publicizing the list does 
not outweigh the benefits of the current practice;  
• publicizing the Anticorruption Sanctions List could lead to incorrect 
conclusions regarding the focus of ADB's anticorruption efforts or levels 
of corruption within a particular region or country.435  
 
9. Case study: Joint Attack on Fraud in Kyrgyz Republic436 
  
In August 2004 ADB debarred 21 credit unions and 41 individuals in the Kyrgyz 
Republic for fraud committed in a sub-project of the ADB-financed Rural Financial 
Institution Project.  
 
The anticorruption case began when in October 2002 the National Bank of the Kyrgyz 
Republic (NBKR) advised ADB that the Financial Company for the Support and 
Development of Credit Unions (FCCU), created with ADB's support as a source of 
financing for businesses in rural areas, found fraud involving fictitious membership 
and financial data in some credit unions. Through surveys, audits, and inspections, 
FCCU identified fraudulent data that formed the basis of credit unions' borrowing 
                                                 
435 ADB, Confidentiality of Anticorruption Sanctions List,  
http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/issues.asp (accessed 20 October 2009). 
436 ADB, Joint Attack on Fraud,  
http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/fraud.asp (accessed 24 November 2009). 
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from FCCU, which was then used to pay members and finance high-risk ventures not 
reported to FCCU. 
 
ADB's East and Central Asia Department staff and the then Anticorruption Unit of the 
Office of the Auditor General, and NBKR and FCCU worked together to effectively 
address the fraud. With ADB's support through technical assistance, FCCU was able 
to increase scrutiny of credit union assets. FCCU also tightened procedures for 
increasing capital of any credit union, and strengthened licensing procedures. FCCU 
ultimately identified fraud in 21 credit unions, and has appropriately classified the 
debt and undertaken efforts to recover fraudulently obtained funds. NBKR referred 
FCCU's findings to prosecutors. FCCU shared its findings with ADB's Anticorruption 
Unit, which resulted in a debarment of these 21 credit unions and 41 individuals 
involved in fraud.  
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CHAPTER VI.  THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was established half a century ago, in 
1959, when 18 countries ratified the Agreement establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB Charter).437 Its defined purpose was “to contribute to the 
acceleration of the process of economic and social development of the regional 
developing member countries, individually and collectively”.438 To achieve it, the 
IADB provides loans, grants, guarantees and investments as well as technical 
assistance for planning and implementing development projects and sector reform 
programs for Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
 
One of the features of the IADB is that over fifty percent of the Bank’s shares are held 
by borrowing members, while in other MDBs control rests in their lenders. It provides 
more financing to the region than any other government-owned regional financial 
institution.439 Since 1959, the IADB has approved $168 billion for projects, 
mobilizing more than $375 billion in investments.  
 
In view of these figures, any diversion of the funds from their intended purpose 
causes national interests to suffer and questions the reputation of the IADB itself. 
However, like in all other MDBs, the problems of fraud and corruption for many 
years were almost ignored in the IADB’s operations. Any losses in its projects the 
Bank was considering to be insignificant compared to the overall benefits derived.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
437 Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank [hereinafter, IADB Charter], effective on 
30 December 1959, http://www.iadb.org/leg/documents/pdf/convenio-eng.pdf (accessed 20 October 2009). 
438 Ibid., Section 1. 
439 The value of the loans approved by the IADB in 2007 was about $10 billion, significantly exceeding 
that of any other regional development bank. 
 126 
 
B. Tackling Corruption in the IADB-funded Projects 
1. The IADB’s fiduciary responsibility 
 
The Bank’s fiduciary responsibility to address fraud and corruption derives from its 
Charter which demands that the resources and facilities of the Bank be used 
exclusively to implement the purpose and functions set forth in Article I of the 
Charter.440  
 
2.  The IADB’s anti-corruption policy 
2.1.  General overview 
 
Echoed by the increase of concerns about the negative impact of fraud and corruption 
on development at a world-wide scope, the Bank assigned a working group to conduct 
a review of the consequences of corruption and possible means of combating it. As a 
result, on 28 February 2001 it adopted a document titled “Strengthening the 
Systematic Framework against Corruption for the IADB” (Systematic Framework) 
calling for reforms that would: 
 
• ensure that Bank staff act in accordance with the highest levels of 
integrity and that the institution’s internal policies and procedures are 
committed to this goal; 
• ensure that activities financed by the Bank are free of fraud and 
corruption and executed in a proper control environment; and 
• support programs that will help borrowing member countries of the Bank 
strengthen good governance, enforce the rule of law, and combat 
corruption.441  
 
Following submission of the Systematic Framework, the IADB reviewed preventive 
and remedial measures to address problems of fraud and corruption. 
 
                                                 
440 IADB Charter, supra note 437, Article III, Section 1. 
441 IADB (2001): Strengthening a Systematic Framework against Corruption [hereinafter, IADB 
Systematic Framework], http://www.iadb.org/leg/Documents/Pdf/Corruption-EN.pdf (accessed 20 
October 2009). 
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2.2.  Procurement reforms 
 
In recognition of the problem posed by fraud and corruption, the IADB undertook an 
overhaul of its procurement policies. As a result, in 1995, the IADB introduced the 
anti-corruption provisions and the notion of debarment for acts of corruption in its 
Basic Procurement Policies and Procedures of the IADB, which were incorporated 
into the Bank's standard procurement bidding documents in 1999. The Bank 
significantly expanded the notion of fraud and corruption in its procurement activities 
in 2005 adopting Policies for the Procurement of Goods and Works Financed by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (Procurement Policies)442 and Policies for the 
Selection and Contracting of Consultants Financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Consultants Policies).443 These Policies were edited in February 
of 2006 and have been modified according to the Sanctions Procedures Document in 
July 2006. 
 
 
C.  The IADB’s Debarment Policy 
1. Introduction 
 
Although the IADB introduced “debarment” clause in its procurement policies in 
1995, that is, even earlier than the WB, it started implementing it only in 2001. 
Following the submission of the Systematic Framework in 2001, the Procurement 
Committee was designated to investigate allegations of fraud and corruption in the 
IADB-funded project procurement process. All other allegations of fraud and 
corruption in any Bank activity were investigated by the Office of the Auditor 
General. 444  
 
                                                 
442Policies for the Procurement of Goods and Works Financed by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (2006) [hereinafter, IADB Procurement Policies], 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=774392 (accessed 2 November 2009). 
443 Policies for the Selection and Contracting of Consultants Financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (2006) [hereinafter, IADB Consultants Policies], 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=774394 (accessed 2 November 2009). 
444 Thornburgh, D., de Noriega, J.S., Gainer, R.L., Walker, C.H. (2008): Report Concerning the Anti-
Corruption Framework of The Inter-American Development Bank, 6, 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1824265 (accessed 2 November 2009).   
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In April 2001, the Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption (OCFC) was 
created with the initial function of receiving and classifying all allegations of fraud 
and corruption and then referring them to the appropriate office for investigation 
(usually the Office of the Auditor General, the Procurement Committee, the Ethics 
Committee, or the Legal Department). After this, OCFC would monitor investigations 
and implementation of recommendations (including sanctions) arising from these 
investigations. It was also responsible for recommending cases to the President of 
IADB that should have been forwarded to national authorities.445  
 
In October 2003, responsibilities to investigate allegations of fraud and corruption in 
Bank-financed activities were reassigned to a newly established Office of Institutional 
Integrity (OII), which started its operation in 2004. Apart from investigations, OII 
performs prevention work by preparing lessons learned from the investigations to 
improve the Bank’s integrity policies and mechanisms.  
 
In September 2004, the IADB created the Sanctions Committee. It is comprised of 
five Bank staff members appointed by the President and is responsible for reviewing 
the evidence discovered in the course of investigations into allegations of fraud and 
corruption. The Sanctions Committee determines whether allegations are well 
founded and if sanctions are appropriate on the basis of the information provided by 
OII and parties subject to the investigation. 
 
In December 2009, the IADB has revised its anti-corruption framework based on the 
recommendations of an external group headed by Richard Thornburgh presented in 
the report in late 2008. Among main changes in the IADB’s procedures are: 
 
• Creation of a new Case Officer position. The Case Officer reviews OII 
investigative findings and has the authority to sanction parties for 
wrongdoing, including a suspension from participating in Bank-funded 
programs.  
 
                                                 
445 Ibid., at 8-9.  
 129 
 
• The Case Officer’s recommendations can be appealed to the new 
Sanctions Committee, which for the first time will include external 
members (four), as well as Bank staff (three). All seven members will be 
appointed by the President.  
• The OCFC has been replaced by the Anti-corruption Policy Committee, 
which will focus on policy development and oversight of the Bank’s anti-
corruption initiatives. The cases previously considered by the OCFC will 
be dealt with by the Sanctions Committee.446 
 
These changes will be implemented over the course of 2010. Therefore, the 
procedures below do not reflect any of them.  
 
2. Grounds for debarment 
 
A Systematic Framework defined corruption as “acts performed by officials who use 
their positions wrongfully, or are requested to do so by others, to obtain some benefit 
for themselves or for others”.447  
 
In the context of the Bank-funded projects, the Bank’s Procurement and Consultants 
Policies provide for of acts which may be committed by bidders, suppliers, 
contractors or consultants in violation of the requirement to adhere to the highest 
ethical standards and lead to sanctions, including debarment. These acts which 
definitions are harmonized with those of the Uniform Framework are as follows: 
corrupt, fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices.448 
 
The Procurement and Consultants Policies clearly stipulate that this list of 
sanctionable practices is not exhaustive since it covers only the most common types 
of corruption. Therefore, the Bank reserves the right to take action in case of any 
                                                 
446 IADB News Release (2009): IDB Moves to Strengthen Anti-Corruption Framework, 
http://www.iadb.org/news-releases/2009-12/english/idb-moves-to-strengthen-anticorruption-
framework-6079.html (accessed 5 January 2010). 
447 IADB Systematic Framework, supra note 441, at 1. 
448 IADB Procurement Policies, Art. 1.14(a), IADB Consultants Policies, Art. 1.21(a). The Bank 
applies the definitions of fraud and corruption as adopted by the International Financial Institutions 
(IFI) Anti-Corruption Task Force. 
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similar act or allegations involving alleged acts of corruption, even when they are not 
specifically stipulated in the list. 
 
3. Initial sources of allegations 
 
Allegations of fraud or corruption can be made to the OII, the President, Vice 
Presidents, managers, or the Bank's Country Office Representative in each of its 
borrowing member countries, as well as in France and Japan. This can be done 
confidentially by telephone, e-mail, fax, regular mail, in person, or through the 
allegations form given on the IADB website, either anonymously or by identifying 
yourself.  
 
All allegations shall be referred to the OII. According to the OII annual report 2008, 
in the period of 2004-2008, 19% of the allegations were made anonymously, 66% 
were made by Non-Bank staff, while 15% came from Bank staff.449 
 
4. Investigative process 
4.1.  Preliminary assessment of allegations 
 
Upon receipt of an allegation involving bidders, contractors or consultants in IADB-
financed projects, OII undertakes a preliminary assessment to determine whether the 
allegation (i) concern a Bank-financed activity, (ii) constitute a violation of the Bank’s 
anti-corruption policies, and (iii) provide enough information to warrant an investigation 
by OII.  
 
If the answer to all of the above questions is affirmative, then OII will conduct a full 
investigation. Contrariwise, if, at the end of the preliminary review or at any other 
stage of the investigation, OII concludes that there is not a sufficient basis to warrant 
continued investigation, OII advises the Oversight Committee on Fraud and 
Corruption (OCFC) of that determination, and the OCFC has the final authority to 
                                                 
449 IADB (2008): OII Annual Report, 4 [hereinafter, OII Report 2008]. 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1927592 (accessed 28 October 2009). 
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decide whether the matter has to be closed (for a flowchart illustrating the process of 
dealing with allegations of fraud or corruption in the IADB see Annex V). 
 
4.2.  Full investigations 
 
Investigations are conducted by OII’s investigators known as “integrity officers” 
pursuant to the Principles and Guidelines for Investigations endorsed by the IFI’s 
Anti-Corruption Task Force. They rely on evidence that is obtained by OII from Bank 
staff members, country officials and third parties, as well as from project documents. 
In case of necessity, OII might undertake missions to conduct interviews.  
 
OII presents the results of its investigations to the OCFC and makes recommendations 
on further actions. OCFC is responsible for deciding whether a sanctions proceeding 
should be commenced. Where the results of an investigation support a finding of 
fraud or corruption, OII can recommend to the OCFC either to (a) submit the matter 
to the Sanctions Committee of the Bank if it involves bidders, contractors or 
consultants in Bank-financed projects using public sector loans, or (b) consider 
sanctions if the matter involves contracts between the Bank and third-parties, or in 
projects funded by Bank loans to the private sector. If as a result of OII investigations, 
evidence is lacking, to either confirm or deny an allegation, OII will accompany its 
report with a recommendation to close the matter.  
 
5. Sanctions Process 
5.1.  Submissions to the Sanctions Committee 
 
Sanctions proceedings are regulated by the Sanctions Procedures.450 If, based on the 
findings and recommendations of OII, the OCFC determines that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that an act of fraud or corruption may have occurred by 
a party subject to the jurisdiction of the Sanctions Committee, the OCFC may request 
OII to prepare and deliver a Notice of Administrative Action451 (Notice) to the 
                                                 
450 IADB Sanction Procedures, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=841305 
(accessed 25 October 2009). 
451 Prior to the end of 2007, “Notice of Administrative Action” was called “Notice of Charges”. 
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Sanctions Committee.452 The OCFC may, in its discretion, decline to authorize the 
preparation of a Notice in relation to an incident that occurred more than 5 (five) 
years earlier.453 
 
The Notice must identify the potential subject to sanctions (Respondent), state the 
allegations of fraud or corruption, and summarize the facts relevant to the basis for the 
allegations. Apart from that, OII should attach to the Notice all evidence relevant to 
the determination of a sanction, including all exculpatory or mitigating evidence, 
explain that the Respondent has an opportunity to respond to the allegations, and list 
the sanctions that the Bank may impose. After having received this Notice, the 
Sanctions Committee sends it with all attachments to each Respondent.  
 
The Respondent is given sixty (60) days to present arguments and evidence in 
response to the allegations set forth in the Notice.454 After this, both OII and the 
Respondent have one more chance to reply to each other’s responses (so called “OII’s 
Reply” and “Respondent’s Surreply”). Based on all materials submitted, the Sanctions 
Committee determines whether the Respondent engaged in an act of fraud or 
corruption in connection with a Bank-financed project. 
 
5.2.  Standard of proof  
 
The required standard of proof shall show that “the evidence is sufficient” to support 
the findings of the investigation. This standard slightly differs from the “more 
probable than not” that had been agreed upon among the MDBs.455 
 
 
 
                                                 
452 IADB, Operating Guidelines and Regulations for the Oversight Committee on Fraud and 
Corruption, Art. 109 [OCFC Guidelines and Regulations], 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1156281 (accessed 30 October 2009). 
453 IADB Sanction Procedures, supra note 450, para.4.2. 
454 If it fails to do so within determined period of time, the allegations will be deemed to be admitted. 
455 International Financial Institutions Principles and Guidelines for Investigations (2006), 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=832313 (accessed 28 October 2009). 
 133 
 
5.3.  Imposition of sanctions 
 
Under the Sanctions Procedures, the Sanctions Committee renders its decision 
without a hearing. However, it may, in its discretion, hold such hearings as it deems 
necessary.  
 
The Committee’s decision takes effect immediately. 
 
a) Range of sanctions 
The possible sanctions that may be imposed by the Sanctions Committee are as 
follows:  
 
• Reprimand in the form of a formal letter of censure of the Respondent’s 
behavior; 
• Conditions on Contracting – a declaration that an individual, entity or 
firm bidding for or participating in a Bank-financed project is ineligible to 
be awarded contracts under Bank-financed projects except under such 
conditions as the Committee deems to be appropriate.  
• Debarment - a declaration that an individual, entity or firm is ineligible, 
either permanently or for a stated period of time, to be awarded and/or 
participate in contracts under Bank-financed projects. 
• Other sanctions that the Sanctions Committee deems to be appropriate 
under the circumstances, including the imposition of fines representing 
reimbursement of the Bank for costs associated with investigations and 
proceedings. Such other sanctions may be imposed in addition to or in 
lieu of other sanctions.456 
 
In exceptional cases, to protect the public and the Bank’s interest, “for good cause 
shown” the OCFC may order, upon issuance of the Notice or at a later stage of the 
sanctions proceedings, that the Respondent be suspended from consideration for 
award of contracts until the decision of the Sanctions Committee.  
 
                                                 
456 IADB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 450, para.11.2.  
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b) Length of debarment 
Debarment may be imposed permanently or for a stated period of time. From the list 
of the sanctioned firms and individuals on the Bank’s website, we can see that the 
length of debarment varies from one to ten years.  
 
c) Mitigating or aggravating factors 
In determining the length of debarment, the Sanctions Committee may consider 
various mitigating or aggravating factors. These factors include:  
 
• severity of the Respondent’s actions;  
• the past conduct of the Respondent involving fraud or corruption;  
• the magnitude of any losses caused by the Respondent;  
• the quality of the evidence against the Respondent;  
• any mitigating circumstances, including the intervening implementation 
of programs to prevent and detect fraud or corruption or other remedial 
measures by the Respondent;  
• the savings of Bank resources or facilitation of an investigation being 
conducted by the OII occasioned by the Respondent’s admission of 
culpability or cooperation in the investigation process; sanctions imposed 
by other parties, including another MDB.  
 
 
6. Parties subject to debarment 
  
Debarment can apply to both individuals and firms. It might be extended to any 
individual or firm that, directly or indirectly, owns or controls457 a Respondent, is 
owned or controlled by a Respondent, or is under common ownership or control with 
a Respondent. Debarment can be extended both to firms in existence at the time the 
debarment is imposed and those formed during the debarment period. 
 
                                                 
457 Indicia of control include, but are not limited to, the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to 
direct the management and policies of a business concern, organization or individual, interlocking 
management or ownership, identity of interests among family members, shared facilities and 
equipment, or common use of employees. 
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Any firm or individual which can be subject to debarment due to its relationship with 
the Respondent shall also be listed as Respondent in a Notice and given an 
opportunity to respond to it.458 
 
7. Appeals 
 
The Sanctions Committee’s decisions are final and not subject to appeal. 
Nevertheless, within one year from the issuance of its decision on debarment the 
Respondent may request reopening of the matter for reconsideration on the basis of 
newly discovered facts (no later than thirty days following such discovery) which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered prior to the Sanction Committee’s 
Decision. The Committee will decide on its own discretion.  
 
 
 
8. Disclosure and information sharing 
 
As of 2007, the Bank publishes the names of debarred individuals and firms on its 
website.459 This public disclosure is in line with the Bank’s policy of “zero tolerance” 
for fraud and corruption and shows that there will be serious consequences will result 
if the Bank finds evidence of the sanctionable practices. Thus, it has a deterrent effect 
and gives credibility to the Bank’s efforts in this area. 
 
If at any time the OCFC determines that there is any evidence of fraud or corruption 
in connection with an activity financed by another MDB, it may make or request OII 
to make available any related information to such organization or government, as the 
OCFC, in consultation with OII, deems appropriate, taking into account the need to 
protect confidential information.460 
 
                                                 
458 IADB Sanctions Procedures, supra note 450, Art. 11.3.  
459 IADB, Sanctioned Firms and Individuals, http://www.iadb.org/topics/transparency/IAD/ 
sanctionedfirms.cfm?lang=en (accessed 30 October 2009). 
460 OCFC Guidelines and Regulations, supra note 452, para.110(b). 
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When investigations lead to a conclusion that internal laws of a country may have 
been violated, the OCFC may recommend to the President of the IADB, that the 
matter be referred to the appropriate national authorities. In this case, the OCFC may 
make or request OII to make available to these national authorities such information 
relating to the suspected violation as the OCFC, in consultation with OII, deems 
appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.461 
 
9. Case study: Fraudulent Curriculum Vitae 
 
A company “X” submitted a bid for a consulting contract that contained three 
Curricula Vitae (CVs) for consultants who would be performing work under the 
contract. The consultants later filed complaints to the effect that the information in 
their CVs had been modified by the company, exaggerating their experience to obtain 
additional points in the evaluation. The company had indeed won the contract based 
on the higher score generated by the altered CVs. 
 
OII interviewed the consultants who confirmed that the information in their CVs was 
false. As a result, a Notice of Administrative Action was issued against the company 
and its legal representative, who had submitted the false information. The Sanctions 
Committee has debarred both for three years. The value of the contract awarded to the 
company was US$ 116,389.462 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
461 Ibid., para.110(a).   
462 OII Report 2008, supra note 449, at 13.  
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CHAPTER VII.  THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Established as the regional MDB for Africa, African Development Bank (AfDB) is a 
leading financial development institution on the continent. It was created on 4 August 
1963 in Khartoum, Sudan, where 23 newly independent African countries signed the 
agreement establishing the institution (AfDB Charter). As of December 2007, AfDB 
includes 53 independent African countries and 24 non-African countries.463 AfDB is 
the parental organization of the African Development Bank Group comprising two 
more entities: the African Development Fund (ADF), established on 29 November 
1972, by the African Development Bank and 13 non-African countries, and the 
Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF), set up in 1976 by the Federal Government of Nigeria.464 
 
Under its Charter, the purpose of the AfDB is to promote the economic development 
and social progress of its regional member countries (RMCs).465 It contributes to  
improving  the  living  conditions  of  the populations,  as  well  as  creating,  
expanding  and  rehabilitating  productive  and  social investments.  It  finances  
development  and  structural  adjustment  projects and programmes,  provides  
advisory  services  and  stimulates  investments  from other sources  of  finance.466 
 
The AfDB’s development assistance, available both for private and public sectors in 
regional member states, is mainly channeled through project loans/grants, including 
lines of credit, and technical assistance. During the period of 1967–2008, the AfDB 
has approved 3,276 loans and grants totaling USD 44.75.   
                                                 
463 Following  the  amendment  of  the Agreement  in  May  1982,  the  membership of  the  AfDB  was  
opened  up  to  non-regional countries.  
464 Although the ADF and NTF are  legally  and  financially  distinct from  the  ADB,  they  share  the  
same  staff,  and  their  projects  are  subject  to  the  same high standards as those of the ADB. 
Therefore, within the context of this thesis, unless otherwise indicated, “African Development Bank” 
(or AfDB) means the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Nigerian 
Trust Fund.  
465 Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, 14 August 1963, Chapter 1, Article 1, 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/30718627-EN-
AGREEMENT-ESTABLISHING-THE-AFRICAN-DEVELOPMENT-BANK-6TH-EDITION.PDF 
(accessed 3 November 2009) [hereinafter, AfDB Charter].   
466 AfDB (2007): Disbursement Handbook, Chapter 1, Article 1.1, 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Financial-Information/30715194-EN-
DISBURSEMENT-HANDBOOK.PDF (accessed 3 November 2009). 
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B. Tackling Corruption in the AfDB-funded Projects 
1. The AfDB’s fiduciary responsibility 
 
Article 17.1(h) of the AfDB Charter requires that AfDB “shall make arrangements to 
ensure that the proceeds of any loan made or guaranteed by it are used only for the 
purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of 
economy and efficiency”.467  
 
2.  The AfDB’s anti-corruption policy 
2.1.  General overview 
 
Various surveys show that the majority of African countries have a high level of 
corruption.468  Michelle Celarier claims that in 1996, up to 30bn dollars in aid for 
Africa ended up in foreign bank accounts.469  
 
However, although known even by the AfDB, the problems of corruption became a 
central component of its good governance agenda only in the late 90s. This was due 
mostly to increase in the incidence of corrupt practices with impunity, mounting 
evidence about its negative impact on economic growth and investment, and 
impediment of the efficient use of development assistance.470  
 
In December 1999, the Bank issued its Bank Group Policy on Good Governance. 
Based on this Policy, the AfDB has been actively supporting governance in RMCs 
through institutional strengthening projects and non-lending activities. While 
strengthening transparency and accountability in the management of public resources 
at the country, sector and regional levels can be crucial for economic development 
and elimination of poverty in fragile states and the region as a whole, it does not 
ensure accountability and transparency in the use of the resources provided by AfDB.  
 
                                                 
467 AfDB Charter, supra note 465, Article 17.1(h). 
468 For example, WB Governance Indicators, TI's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  
469 Celarier, M. (1996): The Search for the Smoking Gun, in: Euromoney Online Magazine, 49. 
470 AfDB Proceedings of the Regional Learning Workshop on Combating Corruption in Africa (2003), 8. 
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Therefore, to prevent and mitigate the harmful impact of corruption on the economic 
development of its member countries, the AfDB has adopted an Anti-Corruption 
Strategy aimed at: 
 
• Preventing corruption in AfDB activities; 
• Mainstreaming corruption issues in AfDB activities; 
• Helping Regional Member Countries (RMCs) that request assistance; and 
• Participation in regional and global anti-corruption initiatives. 
 
2.2.  Procurement reforms 
 
Based on its Anti-Corruption Strategy, AfDB adopted a zero tolerance policy against 
fraud and corruption in the projects it funds. Borrowers (including beneficiaries of 
Bank loans) as well as bidders/suppliers/contractors under Bank-financed contracts are 
required to observe the highest ethical standards during the procurement and execution 
of contracts. 
 
Procurement financed by the AfDB is governed by the Rules and Procedures for 
Procurement of Goods and Works (AfDB Procurement Rules)471 as well as Rules and 
Procedures for Recruitment of Consultants (AfDB Consultants Rules)472 both 
developed in 1999 and revised in 2008 for the purpose of harmonization with other 
MDBs.  
 
Besides, AfDB approved new guidelines for policy-based loans aimed specifically at 
governance policy changes and reforms. Specifically, the guidelines provide 
information for consideration at each stage of the project cycle, and serve as a check 
list of actions required to assess governance risk and impact, required policy changes 
and recommended actions, and relevant indicators to measure progress. 
                                                 
471 AfDB (2008): Rules and Procedures for Procurement of Goods and Works, 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-related-Procurement/Revised%20 
RULES %20AND%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20PROCUREMENT%20OF%20 GOODS %20 
%26%20WORKS%20FINAL%20SEPTEMBER%202009%20ENGLISH.pdf (accessed 30 October 
2009) [hereinafter, AFDB Procurement Rules]. 
472 AfDB (2008): Rules and Procedures for the use of Consultants, 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-related-Procurement/Revised%20 
PROCEDURES%20FOR%20THE%20USE%20OF%20CONSULTANTS%20FINAL%20ENGLISH
%20SEPTEMBER%202009.pdf (accessed 30 October 2009) [hereinafter, AfDB Consultants Rules]. 
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C. The AfDB’s Debarment Policy  
1. Introduction 
 
Provisions on debarment in the AfDB were first introduced when it adopted its formal 
Procurement Rules and Consultant Rules in 1999. Apart from these Rules, debarment 
procedure is based on the Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and 
Corruption in Bank Operations, IACD’s Standard Operating Procedures and AfDB 
Sanctions. Currently AfDB is in the process of developing comprehensive Sanctions 
Guidelines.  
 
Before establishment of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Division (formerly known 
as an Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigation Division), allegations were 
investigated by the Internal Audit Department (IAD) or by an ad-hoc team, including 
the general counsel. The Bank’s Procurement Review Committee (PRC) based on the 
findings and conclusions of investigations used to decide on sanctions, such as 
cancellation of loans to the borrowers or debarment of the contractor/consultants.473  
 
In November 2005, the Board of Directors of the AfDB created the Integrity and 
Anti-Corruption Division (IACD), which began its operations in June 2006. Being 
under the Office of the Auditor General, IACD is the only investigative body for 
fraud and corruption within the AfDB and reports directly to the Auditor General. The 
Division’s mandate is to promote integrity in the use of Bank resources and 
investigate corruption in Bank-financed activities.474 IACD works collaboratively 
with the Internal Audit Division, which also reports to the Auditor General. While the 
Internal Audit Division deals mainly with programmed verifications of financial 
statements and the functioning of business processes, the IACD conducts 
investigations to verify specific allegations of misconduct, fraud or corruption. 
 
 
                                                 
473 Langton, D. (2004): Anti-Corruption Standards of the International Financial Institutions, 7, 
http://web.mit.edu/kolya/.f/root/net.mit.edu/sipb.mit.edu/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-
reports/RL32374.pdf (accessed 1 November 2009). 
474 “Bank-financed activities” refers to all operations and internal administrative matters financed by 
the AfDB. 
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2.  Grounds for debarment 
 
Grounds for debarment listed in the Revised Procurement Guidelines of 2008 are as 
follows: corrupt, fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices.475 Their definitions are 
harmonized with those of the Uniform Framework mentioned above. 
 
3. Initial sources of allegations 
 
Initial allegations can be received from any person who has knowledge of alleged 
corruption and/or fraudulent activities within the Bank's operations: employees, 
contractors, consultants and the general public. The principal receiving point for the 
Bank is the IACD. Allegations can be reported through secured telephone, email and 
facsimile hotlines 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Online forms for receiving 
complaints are also available. 
 
The IACD accepts all information either anonymously or with identification of the 
person making the report, if he/she so wishes. The identity and the information 
provided are held in the strictest confidence.  
 
Apart from IACD, allegations may be provided to any AfDB office or an employee of 
the Bank. In this case, there is a mandatory obligation for this information to be 
reported to the IACD within a period of 7 days from the time of first receipt. 
 
4. Investigation process  
4.1.  Preliminary assessment of allegations 
 
All complaints are registered and reviewed by IACD to determine whether they fall 
under its jurisdiction. Complaints that fall outside the authority of IACD are referred 
to the appropriate organs within the Bank. Those complaints that fall under its 
mandate are evaluated for their credibility, materiality, and verifiability. Depending 
on the outcome of the evaluation, IACD will either:  
                                                 
475 AfDB Procurement Rules, supra note 471, Art.1.14 (a); AfDB Consultant Rules, supra note 472, 
Art. 1.22. 
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• discard them if they are obviously false or frivolous; or  
• warrant the opening of an investigation if there is sufficient evidence to 
move forward; or  
• determines to carry out additional screening via a preliminary inquiry.476 
 
4.2.  Full investigations 
 
Once screening of the allegations reveals that they have a merit, the IACD opens a 
full investigation based on its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) being consistent 
with the Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption 
(for a flowchart illustrating the process of dealing with allegations of fraud or 
corruption in the AfDB see Annex VI). 
 
For the purpose of corroboration of the information in IACD’s possession, 
investigative activity shall include, inter alia, collection and analysis of documentary, 
video, audio, photographic, and electronic information or other material, interviews of 
witnesses, observations of investigators, conducting of interviews, etc. If needed, the 
IACD may also involve external parties for investigations.477  
 
If the IACD believes that an audit is required, it may make a recommendation to the 
Auditor General who will then refer the case to the Internal Audit Division to conduct 
such an audit, if deems it necessary.478  
 
During investigations, at an appropriate time determined by IACD, a Respondent is 
sent a formal Notice on Investigation Findings (Notice). This Notice states the 
allegations, summarizes the facts and evidence, sets forth the possible sanctions, and 
explains the Respondent’s right to present exculpatory evidence. The Bank does not 
provide for any time limitation for contesting the allegations by the Respondent as 
long as the evidence is credible and relevant to Investigations. Likewise, there is no 
                                                 
476 AfDB, Integrity and Anti-Corruption: 2007-2008 Report, 13, 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Integrity%20and%20Anti-
%20Corruption%202007-2008%20Report.pdf (accessed 2 November 2009).  
477 AfDB, Investigative Process, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/auditor-generals-
office/integrity-and-anti-corruption/investigative-process/ (accessed 2 November 2009).  
478 Ibid. 
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such limitation for the Bank to respond to the Respondent’s arguments and evidence - 
it does so as required on case by case basis.479    
If upon completion of the investigation, the findings are not sufficient to substantiate 
the complaint, the IACD will close the investigation and notify the relevant parties 
about it. 
 
5.  Sanctions process 
 
A sanctions proceeding is regulated by the AfDB Sanctions pending adoption of 
comprehensive Sanctions Guidelines.  
 
5.1.  Submissions to the President 
 
If the IACD finds sufficient information to substantiate the complaint, the Auditor 
General presents the Sanction Report to the President of the Bank.480  
 
5.2.  The standard of proof 
 
The standard of proof shall show that it is more probable than not that the Respondent 
had engaged in a sanctionable practice.481 
 
5.3.  Imposition of sanctions 
 
Based on the investigation information furnished, the President makes sanction 
determination with the advice of the Advisory Committee on Corruption and Fraud.482 
 
a) Range of sanctions 
 
The Bank’s range of sanctions for external Subjects include letter of reprimand and 
debarment.483 
                                                 
479 Personal communication with AfDB representatives. 
480AfDB Investigative Process, supra note 477; see also AfDB Integrity and Anti-Corruption Report 
2007-2008, supra note 476. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Ibid. 
483 Ibid. 
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b) Length of debarment 
 
Debarment may be imposed either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, 
determined on case-by-case-basis depending on aggravated and/or mitigating factors.  
By now the average length of debarment imposed has been three (3) years.  
 
c) Aggravating and mitigating factors 
 
Choice of the sanction and length of debarment depend on the following factors:  
 
• severity of the Respondent’s conduct; 
• degree of the Respondent’s involvement in the sanctionable practice; 
• the Respondent’s past conduct involving a sanctionable practice; 
• voluntary disclosure of the information on the involvement in 
sanctionable practice; 
• other factors which might be deemed relevant on a case-by-case basis.  
 
6. Parties subject to debarment 
 
When the debarred party is a company, debarment extends to its directors and staff, as 
well as its affiliates.  
 
 
7. Appeals 
 
Debarred firms/ individuals may within ninety (90) days appeal to the President for 
re-consideration. However, Respondent does not have an automatic right to 
reconsideration. Appeal to Request a Review must reflect information that was not 
known, or could not reasonably have been known to the subject at the time the AfDB 
sought explanations, and would have been relevant to the President’s decision. In 
determining whether to reconsider the case and which decision to take, the President 
may seek the advice of the Advisory Committee on Corruption and Fraud.484 
 
                                                 
484 Ibid..  
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8. Disclosure and information sharing 
 
At the time being, the Bank does not publish the reports/documents concerning 
investigations and the names of debarred persons/entities on its website.  
 
However, in line with collaboration and cooperation being forged amongst MDBs, the 
Bank is open to share information, on a need-to-know basis. Where a case has to be 
referred to a National Authority, this would be decided by the President with the 
advice of the Advisory Committee on Corruption and Fraud on a case-by-case-
basis.485  
 
9. Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP) 
 
The AfDB encourages firms or individuals involved in its projects to volunteer 
information on fraud or corruption of which they have knowledge or in which they are 
involved in. The voluntary disclosure of malpractices can be a mitigating factor in the 
application of sanctions against the firm or individual making the disclosure.486 
 
10. Case study: Financial Irregularities in Project C487 
 
AfDB received an allegation from Government of A related to financial irregularities 
perpetrated by a company B on Project C. Based on its own investigations and the 
sworn affidavits and signed statements obtained by the national anti-corruption office 
of A, AfDB concluded that, under its rules and procedures, standards and definitions, 
there was evidence of fraudulent practices in the award of contract to the company B - 
the procurement process for the selection of B was not competitive and there was 
manipulation in the procurement process that facilitated B to win the bid. The contract 
price was exaggerated and inexplicably high and some local staff received kickbacks 
from the award of this contract. Additionally, company B submitted ineligible and 
                                                 
485 Ibid. 
486 AfDB, Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP), http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/auditor-
generals-office/integrity-and-anti-corruption/voluntary-disclosure-program/ (accessed 5 November 2009). 
487 Due to confidentiality reasons all the names in this case study have been redacted. 
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fictitious invoices to support its claims for reimbursement of expenses under the 
contract it signed with the government of A. 
 
Based on the afore-mentioned findings and pursuant to the AfDB’s Procurement and 
Consultants Rules, the AfDB debarred company B, its two directors and three 
subsidiaries for five years each. Three individual project staff, which had accepted 
bribes and kickbacks and colluded with company B to violate the AfDB rules, were 
sanctioned from working on any AfDB-financed activities for a period of three years 
each. Another individual project staff was recommended for official reprimand for 
gross negligence in exercising due diligence in the supervision of the invoices to be 
enforced by the Government of A under its civil service rules. 
 
AfDB’s findings were referred to the Anti-Corruption office of Government A to be 
used to further investigation.  
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CHAPTER VIII.  THE EUROPEAN BANK ON 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The idea of establishment of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) emerged in 1989 after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold 
War. The foundation agreement was signed on 29 May 1990 by 40 countries, the 
Commission of the European Communities and the European Investment Bank to 
“foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private 
and entrepreneurial initiative”488 in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. With headquarters in London, the EBRD 
began operations in April 1991. Since its establishment, the number of the member 
countries has grown to 61, and the number of recipient countries reached 30.489  
 
EBRD fulfills its mission through project financing for banks, industries and 
businesses, both new ventures and investments in existing companies. Besides, it 
supports publicly owned companies in privatization and restructuring. It also assists in 
building institutions necessary for development of the market economy, and promotes 
market-oriented skills and sound business practices. 
 
 
B. Tackling Corruption in the EBRD-funded Projects 
1. The EBRD’s fiduciary responsibility    
 
Article 8.1. of EBRD’s constituent agreement (EBRD Charter) requires it to “take the 
necessary measures to ensure that the proceeds of any loan made, guaranteed or 
participated in by the Bank, or any equity investment, are used only for the purposes 
for which the loan or the equity investment was granted.”490 Bound by this provision, 
EBRD has to prevent its funds from being diverted from their intended purposes. 
                                                 
488 Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (signed in Paris on 29 
May 1990 and entered into force on 28 March 1991), Chapter 1, Article 1 [hereinafter, EBRD Charter]. 
489 Turkey became the EBRD’s 30th recipient country as of 1 November 2008. 
490 EBRD Charter, supra note 489, Chapter III, Art.8.1. 
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2.  The EBRD’s anti-corruption policy 
2.1.  General overview 
 
The rapidity of economic transformations in the transition countries has also created a 
lot of opportunities for fraud and corruption which exposed EBRD’s funds to risks. 
This urged EBRD to develop an anti-corruption strategy which would encompass 
prevention, detection, investigation and sanction of corruption, fraud and similar 
practices in both the Bank’s operations and more generally. 
 
Preventive measures include assisting EBRD’s countries of operations in their efforts 
to tackle corruption (external assistance); taking steps within the EBRD to ensure its 
integrity (internal prevention), and harmonizing its approach to dealing with 
corruption through global collaboration (international co-operation). 
 
Internal prevention plays a key role in ensuring that the highest levels of ethical 
standards are maintained in all of the Bank’s activities. For this purpose the Bank has 
developed integrity due diligence procedures and guidelines which help the Bank to 
assess the potential risks. The EBRD ensures that integrity concerns are seized on at 
all levels of the investment cycle. Following “know your customer” principle, 
banking teams should check prospective deals and clients for matters that might pose 
risks to the Bank’s interests and reputation.  
 
The due diligence undertaken by the banking teams is routinely reviewed by Risk 
Management to provide independent judgment of its adequacy and conclusions. The 
higher risks are subject to control by the Office of the Chief Compliance Officer 
(OCCO). The OCCO, comprised of seven staff members, regularly monitors 
compliance by the banking teams with the integrity procedures which rely on “red-
flags” serving as early warnings of potential integrity risks. These risks must be 
thoroughly addressed prior to any investment decision by the Bank.  
 
Recently, the EBRD created a position of Business Group Director for Portfolio 
Monitoring whose role is to ensure that the EBRD monitors efficiently and effectively 
the risks in the Bank's portfolio of existing projects, and to provide early warnings and 
solutions to identified problems, including events of corruption and fraud. 
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2.2.  Procurement reforms 
 
30% of EBRD’s business portfolio in the public sector, therefore it is essential that 
clients observe the “highest standards of ethics” during the procurement and 
execution of contracts financed by it.  
 
Considering that particular risks are associated with procurement, the Bank’s Board of 
Directors approved Procurement Policies and Rules (PP&Rs) in 1991491 which have 
been revised several times since then.  
 
In February 1998, the EBRD’s Board of Directors approved revisions to the PP&Rs, 
which covered definitions of corrupt and fraudulent practices in the procurement 
process and the way the EBRD would deal with any proven allegations of these 
practices.492 Amendments of 2007 extended the sanctionable offences to corrupt, 
fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices and introduced a provision on a “no bribe 
pledge”.  
 
 
C. The EBRD’s Debarment Policy  
1. Introduction 
 
Debarment was first mentioned in the Bank’s revised PP&Rs of 1998. Along with 
debarment, PP&R set forth a basis for a cross-debarment of a firm or an individual 
which has been found to have engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in a project 
not financed by the Bank by either a judicial process in a member country of the Bank 
or a finding by the enforcement (or similar) mechanism of another international 
organization (a third-party finding). 
 
Before 2009, all received allegations of fraud and corruption would be investigated by 
the OCCO. The results of its investigations would be reviewed by the EBRD’s 
Procurement and Contracting Committee, which could make, if appropriate, a 
                                                 
491 EBRD, Procurement Policies and Rules, http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/procure/ppr.pdf 
(accessed 24 November 2009). 
492 EBRD, Annual Report 1999, 54, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/general/ar99.htm (accessed 25 
November 2009).   
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sanction recommendation to the Bank’s Executive Committee. The latter would 
decide whether, and what kind of sanction to apply.  
 
In late 2008, as part of its commitments under the Uniform Framework, the EBRD 
adopted the Enforcement Policy and Procedures (EPPs), which set forth provisions on 
how the Bank should proceed with the received allegations of fraud and corruption. 
The EPPs became effective as from 27 March 2009, when the Enforcement 
Committee was established. The EPPs designated OCCO to investigate allegations of 
corruption or fraud in the EBRD’s activities.493  
 
2. Grounds for debarment 
 
Grounds for debarment are: corrupt, fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices. In 
May 2007 EBRD adopted harmonized definitions of fraudulent and corrupt practices 
as set out in the Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and 
Corruption and has incorporated them into the revised PP&Rs.494 
 
As EBRD’s Anti-corruption report of 2008 makes it clear, it is not necessary for the 
prohibited practice to occur in connection with procurement - it may also occur during 
the execution of the Bank project, such as by misappropriation of funds or bribery of 
officials.  
 
3. Sources of initial allegations 
 
Anyone, within or outside the Bank, who has information regarding alleged fraud or 
corruption in EBRD-financed projects shall report it to the Bank's Office of the Chief 
Compliance Officer (OCCO).495 It can be done in person, by calling the toll-free 
                                                 
493 The manner in which OCCO helps EBRD protect its integrity and reputation and manage integrity 
risks is set forth in The Bank’s Integrity Risks Policy which also includes the OCCO’s Terms of 
Reference (approved by the Board of Directors on 7 April 2009), 
http://www.ebrd.com/about/integrity/integrityriskpol.pdf (accessed 21 November 2009). 
494 EBRD PP&Rs (approved 6 May 2009), para.2.9., 
http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/procure/ppr09e.pdf (accessed 24 November 2009). 
495 On 7 April 2009, EBRD’s Board of Directors approved “The Bank’s Integrity Risks Policy and 
Terms of Reference for the Office of the Chief Compliance Officer”.   
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hotline or via e-mail. EBRD can also accept anonymous complaints and keep 
confidentiality of those who disclosed their identity but do not want it to be revealed. 
OCCO can also receive information about judicial judgment in an EBRD member 
country or a decision by another international organization that an individual or entity 
has engaged in fraud or corruption (Third Party Finding). 
 
4. Investigation process  
4.1.  Preliminary assessment of allegations 
 
Upon receipt of an allegation of a suspected Prohibited Practice or information 
concerning a Third Party Finding, the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) shall carry 
out a preliminary assessment to determine whether the allegation falls under OCCO’s 
jurisdiction and whether the information received is reliable (for a flowchart 
illustrating the process of dealing with allegations of fraud or corruption in the EBRD 
see Annex VII). 
 
The matter shall be closed if based on the preliminary assessment the CCO 
determines that it does not warrant further investigation as well as if the prohibited 
practice being object of the allegation or a Third Party Finding took place (or would 
have taken place) more than ten years prior to the date of receipt of such information 
by CCO.496     
 
4.2. Full investigations 
 
If as a result of the preliminary assessment of the allegations the CCO determines, 
that the matter falls under OCCO’s jurisdiction and that the allegations are reliable, 
the CCO shall undertake a more detailed and comprehensive investigation. 
Investigations are carried out in accordance with the International Financial 
Institutions Principles and Guidelines for Investigations.  
 
                                                 
496 EBRD Enforcement Policy and Procedures, para.3.3(ii)-(iv) [hereinafter, EBRD EPPs] 
http://www.ebrd.com/about/integrity/epp.pdf (accessed 24 November 2009).  
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In case of a receipt of a Third Party Finding, the CCO does not carry out an 
investigation but verifies its authenticity, establishes the connection, if any, between 
the individual or the firm subject to that Finding and the Bank, and determines its 
relevance and seriousness to the Bank. In determining the seriousness of the Third 
Party Finding, CCO shall consider whether the Third Party Finding was rendered in a 
jurisdiction which afforded appropriate due process rights to the Respondent and the 
gravity of Respondent’s conduct having regard to international conventions and 
standards.497 
 
If, as a result of investigation, the CCO determines that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of a Prohibited Practice or that a Third Party Finding may warrant 
imposition of sanctions, he/she shall send a draft Notice of Prohibited Practice or a 
Notice of Third Party Finding and proposed sanction to the Enforcement 
Committee.498 
 
5. Sanctions process  
 
A sanctions process in the EBRD is two-tiered involving the Enforcement Committee 
and the President.  
 
5.1.  Submissions to the Enforcement Committee 
 
Upon receipt of the CCO report, the Enforcement Committee which consists of at 
least five senior Bank staff members appointed by the President shall determine 
whether the matter warrants further consideration.499 But prior to that, if the 
Enforcement Committee deems it necessary for protection of the Bank’s interests or 
reputation as well as for maintenance of integrity of the Bank’s procurement process, 
it may order suspension of the eligibility of the Respondent (and affiliates, if any), to 
                                                 
497 Ibid., para.3.4(ii). 
498 Ibid., para.3.5(i). 
499 Prior to adoption of EPPs, this role belonged to the EBRD’s Procurement and Contracting 
Committee (“PCC”), which was reviewing the results of any OCCO investigation and if appropriate, 
was making a recommendation to the EBRD’s Executive Committee to cancel any portion of the 
EBRD’s financing, together with a recommendation as to whether the entity in question should be 
excluded, either indefinitely or for a limited period of time, from bidding on future EBRD projects. 
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participate in any Bank-financed project or to receive payment in respect of an 
ongoing project. Suspension may be either for a defined period of time or for so long 
as the enforcement proceedings are ongoing.500 A suspension decision will be made 
public unless the Respondent has informed the Enforcement Committee in writing 
that he/she will voluntarily refrain from attempts to participate in the Bank-financed 
projects pending a final outcome of the Enforcement Proceedings.501 Breach of such 
an undertaking might affect the sanction decision.502   
 
If there is no sufficient ground to warrant further consideration, the Enforcement 
Committee directs the CCO to close the case. If, on the contrary, the Enforcement 
Committee determines that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the 
Respondent did commit the alleged prohibited practice or that the Third Party Finding 
warrants imposition of sanction, it shall send the Notice of Prohibited Practice or the 
Notice of Third Party Finding, respectively, to the Respondent.503 The Notices 
identify the Respondent, states the allegation and attach all evidence (the Notice of 
Prohibited Practice) or a copy of the Third Party Finding (the Notice of Third Party 
Finding), state proposed sanction(s) and explains the possibility of contesting the 
allegation(s) and/or the proposed sanction(s) (the Notice of Prohibited Practice) or 
proposed actions (the Notice of Third Party Finding) within prescribed period of time 
which should not be less than 30 days. 
 
If, within the period of time set out in either the Notice of Prohibited Practice or the 
Notice of Third Party Finding, the Respondent does not express its/his/her intention to 
contest the allegations or the proposed sanctions, the Enforcement Committee shall 
automatically instruct the CCO to implement the proposed sanctions without need for 
further submission to the President.504  
 
When the Respondent opts for the contested enforcement proceeding, it/he/she should 
submit either (i) arguments and/or written evidence in response to the material 
                                                 
500 EBRD EPPs, supra note 496, para.5.2. 
501 Ibid., para.7.3.  
502 Ibid., para.6.8(v). 
503 Ibid., para.5.1(iii)-(iv). 
504 Ibid., para.5.7(i). 
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provided in the Notice of Prohibited Practice and/or include arguments and evidence 
of mitigating circumstances, such as the intervening implementation of programs to 
detect or prevent prohibited practices; or (ii) mitigating circumstances subsequent to 
the date of the Third Party Finding or other circumstances and arguments regarding 
relevance or seriousness of the Third Party Finding to EBRD.505  
 
The CCO, which receives a copy of the Respondent’s submission, can within 
prescribed period of time rebut the arguments and evidence presented.506  
The Respondent is also entitled to make oral representations if it/he/she wishes so, 
which can be rebutted by the CCO or his/her representative. All oral representations 
are limited to arguments and evidence contained in the written submissions.507 
 
5.2.  Standard of proof 
 
Reviewing the evidence submitted, the Enforcement Committee shall determine their 
relevance, materiality, weight, and sufficiency. In relation to a prohibited practice, the 
Enforcement Committee shall determine whether based on the evidence it is more 
likely than not that Respondent engaged in the alleged prohibited practice. In relation 
to a Third Party Finding, the Enforcement Committee shall determine whether it is 
more likely than not that the Bank’s operations or reputation would be harmed or 
impaired if the Bank did not sanction the Respondent.508 In case of positive 
determination, the Enforcement Committee submits a report to the President together 
with recommended sanctions. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
505 Ibid., para.6.2(ii)-(iii). Due to the nature of the enforcement proceedings by EBRD, the Respondent 
in its/his/her response may not challenge any element of the Third Party Finding. 
506 Ibid., para.6.3. The Enforcement Committee may, at its discretion, accept additional material 
evidence from either the OCC or the Respondent after the deadlines providing the other party with the 
opportunity to respond.  
507 Ibid., para.6.5 
508 Ibid., para.6.6. ‘More likely than not’ means that upon consideration of all of the relevant evidence 
and materials, a preponderance of the evidence and materials supports the finding. 
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5.3.  Imposition of sanctions 
 
Upon receipt of the report and recommendations of the Enforcement Committee, the 
President, in consultation with the Executive Committee509 can: (i) accept the 
recommendation in whole; (ii) accept the recommendation in part and make his/her 
own determination; (iii) reject the recommendation and refer the matter back to the 
Enforcement Committee for further consideration; (iv) or reject the recommendation 
and order the Enforcement Committee to close the matter.510  
 
 
a) Range of sanctions 
The President can impose one or more of the following sanctions: 
 
• Rejection of a proposal for award of contract to a Respondent in respect of 
a procurement of goods, works or services.  
• Cancellation of a portion of Bank finance allocated to a Respondent but 
not yet disbursed in respect of a contract for the procurement of goods, 
works or services. 
• A formal Letter of Reprimand.  
• Debarment: the Respondent is declared ineligible, either indefinitely or 
for a defined period of time, to participate in any new Bank-financed 
Project.  
• Conditional Non-Debarment: the Respondent is required to comply, 
within defined period of time, with certain remedial, preventative or other 
measures as a condition to avoid debarment. If the Respondent fails to do 
so, it will be debarred automatically. 
• Debarment with Conditional Release: the Respondent is declared 
ineligible for a defined period of time subject to conditional reinstatement 
pursuant to which the period of debarment is reduced or terminated if the 
Respondent demonstrates compliance with specified conditions such as 
                                                 
509 Prior to adoption of EPPs, the President was not participating in decision-making process and the 
Executive Committee would decide alone, without whether, and what kind of sanction to impose. 
510 EBRD EPPs, supra note 496, para.6.9. 
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the introduction and/or implementation of corporate compliance or ethics 
programs.  
• Restitution: Respondent is ordered to make restitution of diverted funds to 
any other party.511 
 
b) Length of debarment 
The Respondent can be debarred either indefinitely or for a defined period of time. 
 
 
c) Aggravating and mitigating factors  
Recommendations and decisions on sanctions are affected, inter alia, by the following 
factors: 
 
• severity of the Respondent's conduct;  
• degree of the Respondent’s involvement in the prohibited practice;  
• damage caused by the Respondent to EBRD;  
• past conduct of the Respondent involving a prohibited practice;  
• mitigating circumstances, including the extent to which the Respondent 
cooperated in the investigation.512 
 
6. Parties subject to debarment 
 
Both individuals and firms can be subject to debarment. In relation to a firm, 
debarment can be extended to its affiliates, meaning any firm controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the Respondent, any firm that controls, directly or indirectly, the 
Respondent or any firm directly or indirectly under common control with the 
Respondent.513  
 
 
 
                                                 
511 Ibid., para.7.2. 
512 Ibid., para.6.8. 
513 Ibid., para.2.1. 
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7. Appeals 
 
EPP does not provide any right of appeal to Respondent and its affiliates. The 
President’s decision is final and takes effect immediately. 
 
8. Disclosure and information sharing 
 
Names of the Respondents subject to debarment or debarment with conditional 
release will be posted on the EBRD’s website and remain there for as long as 
debarment is in force. 
 
The materials submitted in the context of enforcement proceedings can with the 
authorization of the Enforcement Committee be disclosed to any international 
organization at any time given this organization has agreed to make similar 
information available from its own files to EBRD.  
 
9. Case study: Cross-debarment of Lahmeyer 
 
Effective 8 February 2007, EBRD determined that Lahmeyer International GmbH 
("Lahmeyer") would be ineligible to be awarded EBRD-financed contracts until such 
time as Lahmeyer had implemented an anti-corruption programme satisfactory to the 
EBRD.514 Lahmeyer, as mentioned above, was originally debarred by the World Bank 
in 2006 for bribery in connection with the WB-financed Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project. Cross-debarment of Lahmeyer by EBRD on the basis of paragraph 2.9 (d) of 
the PP&R was the first case where any of the MDBs has debarred a company for an 
offence committed in a project financed by another MDB. Therefore, it was widely 
celebrated as an important step towards harmonization of the MDB’S anti-corruption 
efforts.   
 
One might ask why they cross-debarred Lahmeyer, and not Acres, for example, which 
was found guilty on more charges than Lahmeyer. The then Chief Compliance Officer 
                                                 
514 EBRD News Release: Anti-Corruption Ruling, 25 March 2008, 
http://www.ebrd.com/oppor/procure/guide/fraud.htm (accessed 24 November 2009). 
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of EBRD in an interview to Transparency International explained that Acres had 
never worked with EBRD on projects, therefore its debarment would have made no 
sense. On the other hand, Lahmeher had done a lot of business with EBRD over the 
years and was actually being considered for an award of a contract that was to be 
financed by the EBRD. 515  
 
Prior to its debarment, Lahmeyer was offered a chance to explain why it should not be 
debarred. Its representatives informed EBRD about a compliance programme and a 
code of conduct introduced since being convicted in Lesotho. But this was not enough 
for EBRD and Lahmeyer was debarred until “it improved its anti-corruption policies”, 
which meant, inter alia, introduction of a compliance monitor to advise on and assist 
in developing an overall effective anti-corruption/ corporate governance structure; a 
viable reporting mechanism and a policy that protects employees that report 
corruption in good faith.516  
 
By 2008, Lahmeyer had introduced an enhanced Compliance Management System 
(CMS), which was a comprehensive anti-corruption programme satisfactory to the 
EBRD. In view of Lahmeyer's efforts, the EBRD had decided to re-instate Lahmeyer's 
eligibility to be awarded EBRD financed contracts effective 3 March 2008.517 
 
However, in order to ensure that full implementation of the CMS is achieved, 
Lahmeyer's Compliance Monitor was required to provide the EBRD with two 
monitoring reports, demonstrating Lahmeyer's implementation of its anti-corruption 
program to the satisfaction of the EBRD. In case of Lahmeyer’s failure to do so or a 
new finding of fraud or corrupt practices in the company by a judicial process or other 
official enquiry at any time prior to 1 March 2009, the Bank would have had the right 
to re-instate Lahmeyer's debarment and declare Lahmeyer ineligible to be awarded a 
future EBRD financed contract for an indefinite period of time.518 
 
                                                 
515 Transparency International, Interview with Enery Quinones, Chief Compliance Officer of EBRD 
(April 2007), http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2007/april_2007/interview 
(accessed 24 November 2009) [hereinafter, TI Interview].  
516 Ibid. 
517 EBRD News Release, supra note 515. 
518 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER IX.   SYNTHESIS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
This research on debarment by the MDBs demonstrates that all MDBs have 
debarment systems in place and all of them are of an administrative nature.519 Their 
debarment policies have a lot in common due to harmonization steps under the 
Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption signed on 
17 September 2006 by the heads of the African Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European 
Investment Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank in Singapore. However, the Uniform Framework is focused only 
on definitions of sanctionable practices, investigative principles and guidelines, as 
well as the promotion of information sharing among IFIs, leaving out the sanction 
procedures (for a tabular synthesis of debarment procedure in the MDBs see Annex I).  
 
 
A. Grounds for debarment  
 
As claimed by Thornburgh, to ensure fairness of the debarment proceedings, it is 
essential to forewarn the potential subjects thereof of the kinds of conduct which will 
give rise to their liability under such proceedings. Therefore, the range of the 
particular activities which may lead to debarment should be clearly defined.520  
 
The current definitions of the sanctionable practices set forth in the procurement rules 
and procedures of the MDBs have been harmonized with those provided for in the 
Uniform Framework. They are as follows: 
  
• A corrupt practice is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly 
or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of 
another party.  
                                                 
519 Despite being administrative in nature, Moran et al. argued that the WB’s debarment process can be 
considered as a quasi-judicial, where companies are allowed to be represented by lawyers, written 
submissions are accompanied by a signed statement that they are “trustful to the best of the signer’s 
knowledge”,519 as well as witnesses can be called. See Moran et al., supra note 140, at 16. 
520 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 30.  
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• A fraudulent practice is any act or omission, including a 
misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to 
mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an 
obligation.  
 
• A collusive practice is an arrangement between two or more parties 
designed to achieve an improper purpose, including to influence 
improperly the actions of another party. 
 
• A coercive practice is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or 
harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to 
influence improperly the actions of a party.  
 
The only MDB which list of sanctionable practices differs from those of the others is 
the WB. In addition to the harmonized definitions listed above, it also includes an 
“obstructive practice” which means (i) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or 
concealing of evidence material to the investigation or making false statements to 
investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation into allegations of a 
corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or 
intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant 
to the investigation or from pursuing the investigation, or (ii) acts intended to 
materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspection and audit rights.521 Other 
MDBs use an “obstructive practice” only as an aggravating factor while determining 
sanctions in case the fact of corruption has been proved. There is even a reference to it 
in the ADB’s Integrity Principles and Guidelines. Although these Guidelines do not 
include it in the list of sanctionable practices, they consider it as “a failure to maintain 
the highest ethical standards”, which may form the basis for remedial actions.  
 
B. Cross-debarment 
 
Only the ADB and the EBRD refer to the cross-debarment in their policies. Thus, the 
ADB under its Integrity Principles “may determine that other international financial 
                                                 
521 WB Procurement Guidelines, Section 1.14(a)(v). 
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institutions’ or legal or regulatory bodies’ decisions that a party has failed to adhere to 
appropriate ethical standards (any established system of principles, rules, or duties, 
including the laws or regulations of a state), constitutes that party’s failure to maintain 
the highest ethical standards required by ADB’s Anticorruption Policy”.522 Likewise, 
the EBRD, under its Enforcement Policy and Procedures, may impose debarment 
based on the third-party finding, which is “a final judgment of a judicial process in a 
member country of the Bank or a finding by the enforcement (or similar) mechanism 
of another international organization that an individual or entity has engaged in a 
Prohibited Practice”.523  
 
However, in practice, there is only one case of cross-debarment by now – that of 
Lahmeyer by the EBRD, which had initially been debarred by the WB. Debarment of 
only firms and individuals that had engaged in corrupt practice within the projects 
funded by a certain MDB has been often criticised for significantly undermining the 
essence of debarment, since firms or individuals debarred by one MDB are still 
eligible to obtain a contract funded by another MDB. Therefore, to ensure a deterrent 
effect of debarment and prevent corrupt practice, all MDBs should apply cross-
debarment. It makes no sense for any MDB to do business with a company that 
another MDB has debarred because of corruption.  
 
Over the last few years there has been an active discussion about the possibility of 
implementation of cross-debarment among the MDBs. The complexity of this issue 
was due to different sanctions procedures they apply, and the need to ensure due 
process to the Respondent. An MDB has to be sure that when it takes a decision based 
on a decision made by someone else, it is comfortable with that decision-making 
process. In some cases, it can rely on the processes and procedures of another 
institution, while in other cases, it may doubt their transparency or fairness. As an 
EBRD Chief Compliance Officer pointed out in her interview with TI, “cross-
debarment is saying ‘yes, we trust that the decision was made in a way we can rely 
on’”.524 Therefore, according to some points of view, before establishing a practice of 
                                                 
522 ADB Integrity Principles and Guidelines, supra note 409, para.52. 
523 EBRD EPPs, supra note 496, para.2.19.  
524 TI Interview, supra note 515. 
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cross-debarment, MDBs should have adopted uniform sanction policies. However, it 
seemed hardly achievable because of some institutions’ long-established practices.  
 
Finally, on 9 April 2010, after two years of meetings to discuss a WB proposal the 
heads of the MDBs signed an Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment 
Decisions.525 Under the Agreement, a company or individual debarred by one MDB 
may be sanctioned for the same misconduct by all other MDBs. However, the 
Agreement sets criteria, subject to which cross-debarment can take place, including 
that the debarment exceeds one year, was made public by the sanctioning MDB and 
was made within 10 years of the date of commission of the sanctionable practice.  
 
The Agreement will only apply to debarment decisions made after the Agreement has 
entered into force, which is set to be by mid 2010, according to a statement by the 
banks. 
 
As cross-debarment is limited to sanctions which are made public, MDBs will 
recognize and cross-debar only sanctions published on the website of a sanctioning 
MDB. In case of ADB, these will only be firms and individuals (i) who have been 
sanctioned for having breached any earlier sanction imposed by ADB, or (ii) whom 
ADB could not notify of sanction after reasonable efforts. As for AfDB, it is not clear 
yet how this Agreement will impact its debarment policy.  
 
It should be pointed out, that the Agreement does not preclude an MDB from 
pursuing independent debarment proceedings for separate sanctionable practices. It 
also allows an MDB to decide not to enforce a debarment by the sanctioning bank, if 
that would be “inconsistent with its legal or other institutional considerations.” In this 
case the former must “promptly notify” all other MDBs of that decision.      
 
However, despite its restrictions, the agreement on cross-debarment is an 
unprecedented step in the global fight against fraud and corruption. As the President 
of the WB, R. Zoellick said after the signature of the Agreement, “[w]ith today’s 
                                                 
525 The Agreement is available at http://www.ebrd.com/about/integrity/Debar.pdf (accessed 15 April 
2010). 
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cross-debarment agreement among development banks, a clear message on 
anticorruption is being delivered: Steal and cheat from one, get punished by all”.526  
 
C. Actors involved in a debarment procedure 
 
Debarment procedure in the MDBs involves at least two actors: the one investigating 
allegations, and the one taking sanctions decisions on the basis of the results of those 
investigations. However, some MDBs involve additional actors to filter cases 
submitted for sanctions.  
 
In the WB, the allegations that a firm or individual has engaged in the sanctionable 
practices are investigated by its Integrity Vice Presidency (INT). Sanctions 
decisions are taken through a two-tiered process conducted by the Evaluation and 
Suspension Officer (EO) and the Sanctions Board.  If INT believes there is 
sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations, the case is referred to the EO - the 
first tier of the sanctions process. If the EO determines that the evidence supports a 
finding that the alleged offence has occurred or a material term of the Voluntary 
Disclosure Program Terms and Conditions has been violated, he/she submits the 
case to the Sanctions Board with a recommended sanction.   The Sanctions Board - 
the second tier of the Bank’s sanctions process – automatically imposes the sanction 
recommended by the EO, or, if the case has been contested by the respondent, 
reviews the case itself and takes the final decision. It may also hold a hearing as part 
of its deliberations.  
 
Advantage of the two-tiered process, is that less cases are submitted to the Sanctions 
Board, because not all EO’s decisions are contested. Some respondents realize that in 
view of the evidence possessed by the Bank it would be senseless to do so. As a 
result, the Bank is able to conclude such cases at the EO level, without going through 
                                                 
526 WB Press Release (2010), Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight Against Corruption, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22535805~pagePK:64257043~
piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 15 April 2010). 
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the time-consuming and expensive process associated with a full review and hearing 
by the Sanctions Board.  
 
In the ADB, all allegations are investigated by the Office of Anticorruption and 
Integrity (OAI). Sanctions decisions are taken by the Integrity Oversight Committee 
(OIC). 
 
In the IADB, investigations of all allegations are carried out by the Office of the 
Institutional Integrity (OII). The results of the investigations, together with the 
recommendations on further actions are referred to the Oversight Committee on Fraud 
and Corruption (OCFC). If the OCFC decides that there is sufficient evidence to 
commence the sanctions proceeding, the case is forwarded to the Sanctions 
Committee, which takes sanctions decisions.  
 
In his report concerning the anti-corruption framework of the IADB, Thornburgh 
questioned the necessity of the OCFC’s continued existence in the current form,527 
claiming that it acts “largely as a document forwarding facility” and delays the work 
of the OII and the Sanctions Committee and should, therefore, “be freed of the 
functions of filtering documents travelling between the two”.528 Based on 
Thornburgh’s recommendations, in 2009, the IADB introduced some changes in its 
anti-corruption framework to be implemented in the course of 2010. As a result of 
these reforms, the OCFC has been replaced by the Anti-Corruption Policy Committee, 
which will focus on policy development and oversight of the Bank’s anti-corruption 
initiatives, while the cases previously considered by the OCFC will be dealt with by 
the Sanctions Committee. 
 
In the AfDB, the allegations of corruption and fraud are investigated by the Integrity 
and Anti-Corruption Division (IACD). The sanction decision is taken by the President 
on the advice of the Advisory Committee on Corruption and Fraud (ACCF). 
                                                 
527 As it was mentioned earlier, the initial responsibilities of the OCFC were responding to allegations 
of fraud and corruption, conducting investigations and taking appropriate actions based on the results 
thereof. However, majority of its responsibilities have been assumed by subsequently created OII and 
the Sanctions Committee.   
528 Thornburgh et al., supra note 444, at 24, 67.  
 165 
 
In the EBRD, investigations of all received allegations of suspected prohibited 
practices and information about a third-party finding are conducted by the Office of 
the Chief Compliance Officer (OCCO). Like in the WB, the sanctions process in the 
EBRD is two-tiered. If the CCO believes there is sufficient evidence to substantiate 
the allegations, the case is referred to the Enforcement Committee - the first tier of the 
sanctions process. If the Enforcement Committee, in its turn, determines that there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the alleged offence has occurred, it issues a 
Notice to the Respondent giving the latter an opportunity to contest the allegations 
and/or proposed sanctions. If the Respondent fails to do so within a prescribed period 
of time, the Enforcement Committee instructs the CCO to implement the proposed 
sanction without submission of the case to the second tier – the President. This 
procedure is different from that of the WB, where the EO submits the case to the 
Sanctions Board even when the latter imposes sanctions automatically, in the absence 
of the Respondent’s willingness to contest the allegations and/or recommended 
sanctions.  
 
However, if the Respondent opts for a contested enforcement proceeding, the 
Enforcement Committee based on the evidence received from both CCO and the 
Respondent, as well as arguments presented during hearings, if any, submits a report 
of its determination to the President, including a recommended sanction. The 
President, in consultation with the Executive Committee, takes a final decision.  
 
Involving the President in taking the final decision was criticized by Thornburgh in 
his report concerning debarment in the WB, which also used to have the President in 
this role. Thornburgh claimed that involving the President in the sanctions process 
imposed burdens on his time and subjected him to “lobbying” by advocates of 
respondents, including in some cases the Executive Director representing the country 
of the respondent. This may be considered as subjecting the President to undue 
influence which can erode the Bank’s reputation. Therefore, Thornburgh 
recommended that the President should have been taken out of the decision-making 
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process.529 This recommendation was implemented as a result of the WB’s sanctions 
reforms of 2006.  
 
Obviously, the same approach can be taken regarding the role of the President in the 
AfDB and the EBRD. It would be advisable to remove the President’s responsibility 
for taking sanctions decisions. In the EBRD, it can be achieved by vesting this 
authority with the Enforcement Committee. In the AfDB, it would be better to create a 
unit designated for taking sanctions decisions, and limit the role of the ACCF to 
matters concerning the Bank’s anti-corruption policies and oversight of its activities 
in this direction.      
 
D. Statute of limitations 
 
In the report on debarment by the WB, Thornburgh argues that the Bank should not 
adopt any statutes of limitations. If the evidence met the standard of proof, 
establishing that the Respondent engaged in fraud or corruption, it should not matter, 
how long ago the alleged incident occurred, since the primary purpose of the Bank’s 
debarment process is to protect its funds from future harm. He further claims, that in 
fraud and corruption matters, the delayed discovery of evidence is rather a rule than 
an exception and that the imposition of time limitations in debarment proceedings 
would serve those who could hide their acts for the duration of the limitations 
period.530  
 
However, during its sanctions reforms, the World Bank decided to introduce a ten-
year time limitation.  
   
The EBRD has also a ten-year time limitation, while the IADB has just a five-year one.  
 
As for the ADB and the AfDB, they do not have any time limitations to pursue 
allegations, no matter how long ago the alleged wrongdoing occurred. However, as 
mentioned by an ADB representative, if the alleged wrongdoing occurred too long 
                                                 
529 Thornburgh et al., supra note 156, at 78-80. 
530 Ibid., at 35. 
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ago, there is not always the possibility to verify the allegations. In such cases, there is 
no other recourse but to close the complaint. 
 
E. Standard of proof and burden of proof 
 
Since debarment procedures by MDBs are administrative, the standard of proof must 
be lower than the one applied in criminal cases - “beyond a reasonable doubt”. 
Therefore, the standard of proof, required during sanctioning process in the MDBs, is 
similar to the one required in the most civil cases – “preponderance of evidence”, 
also known as “balance of probabilities”. The standard is met, when on the basis of 
preponderance of evidence, the sanctioning body can decide that it is “more likely 
than not” (WB, EBRD) or “more probable than not” (ADB, AfDB) that the 
Respondent committed the sanctionable practice.  
 
Only the IADB has a bit different wording, requiring the determination that “the 
evidence is sufficient” to believe that the Respondent has engaged in fraud or 
corruption. The WB used to have a similar standard – “reasonably sufficient”. This 
standard was criticized for being ambiguous and causing misinterpretation or 
misapplication. For this reason, to increase the clarity and achieve more uniformity in 
application, Thornburgh suggested to replace it with a more descriptive standard, such 
as “more likely than not”,531 which the WB did as a part of its Sanctions Reform of 
2006.   
 
The burden of proof to present sufficient evidence to meet the standard of proof is 
born by the MDBs, since they initiate the proceedings. Once the case is initiated, the 
burden of proof shifts to the Respondent, to overcome the evidence against him/her 
and demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the Respondent’s behavior did not 
constitute a sanctionable practice.     
 
                                                 
531 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 50. 
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Obligation of a subject under investigation to prove it is “not guilty” is being 
considered by some critics as contradicting to the presumption of innocence.532 
However, the presumption of innocence and the burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt are limited to criminal cases. The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and other international and regional human rights instruments 
apply only to cases, where a person is “…charged with a criminal offence”.533 On the 
other hand, civil actions initiated on the basis of suspected criminal activities, do not 
require proof of illicit origin “beyond reasonable doubt” and accept proofs on a 
balance of probabilities. Therefore, in view of the administrative nature of debarment 
and the fact that it does not have a degree of severity as that of a criminal sanction, it 
should be considered as compatible with the principle of the presumption of 
innocence,     
 
F. Range of sanctions 
 
To ensure compliance with their conditions and requirements, MDBs can impose a 
range of sanctions, individually or in combination, that would best serve their interests 
and the sanctioning purposes appropriate thereto. Existence of sanctions of different 
levels is explained by the fact that sanctions should be “tailored to the individual 
cases”.534 Among those which can possibly be employed by all MDBs are debarment, 
a letter of reprimand and restitution, debarment being the mostly used one. 
 
Debarment can be permanent, indefinite or for a limited period depending on the 
aggravating and/or mitigating factors. These factors include, inter alia, egregiousness 
and severity of the respondent’s actions; past conduct of the respondent involving 
fraudulent or corrupt practices; magnitude of any losses caused by the respondent; 
quality of the evidence against the Respondent; mitigating circumstances, including 
respondent’s admission of culpability, voluntary disclosure of information on the 
involvement in the sanctionable practice, cooperation in the MDBs’ investigation, the 
                                                 
532 Oberdorfer, J. Kim H., Martinez, V. (2002): Contractors Beware: The Pitfalls of a World Bank 
Debarment Proceeding, 2, http://www.pattonboggs.com/files/News/89db43d8-b1bc-48fb-919e-
b91e61e665f8/Presentation/NewsAttachment/47c98bf1-620a-44fd-94ee-04213b703ebf/2002_09_ 
24_WorldBankArticle.pdf (accessed 10 October 2009).  
533 Moran et al., supra note 140, at 23. 
534 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 61.  
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intervening implementation of programs to prevent and detect fraud or corruption or 
other remedial measures by the Respondent.  
 
In addition to the mentioned sanctions, IADB may impose a sanction called 
“conditions on contracting”, which deprives the debarred party of the right to be 
awarded contracts, except under certain conditions as deemed necessary. The WB and 
the EBRD additionally provide for the debarment-related sanctions, such as 
conditional non-debarment and debarment with conditional release.  
 
Conditional non-debarment is a sanction, where the debarred party is required to 
comply, within a defined period of time, with certain measures as a condition to avoid 
debarment. It can be considered as a probationary period, during which the party 
should change in a way that would reduce the likelihood of its engagement in future 
wrongdoing. As argued by Thornburgh, it is easier for firms to exchange personnel, 
than for people to change.535  Therefore, this sanction applies mostly to firms which 
would be compelled, during the determined period of time, inter alia, to terminate the 
employees involved in fraud or corruption; to initiate an effective business ethics 
training program; to adopt a compliance program incorporating systematic audits, 
anonymous reporting systems, and internal investigations; and to correct its other 
corporate deficiencies that could affect the honesty of its dealings.536  
 
Debarment with conditional release is a sanction, where the debarred party is 
debarred for a defined period of time subject to conditional reinstatement if the 
debarred party demonstrates compliance with specified conditions. The conditions 
would be basically the same as those for the conditional non-debarment with the only 
difference that in debarment with conditional release these conditions are the 
requirements to be met before the firm can be reinstated. That is exactly how the ADB 
determines the duration of the debarment, although it does not call it “debarment with 
conditional release”. First, it imposes debarment for a minimum period, from 1 to 7 
years, after which this period is being reassessed and might be either extended or 
ended. Maximum debarment period for the first violation is “indefinitely” for 
                                                 
535 Ibid., 62. 
536 Ibid. 
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individuals537 and 7 years for companies. Debarment period for the subsequent 
violation (after being reinstated) is “indefinitely” for individuals and up to 10 years 
for companies. Only under extraordinary circumstances (for example, repeated 
violations of ADB's Anticorruption Policy or procedures) can companies be debarred 
indefinitely. 
 
As for the length of debarment for a limited period in other MDBs, that of the 
currently debarred parties varies from three to fifteen years in the WB, from one to ten 
years in the IADB, and from three to five years in the AfDB. The average length of 
debarment in the MDBs can be estimated as three years.  
 
G. Due process 
 
During debarment procedure, all MDBs ensure due process to Respondents. However, 
since this procedure is administrative, the Banks are not bound by the rules applied in 
traditional judicial proceedings. Therefore, in view of the absence of the harmonized 
sanctions proceedings among the MDBs, the due process rights provided to 
Respondents vary from one Bank to another (for a synthesis table on due process 
rights during debarment procedure in the MDBs see Annex II).  
 
1. Right to contest allegations and recommended sanctions  
 
Prior to the imposition of any sanction, all MDBs send a notice to the Respondent, 
informing that the latter may be sanctioned for the allegation indicated therein, 
provides a description of the evidence gathered, and gives the Respondent an 
opportunity to contest allegations and/or recommended sanction by submitting any 
relevant information within a designated period of time. The period of time given to 
respondents to contest allegations is different in each MDB. Likewise, the timeframe 
in which the MDBs can reply to the Respondents’ responses to the allegations also 
varies.  
                                                 
537 ADB, like Thornburgh, believes that a change in character for individuals is less likely, and, for this 
reason, may consider not engaging further any individual who has committed any corrupt or fraudulent 
practices.    
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In the WB, a Respondent has ninety (90) days after issuance of the notice to respond 
to the allegations and recommended sanction, while INT may reply to the 
Respondent’s arguments and evidence within thirty (30) days.   
 
In the ADB, although there is a provision in the Integrity Principles and Guidelines 
giving a Respondent an opportunity to respond to the OAI’s findings, there is no 
prescribed period of time within which it can do so. Lack of the precise delay is 
explained by the fact, that OAI does not control administrative actions which may 
result from its findings.538 Therefore, it may not determine the timing of ADB 
presenting its findings to a Respondent or its opportunity to respond to those findings.  
 
In the IADB, the Respondent has an opportunity to respond to the allegations and 
recommended sanction that the Bank may impose within sixty (60) days. If the 
Respondent submits a reply, OII may contest it within twenty (20) days giving the 
Respondent the second chance to reply to the OII’s arguments and evidence within 
twenty (20) days.  
 
In the AfDB, there is no time limitation for presenting exculpatory evidence - the 
debarred party is entitled to do so as long as evidence is credible and relevant to 
investigations. AfDB can reply to the brought arguments in order to verify facts and 
analyze evidence within period of time as required on a case-by-case basis. 
 
In the EBRD, respondent should be given not less than 30 days to contest the 
allegation(s) and/or the proposed sanction(s) when the ground for proceeding is a 
prohibited practice, or only proposed actions, when the ground is the third party 
finding. 
 
As we can see, Respondents are informed in advance of the allegations brought 
against them and sanctions that might be imposed based on the recommendations 
presented in the notice, and have sufficient time to contest them. This can be achieved 
by submitting written arguments and evidence to the MDB, taken into account during 
                                                 
538 ADB Integrity Principles and Guidelines, supra note 409, para.57.  
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review of the case for rendering a sanction decision. However, it is up to the 
Respondents to decide whether to contest the allegations and/or recommended 
sanction. Sometimes they might opt for not doing so, considering it meaningless in 
light of the evidence possessed by the MDB. In this case, the allegations will be 
deemed admitted by the Respondent, and the sanctions decision will only be based on 
the arguments and evidence presented by the MDBs’ investigative actors. As it was 
mentioned above, in case of the WB, it would result in imposing a sanction 
recommended by the EO, without submitting it for a full review and hearing to the 
Sanctions Board.   
 
2. Right to hearing 
 
Right to hearing gives Respondents a chance to explain their understanding of the 
matter, view of the evidence against them and to present arguments of mitigating 
circumstances face-to-face. Only the WB and the EBRD provide a Respondent with 
this right. The IADB may also hold a hearing, but only at its own discretion, when it 
deems it necessary, without providing either party with a right to request a hearing.  
 
In the WB, a hearing can be held upon request of either INT or the Respondent. At the 
hearing, the Respondent may be self-represented or represented by an attorney or any 
other individual authorized by the Respondent, at the Respondent’s own expenses. 
Hearings are limited to arguments and evidence contained in the written submissions 
to the Sanctions Board. Witnesses may be called and questioned only by the Sanctions 
Board. Cross-examination is not allowed, while it is possible to present rebuttal 
evidence during the hearing.      
 
In the EBRD, hearing or how it is called in its EPPs, “oral representations” are 
possible only upon request of the Respondent. Compared to the WB, the Respondent 
cannot have any representatives and has to be present in person. All oral 
representations are limited to arguments and evidence contained in the written 
submissions, which can be rebutted by the CCO or his/her representative. 
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There was a concern regarding the WB’s hearing process, that it is inappropriate for 
the INT investigator to present the evidence to the Sanctions Board since it serves at 
the same time as investigator and “prosecutor”. However, as Thornburgh explains in 
his report, this complaint does not have any grounds, since INT’s role is only to 
summarize and explain the evidence.539 This could also apply in the context of the 
EBRD, where CCO plays the same role as INT. 
 
3. Right to appeal  
 
None of the MDBs provide the debarred parties with legal remedies (through national 
courts) and only ADB provides them with an administrative remedy (through the 
Bank’s outside panel) against sanctions decisions.  
 
Impossibility, by the debarred parties to turn to national courts, is explained by several 
reasons: 
• MDBs and their staff have immunity from domestic jurisdiction for 
anything done in connection with their employment.540 
 
• The procurement guidelines being integral part of the Loan Agreement 
constitute international law and thus prevail over domestic law. For this 
reason, a bidder cannot claim that the MDB’s actions contradict due 
process as determined by national law, as the MDB is “insulated from 
accountability within domestic legal systems.”541 
 
• There is no legal relationship between MDBs and contractors. Therefore, 
the latter do not have any rights of recourse against Banks.542  
 
                                                 
539 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 44. 
540 Sands, P., Bowett, P.K. (2001): The Law of International Institutions, 490–91; Jenks, C.W. (1961): 
International Immunities, 41; Articles of Agreement, art. VII, § 8.  
541 Arrowsmith et al., supra note 78, at 149. 
542 However, Meireles argues that as the Bank has the right to interfere with the decisions during the 
procurement process, it should have the correspondent obligation of recognizing the rights of the other 
party to be heard. See Meireles, supra note 191, at 110. 
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• Although MDBs have to ensure that, contractors facing debarment are 
treated fairly, as much as it is possible and reasonable, they do not have 
resources to ensure that the aggrieved contractors always have a right of 
recourse.543 As Thornburgh et al. argued, the Bank’s goal “must be fairness, 
not placation”.544  
 
As for administrative remedies, only the ADB provides the Respondent with a right to 
appeal a sanctions decision. For this purpose, there is a special Sanction Appeals 
Committee (SAC) where the Respondent may appeal within 90 days from the date of 
the decision of the Integrity Oversight Committee (IOC). However, the SAC 
considers only appeals that include new information that had not been known to the 
Respondent before. After having considered the appeals, the SAC may reduce or lift 
the imposed sanctions, or require the IOC to reconsider the case.  
 
The IADB and the AfDB have similar procedures, whereby a debarred party may 
request re-opening of the case only on the basis of new information that was not 
known, or could not reasonably have been known during consideration of the case, 
and would have been relevant to the sanction decision. Hence, they do not provide an 
automatic right to reconsideration – it is always at the discretion of the body, which is 
meant to reconsider the case. The difference between the two is that, in the IADB, the 
sanctioned party is given one (1) year from the issuance of the decision on debarment 
to do so, while in the AfDB this period is limited to ninety (90) days.  
 
However, these procedures are different from that of the ADB and, in my opinion, 
cannot be considered as an appeal, even though AfDB uses the term “appeal”. The 
reason is, that the body reconsidering the case is the same one which took a sanction 
decision, and not an independent unit or panel designated specifically for this purpose 
(the Sanctions Committee in IADB and the President in AfDB with the advice of the 
Advisory Committee on Corruption and Fraud).  
 
                                                 
543 Williams, supra note 144, at 303. 
544 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 9. 
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The World Bank formally does not provide the debarred parties with any right of appeal. 
However, introduction of a two-tiered sanctions process and involvement of external 
members to the Sanctions Board eliminated conflict of interest and removed the need for 
an additional review of sanctions cases by an outside panel. If to analyze the WB’s 
sanctions process, one might see that Respondents’ right to contest the allegations and 
sanctions recommended by the EO, and as a result, receive a full review and hearing 
(upon request) before the Sanctions Board can be considered as an equivalent of a right to 
appeal. The standard of the review by the Sanctions Board, as pointed out by Thornburgh, 
would be de novo, meaning that it would take a fresh look at the matter and would not be 
bound by the findings or recommendations of the EO.545 On the other hand, if the 
Respondent waives the right to contest the case, the sanction proposed by the EO would 
become final. Thus, the EO can be considered as a sanctioning body, and the Sanctions 
Board as an appeal body.  
 
What is also important in the contested proceeding of the WB is that there are no 
preconditions for the case to be reviewed by the Sanctions Board, except for being 
submitted within ninety (90) days from the issuance of the notice to the respondent. The 
same timeframe is given to the respondents in the ADB to appeal the IOC’s decisions. 
However, unlike the procedure in the WB, the SAC will only accept and consider appeals 
that include new information, which had not been known to the respondent before. Thus, 
in the absence of new facts, the respondent is not eligible to appeal on the ground of an 
error during debarment procedure, too harsh sanction or the violation of the Bank’s due 
process requirements. Besides, the Sanctions Board consists both of internal and external 
experts, while SAC is composed only of the ADB’s senior staff members. 
 
In the EBRD, the debarred party does not have any right of recourse - the President’s 
decision is final. Moreover, the Enforcement Committee that makes recommendations 
to the President is made up only of the Bank officers. Hence, its procedure is similar 
to that of the WB prior to its sanctions reform, which was criticized by Thornburg due 
to the Bank’s personnel serving as investigators, prosecutors, judge and jury.546    
 
                                                 
545 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 37. 
546 Ibid., at 79. 
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Although the EBRD also has a two-tiered sanctions process, the latter cannot be 
considered as an equivalent of an appeal procedure, like in the WB. The difference is that 
in the EBRD, it is the Enforcement Committee - the first tier - that fully reviews the case 
and holds hearings, if any, while the President - the second tier - takes decision based on 
the submissions received by the Enforcement Committee not including the arguments and 
explanations presented during hearings. Upon necessity, the President can also refer the 
case back to the Enforcement Committee for further consideration. 
 
H. Disclosure and information sharing  
 
As noted by a WB employee with field experience involving procurement matters, “fear 
must be placed in the hearts of those willing to give or take a bribe. One of the few things 
that can provoke such fear is the prospect of a public announcement of debarment”.547 
Besides, in the experience of some WB investigators, the disclosure of the names of the 
debarment parties also encourages representatives of concurring firms to volunteer 
information to the Bank concerning wrongdoing that they have observed.548 
 
At the moment, only the WB, the IADB and the EBRD provide for disclosure of the 
information on the debarred firms and individuals by uploading the names, grounds 
and lengths of debarment on their websites and constantly updating this information. 
 
The ADB and the AfDB do not publish this information. The ADB believes that the 
practice of not publicizing the Anti-Corruption Sanctions List best supports fair and 
consistent implementation of its anticorruption policy justifying it by the following 
reasons: 
 
• the ADB’s debarment procedure is an administrative tool, not a legal or 
judicial assessment of fraud or corruption - terms that have different 
definitions and carry significant legal implications in ADB’s member 
countries;  
                                                 
547 Ibid., at 82-83. 
548 Ibid. 
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• firms, in particular those with significant resources, are more likely to 
present challenges to decisions that publicly classify them as corrupt or 
fraudulent, requiring ADB’s time and expenses to address rebuttals;  
• the deterrent effect believed to be the benefit of publicizing the list does 
not outweigh the benefits of the current practice;  
• publicizing the Anti-Corruption Sanctions List could lead to incorrect 
conclusions regarding the focus of ADB's anti-corruption efforts or levels 
of corruption within a particular region or country.549  
However, the ADB would disclose the names of the debarred parties when they 
attempt to participate in the ADB-funded project while being ineligible and when the 
ADB cannot reach them. In these cases, it makes a Notice of Sanctions on its website.  
Resistance to disclose the names of the debarred parties, grounds for their debarment, 
length of debarment etc. was considered by Transparency International as one of the main 
obstacles debarment was facing.550 However, in my opinion, disclosing the identities of the 
debarred parties is not consistent with the MDBs’ intended purpose to protect their funds 
and makes debarment similar to a criminal conviction. Given the value of reputation for 
honesty and quality of service in the business world, publicly labeling parties for 
engagement in fraud or corrupt practices minimizes their chances to survive in the 
marketplace, in particular, when it concerns small companies ending up in bankruptcy. It 
can happen even in jurisdictions, where the practices the companies are debarred for, are 
not sanctionable due to the difference in definitions. This would place MDBs, as claimed by 
the ADB, “above the law”.  
 
However, in the interest of cooperation, harmonization and transparency, MDBs should 
exchange the information on debarred parties and share it with international organizations 
and member countries on a need-to-know basis, which they all do.  
 
Besides, if any of the MDBs happens to know about an alleged fraud and corruption within 
activities funded by another MDB, it may share this information with the latter. Likewise, if 
                                                 
549 ADB, Confidentiality of Anticorruption Sanctions List,  
http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/issues.asp (accessed 20 October 2009). 
550 Jennett, V. (2006): Using Blacklisting Against Corrupt Companies, 2, 
http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query119.pdf (accessed 3 June 2009).   
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the MDBs determine that internal laws of a country may have been violated, they may at 
any time disclose relevant information to the corresponding national authorities.  
 
I. Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) 
 
Only the WB and the AfDB have a VDP in place. However, the two are quite different. 
The VDP of the WB is a program, which gives firms and individuals the opportunity, to 
participate therein through ceasing corrupt and fraudulent practices, voluntarily disclosing 
all information in their possession about practices sanctionable by the WB, and enhancing 
their compliance system and controls. In exchange, the WB does not publicly debar the 
participants for disclosed sanctionable practices and keeps their identities confidential. 
But in case a participant conceals some information and/or continues to engage in 
sanctionable practices, then participant faces mandatory 10-year public debarment.  
As for the VDP in the AfDB, it only serves as a mitigating factor in determination of 
sanctions against the firm or individual, which voluntarily disclose information on 
fraud or corruption of which they have knowledge or in which they are involved in.  
 
J.  Debarment practices by the MDBs 
 
The status of the debarment practices by the MDBs is outlined in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2.  Status of the Debarment Practices by the MDBs 
MDBs Introduction of 
the debarment 
clause in the 
MDB policies 
№ of the debarred parties № of the cross-
debarred parties 
(as of 1 
February 2010) 
WB 1996 379 (as of 10 December 2009) N/A 
ADB 1998 673 (as of 17 December 2009) N/A 
IADB 1995 146 (as of 1 February 2010) N/A 
AfDB 1999 9 (as of 13 November 2009) N/A 
EBRD 1998 N/A 1 
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In the INT’s Annual Report 2008, it was pointed out that “the statistic in isolation is not a 
benchmark of success. Each case is unique in its complexity, and each presents its own 
factual challenges, including the scope of documents to be reviewed or investigative 
interviews held. Ultimately, the impact and value of the case to the WB would be the 
determining factor.”551  
 
However, there is a quite curious fact about this table. Considering that the WB and the 
ADB started implementing their debarment policies approximately at the same time 
(1999 and 1998, respectively), and bearing in mind that one case can result in debarment 
of several firms and/or individuals (subsidiaries, directors, etc.), it is still unclear, why the 
number of parties debarred by the ADB far exceeds that of the WB. To find out the 
possible reason of this gap, let us have a look at the caseload management in these two 
Banks during 2003-2008,552 based on the data derived from the annual reports of the INT 
and OAI: 
 
 
* Comprise substantiated, unsubstantiated and unfounded cases. “Substantiated” means evidence 
showed wrongdoing “more likely than not” to have occurred and should be submitted for sanctions.  
 
                                                 
551 World Bank (2008): INT Annual Report, 4, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ 
INT_AnnualReport_web.pdf (accessed 14 December 2009). 
552 The choice of this timeframe is explained by the public availability on the annual reports for only 
those years.  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cases investigated* 213 103 162 74 85 67
Cases substantiated 72 45 58 13 33 29
Cases submitted for sanctions 15 23 2 1 2 4
Parties debarred 22 126 99 13 1 8
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Figure 2. WB Caseload Management by year, 2003-2008
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* Due to the inconsistency in the OAI’s annual reports and difficulties with retrieving data therefrom, 
as well as lack of separation between external and internal cases, the figures provided in this table are 
based partially on personal calculations and might, therefore, not be very accurate.   
 
 
Figure 4 compares the caseload management of the ADB and the WB for the period 
of 2003-2008, based on the totals illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3: 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 4, the number of cases investigated and substantiated by 
the WB exceeds that of the ADB by 40% and 44%, respectively. At the same time, 
only 19% of the cases substantiated were referred for sanctions in the WB compared 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cases investigated 65 77 83 102 78 48
Cases substantiated 6 8 31 22 28 24
Cases submitted for sanctions 6 8 31 22 28 24
Parties debarred 62 74 62 69 109 79
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Figure 3. ADB Caseload Management by year, 2003-2008*
Investigated Substantiated
Submitted for 
sanctions
Debarred
WB 704 250 47 269
ADB 451 143 143 455
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Figure 4. WB and ADB Caseload Management, 2003-2008
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to the 100% in the ADB, which in its turn, affected the number of the parties 
debarred.  
 
As it was mentioned in the INT’s Annual Report 2007, “INT’s objective is not to 
increase the number of substantiated cases but to provide solid investigative findings 
in order to resolve the allegations made.”553 However, the overall objective of the 
INT’s investigations is to detect fraud and corrupt practices, and once there is an 
evidence that they “more likely than not” have occurred, INT should submit cases for 
sanctions. Figure 2 illustrates a drastic decrease in a number of such submissions 
during the period of 2005-2008. Apparently, INT’s eagerness to provide “solid 
investigative findings” switched its whole focus to the investigations, while 
disregarding the necessity of referring the Notices of Sanctions Proceedings (NoSPs) 
to the Evaluation Officer (previously, to the Sanctions Committee). Lack of the NoPs, 
being the documents to initiate the sanctions procedure, caused a delay in the 
transition from closing investigations to bringing cases to sanctions.554 
 
Besides, the implementation of the sanctions reforms in 2006, which replaced the 
Sanctions Committee by the Sanctions Board and created the position of Evaluation 
and Suspension Officer, resulted in a transition period and added up to the slowdown 
in the WB’s ability to move sanctions proceedings forward. 
 
As for the ADB, the Table 3 illustrates that the number of the cases submitted for 
sanctions corresponds to the number of the cases substantiated, which can be 
explained by a more simplified procedure of submitting cases for sanctions than in the 
WB. 
 
Consequently, the number of cases referred for sanctions affected the number of the 
parties debarred. This seems to be a good explanation, why the ADB is so ahead of the 
WB.  
                                                 
553 World Bank (2007): INT Annual Report, 15, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources 
/ fy07report-complete.pdf (accessed 14 December 2009).  
554 In 2009, to clear the backlog of cases for sanctions for the previous years, INT created a specialized 
litigation unit devoted to drafting and preparing proposed NoSPs. As a result, that year, INT submitted 
40 proposed NoSPs to EO, compared to 9 NoSPs over the course of 2005-2008. 
 182 
 
CHAPTER X. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A. Criticism of Debarment 
 
Many of the debarment systems in place have been criticized for being unfair and 
inefficient. Steven Schooner compared them with paper tigers – “pretty to look at, but 
not to fear”.555 The flaws revealed by critics as jeopardizing fairness and efficiency of 
debarment make them suggest that other ways of securing bidder compliance might be 
more successful. These flaws, in addition to the lack of right of appeal and resistance to 
public disclosure of the blacklists in some of the MDBs, already discussed above in 
subchapters G..3. and H ofChapter IX, include, but are not limited to: 
 
a) Application of debarment mainly towards small companies  
This criticism appears mostly in relation to the WB, accusing it of turning a blind eye 
to corruption involving large multinational companies that win the most profitable 
contracts, financed by the Bank with money donated by the governments of the 
countries where these companies originate from.556 This fact can also be considered as 
politization of debarment decisions. Acres and Lahmeyer were the first multinational 
companies to be debarred by the WB. On the one hand, this act was criticized for the 
delay, and, on the other hand, it raised a question whether by doing so the WB “acted 
primarily on the merit of the case, or to deflect the mounting criticism and prove that 
its public pronouncements against corruption have weight”.557  
 
b) Lack of right to cross-examination  
Lack of the right to cross-examine the accuser is often considered as a violation of a due 
process.558 Difficulties in providing this right are rooted in the necessity of obtaining 
consent of the accuser to be cross-examined,559 which is hard to achieve since an accuser 
may decline to be questioned or even identified, and as it is common in administrative 
proceedings, MDBs cannot compel a person’s attendance and testimony.560 The WB’s 
                                                 
555 Schooner, supra note 138, at 219. 
556 Hearne, supra note 377.  
557 Ibid.  
558 Oberdofer et al., supra note 528, at 3. 
559 WB Sanction Reform, supra note 243, at 3. 
560 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 55-58. 
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January 1998 Operational Memorandum provided for the provision permitting to do so, 
but in practice it turned out to be impossible to implement, therefore it was decided not to 
reflect this provision in the August 2001 Procedures.  
 
c) Lack of transparency on ongoing or past investigations  
Some critics claim the lack of transparency on ongoing or past investigations is the 
reason why the accused contractor cannot develop its case until it receives a formal 
debarment notice.561 Besides, the WB was accused of not issuing any written 
decisions or advisory opinions publicly, which would help interpret its guidelines and 
procedures, because “the provisions are subject to broad interpretation”.562 It should 
be noted that by now all MDBs publish annual reports containing statistics on trends 
in allegations, reporting, and investigative outcomes. Moreover, following Volker’s 
Recommendations, the World Bank has started disclosing redacted investigative 
reports on its website since 13 September 2007.563  
 
d) Reliance on witness testimonies  
Some respondents complain that the witness testimonies given to investigators are 
“hearsay” and cannot be admitted as evidence. As correctly claimed by Thornburgh in 
the context of the WB, the debarment process is not a judicial proceeding and “there 
are valid reasons that formal rules of evidence do not apply”.564 These reasons are 
rooted in the fact that bank investigators lack law enforcement powers, which would 
enable them, to compel testimony from material witnesses. Therefore, they have to 
rely on what those involved in a case are willing to reveal.  
 
e) Lack of time-effectiveness  
Debarment procedures are often criticized for their slow speed. An extremely lengthy 
process can undermine the purpose of the policy – to secure integrity and protect 
funds. 
 
                                                 
561 Oberdofer et al., supra note 528, at 3. 
562 Ibid. 
563 World Bank, Status of Recommendations from Volcker Independent Review of INT, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21924818~menuPK:34480~p
agePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 16 October 2009). 
564 Thornburgh et al, supra note 156, at 56. 
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f) Lack of cost-effectiveness  
Critics often raise the issue of the costs involved in the debarment proceedings. The 
expenses might be related, for example, to the investigative missions, involvement of 
external investigators and reputable international accounting firms.  
 
 
B. Challenges in Using Debarment 
 
One of the main challenges MDBs face during the debarment procedure, is a lack of 
extra-territorial legal powers that would enable them to investigate allegations of 
corruption as effectively as prosecutors and criminal investigators can, by requesting 
mutual judicial assistance.565 As a result, they do not have sufficient power to compel 
the production of evidence or witness testimonies, such as issuing warrants, seeking 
subpoenas, engaging in search and seizure, or exercising other intrusive powers. Thus, 
it might happen that corrupt firms or individuals can avoid sanctioning measures by 
MDBs, if the latter fail to obtain sufficient evidence. Therefore, to facilitate the 
imposition of sanctions on corrupt firms, they have to cooperate closer with national 
law enforcement authorities or should automatically debar firms that have been 
convicted in a national court regarding an MDB-funded project.  
 
Another challenge is that, although all MDBs extend debarment to individuals and/or 
organizations which directly or indirectly control or are being controlled by a 
debarred firm, there is still a risk that debarred firms might act through their affiliates 
or newly established firms. At the same time, there is also a risk that a parent or 
subsidiary company, or an agent, a joint venture or a consortium partner, or a 
subcontractor of the other company can be debarred for the actions of another 
company over which they had no control, and in situations where they were not 
involved in corrupt conduct.566 Therefore, before debarring an affiliated company and 
determining the length of debarment, MDBs should take into account the factors, 
whether there was an authorization by the company to commit the corrupt act, 
whether it was complicit in the corrupt act, and if so, the level of its involvement. 
                                                 
565 Moran et al., supra note 140, at 19. 
566 UK Anti-Corruption Forum, supra note 167, at 4-5. 
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They should also consider it as a mitigating factor, when participants in cartel 
agreements decide to provide the relevant information, documents, proof and 
evidence on the existence of such an agreement.567 
 
Finally, as the WB INT pointed it out itself in its annual report 2009,568 it is a great 
challenge to conduct investigations in an efficient and effective manner in light of the 
volume of allegations that it receives, the complexity and covert nature of the fraud 
and corruption that may be found, and the political sensitivity of launching certain 
investigations. These challenges added up with the length of time needed to complete 
investigations are the key challenges for all MDBs. 
 
 
C. Conclusion  
 
The right to freely exercise a trade or profession is proclaimed in the constitutions of 
many countries as well as in various international instruments. Therefore, debarment 
might be considered as an infringement of this right which cannot even be appealed in 
the national courts due to the immunity of the MDBs discussed in subchapter G..3 of 
Chapter IX.  
 
However, despite the legal vacuum caused by the international nature of the MDBs, 
the Respondents, as discussed above, are granted certain rights during debarment 
proceedings. Since debarment substitutes or complements a criminal conviction, 
MDBs tend to meet the due process criteria, as set by the national criminal laws, 
which would normally be required, where a state authority is involved.  
 
On the other hand, debarment by MDBs being of an administrative nature , does not 
deprive the sanctioned parties of the possibility to continue their professional activity 
in general as a criminal conviction would do, but is limited to their ineligibility to 
                                                 
567 Ondráčka, supra note 141, at 16. For more information about discovering and breaking of cartel 
agreements, the so-called leniency program, see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ 
media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/FINALFormattedChapter2-modres.pdf (accessed 2 June 
2009). 
568 INT Report 2009, supra note 198, at 18. 
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obtain MDB-funded contracts either permanently or for a stated period of time. Thus, 
debarment by MDBs can also be considered as a business decision.  
 
Many of us have come across the English proverb “He who pays the piper calls the 
tune”. The essence of this saying is that paying for something entitles the donor to 
decide in detail how the money is used. Because of being paid, the piper is 
accountable to the paymaster. As a result, the paymaster acting as a judge, will require 
the piper to prove that he has fulfilled the required instructions.  
 
Similarly, when an MDB is financing the project, it can demand its proper 
implementation and usage of money for the intended purpose. Therefore, if, on the 
basis of the preponderance of the evidence, it is determined that the company or an 
individual had more likely than not engaged in fraud or corruption, that would be 
enough for an MDB to decide that it does not want to work with this 
company/individual.  
 
Another justification of debarment can be expressed by the quotation from Molière: 
« Je ne suis point d'humeur à payer les violons pour faire danser les autres ».569 
MDBs are funding projects to promote development and eradicate poverty in 
beneficiary countries, and not to “feed” the corrupt government officials letting fraud 
and corruption occur and turning a blind eye to them. 
      
However, when debarment is public and names of the debarred firms and individuals 
are accessible to everyone, the consequences thereof might be devastating and go 
beyond the initial intentions of the MDBs’ debarment policies. As a result of the lost 
reputation or stigmatization, the debarred parties will most likely be put out of 
business. In addition, when debarment is imposed on a firm, it might result in a so-
called “corporate death penalty”, hurting thereby innocent third parties: the 
stakeholders, who are unable to affect the conduct of corporate executives especially 
in large firms; creditors; employees who will become unemployed paying for the 
                                                 
569 Molière (1671): “La Comtesse d'Escarbagnas”, scene VIII  - “I am not at all in the mood to pay the 
fiddlers for others to dance”. 
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wrongdoings of the top management;570 the community in which the firm is located 
since it might be one of the few or the only firm in place to do what it does; suppliers; 
and consumers, who will most likely pay higher prices because of the lower 
competition.  
 
While it is true that the threat of going out of business can be a powerful deterrent and 
an incentive to compel firms to make a real effort to prevent their employees from 
wrongdoings, the dramatic consequences, that debarment can entail, contradict 
MDBs’ intention to impose it only for the protection of their funds and not to punish. 
Debarment of firms and individuals from MDB contracts is already a severe measure 
since it limits the business opportunities of the sanctioned parties and might be fatal to 
those of them for which these contracts are key sources of revenue. However, being a 
business decision and at the same time being imposed with consideration of the 
respondents’ due process rights, debarment might be considered as a fair step.  
 
Undoubtedly, a certain level of tension will always exist between the MDBs’ efforts 
to ensure that they only fund corruption-free contracts and the private sector's protests 
against “unfairness” of their debarment and attempts to prove that the fact of having 
been involved in corrupt practices in the past does not necessarily mean that they will 
not be able to provide economically advantageous contracts in the future. At the same 
time, MDB officials should bear in mind the significance of the duties that the 
debarment policies entrust to them, and they should use sound judgment in exercising 
the substantial power they have at their discretion. Over the last few years, many 
changes have been made to remove procedural flaws and weaknesses. And although 
there is still room for improvement, current procedures in place represent a fair and 
reasonable framework to balance competing interests of both parties by ensuring 
efficient deterrent effect, due process, reinstating eligibility of the “wrongdoers” 
earlier than envisaged subject to certain conditions, and avoiding dire consequences 
for innocent parties.   
 
                                                 
570 Arthur Andersen’s going out of business in 2002 as a result of its conviction for destruction of 
Enron-related documents made 28,000 employees in the US lose their jobs. 
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Right now it is too early to say whether debarment has a significant effect in reducing 
corruption in MDB-funded projects. None of the MDBs has a performance indicator 
of the debarment policy. 
However, despite its flaws and bearing in mind that debarment is only one of the 
mechanisms used by the MDBs to fight corruption in the projects they fund, I think, 
debarment is an important mechanism as it can serve as a deterrent signaling to 
borrowers and contractors that the MDBs are strengthening their anti-corruption 
efforts. As Patricia Adams said in the context of the WB, “if the Bank doesn’t debar 
the companies, the future of corruption will become much more secure”.571 
 
And yet, as I already argued above, debarment policies should only be in place when 
they go hand in hand with respect for the due process rights, which is the case in the 
MDBs. Thus, being a fair sanction, debarment is not only consistent with the idea of 
rule of law, but also contributes in the strengthening thereof by enhancing respect of 
the companies and individuals for existing rules and regulations. This being said, 
debarment goes beyond the initial intention of the MDBs to make it as an “act of self-
defense” to protect their own financial interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
571 Hearne, supra note 377. 
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ANNEX III. Sanctions Process in the WB 
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Source:   WB, Office of Evaluation and Suspension (WB website) 
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ANNEX IV. ADB’s Process for Dealing with Allegations of Fraud or 
Corruption Involving Bidders, Consultants, Contractors, Suppliers, 
or Other Third Parties to ADB-funded Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADB, Office of Anti-Corruption and Integrity (ADB website) 
Office of the Auditor General, 
Integrity Division (OAGI) 
receives allegations or 
evidence of fraud or corruption 
involving ADB-financed activities 
OAGI investigates allegations or 
evidence  
Sanction upheld; 
case is closed 
no
no
no
Does sufficient 
evidence exist that 
ADB’s anticorruption 
policy is violated 
OAGI director 
closes complaint 
OAGI director 
endorses closing 
of investigations; 
auditor general 
approves 
ffice of the uditor eneral, 
Integrity ivision ( I) 
receives allegations or 
evidence of fraud or corruption 
involving B-financed activities 
OAGI investigates allegations or 
evidence  
OAGI screens allegation or evidence
Integrity Oversight Committee 
decides on a sanction 
SAC decides whether to confirm 
the sanction 
The IOC’s secretariat advises 
sanctioned firms/individuals of the 
decision   
The Sanction Appeals Committee’s  
(SAC) Secretariat considers the appeal 
ADB President decides if the SAC 
is unable to agree unanimously 
Does the 
sanctioned party 
file an appeal 
within 90 days? 
 
Is new and 
relevant 
information 
resented? 
OAGI submits its findings to the IOC 
Case is closed 
no
s s ffi i t 
i  ist t t 
’s ti rr ti  
li  is i l t  
Is the allegation or 
evidence within 
OAGI’s mandate, 
specific, credible, 
verifiable and 
material? 
f ice of the uditor eneral, 
Integrity ivision ( I) 
receives allegations or 
evidence of fraud or cor uption 
involving B-financed activities 
I screens allegation or evidence 
OAGI director approves an 
investigative plan 
yes 
yes 
yes
yes
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ANNEX V.  IADB’s Process for Dealing with Allegations of Fraud or 
Corruption Involving External Parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IADB, Office of Institutional Integrity (IADB website) 
Sanctions 
Committee 
makes 
decision and 
determines 
any sanction 
Names of sanctioned parties and type 
and length of sanction will be posted 
on the Bank´s Web site 
Respondent has 20 days to 
file Second reply 
OII has 20 days  to file reply 
Respondent has 60 days 
to file written response 
OII prepares Notice of 
Administrative Action for 
Sanctions Committee 
to send to Respondents 
OCFC may temporarily 
Suspend Respondent´s 
eligibility to participate in 
IADB-financed operations 
OCFC can also recommend 
additional actions and/or 
recommend to the President 
that the case be referred 
to National Authorities 
OCFC agrees and refers case to 
Sanctions Committee 
Office of Institutional Integrity (OII) 
investigates allegations of fraud or 
corruption involving IADB-financed 
activities and makes recommendations 
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ANNEX VI.  AfDB’s Process for Dealing with Allegations of Fraud 
or Corruption Involving External Parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case is closed 
Integrity and Anti-Corruption 
Division (IACD) receives 
allegations or evidence of fraud 
or corruption involving AfDB-
financed activities 
Does sufficient 
evidence exist that 
AfDB’s 
anticorruption 
policy is violated? 
 
Is the allegation or 
evidence within 
IACD’s mandate, 
credible, verifiable 
and material?
IACD closes 
complaint 
IACD closes 
investigation 
IACD opens full investigation  
IACD screens allegation or 
evidence 
IACD sends a Notice of 
Investigative Findings to a Subject 
Subject can reply to allegations 
as long as the evidence is 
credible and relevant to 
investigations 
Does sufficient 
evidence exist that 
AfDB’s 
anticorruption 
policy is violated? 
no 
no 
yes
yes
t it   ti ti  
i i i   i  
ll ti   i    
 ti  i l i  
i  ti iti  
 
I  t  ll ti  r 
i  it i  
I ’  t , 
r i l , rifi l  
t ri l
IACD submits its findings 
together with recommended 
sanctions to the President 
no 
The President decides on a 
sanction with the advice of the 
Advisory Committee  
IACD can respond to Subject’s 
reply as required on a case-by-
case basis 
yes
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ANNEX VII.  EBRD’s Process for Dealing with Allegations of Fraud or 
Corruption Involving External Parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
no 
 
The EC sends a Notice of 
Prohibited Practice or Notice of 
Third Party Finding to the 
Respondent 
yes
Case is closed 
CCO closes 
complaint 
CCO closes 
investigation 
CCO opens full investigation or 
verifies the authenticity of the Third 
Party Finding and determines its 
relevance to the EBRD 
CCO screens allegation or evidence or 
a Third Party Finding 
CCO sends a draft Notice of Prohibited 
Practice or Notice of Third Party Finding 
to the Enforcement Committee (EC) 
If necessary, the EC may order 
suspension of the Respondent and 
its affiliates 
no 
no 
yes
yes
Office of the Chief Compliance 
Officer (OCCO) receives allegations 
or evidence of fraud or corruption 
involving EBRD-financed activities 
or information about Third Party 
Finding 
The CCO may rebut the 
arguments and evidence presented 
by the Respondent within 20 days 
The EC instructs 
the CCO to 
implement the 
proposed 
sanctions
Does sufficient 
evidence exist that 
EBRD’s anticorruption 
policy is violated? 
Has the Respondent 
contested the 
allegations and/or 
proposed sanctions in a 
prescribed period of 
not less than 30 days? 
Does sufficient 
evidence exist that 
EBRD’s anticorruption 
policy is violated? 
The EC refers the case to the 
President together with the 
proposed sanctions 
Does sufficient 
evidence exist that 
EBRD’s anticorruption 
policy is violated? 
The President issues final decision and 
imposes a sanctions in consultation 
with the Executive Committee  
Is the allegation or 
evidence or a Third 
Party Finding within 
EBRD’s mandate and 
reliable 
yesyes
yes
yes 
no 
no 
The President 
orders the EC to 
close the case or 
refer it back to 
the EC for further 
consideration 
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Abstract 
 
 
No country is immune to corruption. However, those who suffer the most from this 
evil phenomenon are poor people in developing countries. Each year Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) including the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Inter-American Development Bank are spending billions of 
dollars on loans intended for development and reduction of poverty in poor countries. 
Nevertheless, their efforts are in vain as long as these funds are being lost to corruption. 
Until the early 1990s, the problem of corruption was barely addressed either at 
national or international level, although everyone knew about its existence. In 1996, a 
speech of James Wolfenson, the then president of the World Bank, urging the 
international community to deal with the “cancer of corruption”, has put an end to a 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding corruption. As a result, the problem of 
corruption has been brought to light leading to establishment of new anti-corruption 
policies. One of the mechanisms introduced was debarment, that is preclusion of the 
companies or individuals, the activities of which are in contradiction with the valid 
rules, from engaging in future contracts funded by the debarring institution 
permanently or for a certain period of time.  
 
This dissertation examines corruption in the MDB-funded projects, the mechanism of 
its occurrence, its consequences and importance of combating it with the main focus 
on debarment as one of the anti-corruption mechanisms, its features and requirements, 
conditions, criteria and the procedure of its usage, as well as its implementation by the 
MDBs. The research was based on the published literature, information available on 
the Internet and personal communication with MDB representatives at the time of 
writing this dissertation. A thorough description of debarment proceedings in all five 
MDBs is followed by a comparative analysis thereof, showing their advantages and 
disadvantages. Although the research was unable to establish the efficiency level of 
debarment in reducing corruption, its existence as such while respecting the due 
process rights was proved to have a strong deterrent effect to prevent the individuals 
and companies from engaging in corrupt activities.     
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Auch wenn wohl kein Land immun gegen Korruption ist, wirkt sich dieses negative 
Phänomen besonders schädlich auf die arme Bevölkerung von Entwicklungsländern 
aus. Die großen Summen, die alljährlich von den Multinationalen Entwicklungs-
banken („MDBs“, nämlich der Weltbank, der Asiatischen, der Afrikanischen, der 
Inter-Amerikanischen Entwicklungsbank sowie der Europäischen Bank für 
Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung) an Krediten für die Förderung der Entwicklung und 
den Abbau der Armut diesen Ländern zur Verfügung stellen, bilden jedoch einen 
sinnlosen Aufwand, wenn sie der Korruption zum Opfer fallen. Bis in die frühen 90er 
Jahre war das Problem Korruption in der öffentlichen Diskussion sowohl auf der 
nationalen als auch auf der internationalen Ebene wenig präsent, obwohl man sich 
seiner Existenz bewusst war. 1996 hat das mittlerweile historische Wort von James 
Wolfenson, dem damaligen Präsident der Weltbank, vom „Krebsgeschwür der 
Korruption“, dem sich die internationale Gemeinschaft widmen müsse, das verbreitete 
Schweigen durchbrochen. Die Bewusstseinsänderung, die dadurch bewirkt wurde, 
mündete in die Entwicklung einer progressiven Antikorruptionspolitik. Zu den 
Mechanismen, die dabei geschaffen wurden, gehört der Ausschluss juristischer oder 
physischer Personen, deren Handlungen im Widerspruch zu geltenden Regeln stehen, 
von der Möglichkeit, dass ein Staat Aufträge an sie vergibt. Ein solcher Ausschluss 
von einer zukünftigen Vergabe – der über die Ingerenz der Bank gegenüber den 
Staaten wirkt – kann auf Dauer oder für eine bestimmte Zeit verfügt werden.  
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Erscheinungen von Korruption in 
Projekten, die von den MDBs gefördert werden, ihre Auswirkungen und die 
Bedeutung ihrer Bekämpfung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Ausschlusses 
vom Vergabeverfahren („debarment“), die Merkmale und Erfordernisse eines solchen 
Ausschlusses, die Bedingungen, Kriterien und Verfahren zu seinem Einsatz sowie die 
praktische Implementation dieses Instruments. Die Untersuchung basiert auf der 
veröffentlichten Literatur, auf Informationen, die im Internet verfügbar sind, sowie 
auf persönlicher Kommunikation mit Angehörigen der MDBs während der Arbeit an 
der Dissertation. Auf eine genaue Beschreibung der Ausschlussverfahren bei jeder 
MDB folgt eine vergleichende Analyse und Bewertung ihrer Vor- und Nachteile. 
Auch wenn die Arbeit nicht statistisch oder sonst quantifizierend den Einfluss des 
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„debarment“ im Sinne einer erfolgreichen Bekämpfung der Korruption nachzuweisen 
vermag, erscheint die Annahme gerechtfertigt, dass seine schlichte Existenz im 
Zusammenhalt mit der Beachtung rechtsstaatlicher Grundsätze gegenüber Individuen 
und Unternehmen einen starken generalpräventiven Effekt hat, der korrupten 
Handlungsweisen entgegenwirkt. 
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